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OVERTURNING THE LAST STONE: THE FINAL STEP 
IN RETURNING PRECEDENTIAL STATUS TO ALL 
OPINIONS 
David R. Cleveland* 
I. BACKGROUND 
"When over 500 of the best judges, lawyers, and law 
professors in America get into a fight over a proposed rule, no 
stone will be left unturned, and no argument will be left 
unmade."1 Yet in the adoption of the new Federal Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 32.1, permitting citation of unpublished 
decisions issued after January 1, 2007, the most significant stone 
remains unturned. 2 That stone bears the label "precedent." 
*Assistant Professor of Law at Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center. 
. . 
Professor Cleveland would like to express his gratitude to his colleagues Kathy Cerminara, 
Michael Dale, and Joel Mintz for their invaluable advice,. and also to his students Brooke 
Guenot and Jamie Cohen for their outstanding research assistance. 
1. Patrick J. Schiltz, The Citation of Unpublished Opinions in the Federal Courts of 
Appeals, 14 Fordham L. Rev. 23, 30 (2005) [hereinafter Schiltz, Citation of Unpublished 
Opinions]. Professor Schiltz was the Reporter for the Advisory Committee on the Federal 
Rules of Appellate Procedure during the drafting, comment, and recommendation period of 
. . 
new .Fed. R. App. P. 32.1. His article is an excellent discussion of that Rule, the arguments 
presented for and against it, and the process by which it gained approvaL Professor Schiltz 
is exactly correct in the quoted text that the argument about the precedential value of 
unpublished opinions was not left unmade; however, this critical underlying issue was left 
unaddressed, and explicitly so, by the Committee, the Supreme Court, and Congress. 
At roughly the same time, Professor Schiltz again benefiting from his wealth of 
experience with the process wrote an interesting article outlining the arguments for and 
against Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and suggesting that the rule regarding citation was a tempest 
in a teapot with little practical effect to recommend (or disparage) it, though he ultimately 
came to support it. The gem of Professor Schlitz's article, though, is his careful distinction 
between citation, as an issue of sound and fury signifying very little, and precedent, which 
be acknowledges as "extremely important.'' Patrick J. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little: 
Explaining the Sturm Und Drang Over the Citation of Unpublished Opinions, 62 Wash. & 
Lee L. Rev. 1429, 1463 (2005) [hereinafter Schiltz, Much Ado About Little]. 
2. This issue is not is truly fresh, as much has been written on it already. See n. 5, 
infra. Still, the issue of precedential status for ''unpublished" opinions remains unresolved. 
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Despite the Rule's adoption, the most critical questions 
regarding precedent remain: Do American courts have the 
authority to render decisions not binding on future courts, and, 
even if they do, should they issue such decisions? These 
questions were expressly avoided by the Committee and the 
Supreme Court in approving the new federal rule,3 as well as the 
first committee to propose a limited publication plan in 1973.4 
Nonetheless, they merit further consideration by everyone who 
practices before, sits on, or is concerned with our nation's 
courts.5 
3. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 advisory comm. n. (acknowledging that "Rule 32.1 is 
extremely limited .... It says nothing about what effect a court must give to one of its 
unpublished opinions or to the unpublished opinions of another court.") 
4. Advisory Council on Appellate Justice, Committee on Use of Appellate Court 
Energies, Standards for Publication of Judicial Opinions: A Report of the Committee on 
Use of Appellate Energies of the Advisory Council on Appellate Justice 20 (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 
& Natl. Ctr. for St. Cts. 1973) [hereinafter Standards for Publication] (recommending 
adoption of a policy of non-citation and issuance of a statement in which "nothing is said 
about precedential value"). 
5. This is not to say that there hasn't been much written and published over the years 
on the issue of unpublished cases, much of it addressed to the specific topic of precedent. 
See e.g. Jessie Allen, Just Words? The Effects of No-Citation Rules in Federal Courts of 
Appeals, 29 Vt. L. Rev. 555 (2005); J. Lyn Entrikin Goering, Legal Fiction of the 
"Unpublished'' Kind: The Surreal Paradox of No-Citation Rules and the Ethical Duty of 
Candor, 1 Seton Hall Cir. Rev. 27 (2005); Lawrence J. Fox, Those Unpublished Opinions: 
An Appropriate Expedience or an Abdication of Responsibility? 32 Hofstra L. Rev. 1215 
(2004); Martha Dragich Pearson, Citation of Unpublished Opinions as Precedent, 55 
Hastings L.J. 1235 (2004); Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of 
Private Judging in the U.S. Courts, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1435 (2004); Amy E. Sloan, A 
Government of Laws and Not Men: Prohibiting Non-Precedential Opinions by Statute or 
Procedural Rule, 79 Ind. L.J. 711 (2004); Norrnan R. Williams, The Failings of 
Originalism: The Federal Courts and the Power of Precedent, 31 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 761 
(2004); Richard B. Cappalli, The Common Law's Case Against Non-Precedential Opinions, 
76 S. Cal. L. Rev. 755 (2003); Michael B. W. Sinclair, Anastasoff Versus Hart: The 
Constitutionality and Wisdom of Denying Precedential Authority to Circuit Court 
Decisions, 64 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 695 (2003); Lauren Robel, The Practice of Precedent: 
Anastasoff, Noncitation Rules, and the Meaning of Precedent in an Interpretive 
Community, 35 Ind. L. Rev. 399 (2002) [hereinafter Robel, Practice of Precedent]; Lauren 
K. Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion: Unpublished Opinions and Government 
Litigants in the United States Courts of Appeals, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 940 (1989) [hereinafter 
Robel, Myth]; William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited 
Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 573 ( 1981) [hereinafter Reynolds & Richman, The Price of Reform]; William L. 
Reynolds & William M. Richman, Limited Publication in the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, 
1979 Duke L.J. 807 (1979) [hereinafter Reynolds & Richman, Limited Publication]; 
William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-Precedentia/ Precedent Limited 
Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1167 (1978) [hereinafter Reynolds & Richman, No-Citation Rules]. 
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II. INTRODUCTION 
In the mid-1970s, the members of the judiciary 
fundamentally changed the nature of precedent in the federal 
courts. They did so relatively quickly and quietly: first, by 
issuing decisions not designated for publication and not citeable, 
and then, by denying these decisions precedential status. The 
number of these unpublished decisions had risen to over eighty-
four percent of all circuit decisions in 2006.6 While Rule 32.1 
restores citeability to these decisions, it does nothing to address 
the more critical issue of whether these decisions can be denied 
precedential weight, and even if so, whether they ought to be 
denied such value. 7 
The history of this process reveals that removing the 
precedential status of some federal decisions was not, at least 
initially, an explicit part of the plan for limited publication or 
citation. While concern over the increasing volume of federal 
case decisions was expressed as early as 1915, a mere twenty-
one years after the Federal Reporter began publishing cases 
from the Courts of Appeals, it was not until 1964 that the current 
publication/citation/precedent landscape began to take shape.8 In 
1964, the Federal Judicial Conference recommended that the 
Courts of Appeals should report only those decisions that would 
be of "general precedential value" in order to deal with "the ever 
increasing practical difficulty and economic cost of establishing 
and maintaining accessible private and public law library 
facilities."9 Little action was taken on this suggestion until the 
1973 Committee on the Use of Appellate Court Energies of the 
Federal Judicial Center's Advisory Council on Appellate 
6. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Judicial Business 52 (Table S-3), 
http://www. uscourts.gov /j udbus2006/tab les/s3 .pdf (2006) [hereinafter Judicia I Business 
Table S~3] (showing percent unpublished in the twelve-month period ending Sept. 20, 
2006, to be 84.1%) (accessed Oct. 20, 2008; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice 
and Process). 
7. Fed R. App. P. 32.1 advisory comm. n. 
8. Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 Ohio St. L.J. 177, 
184 ( 1999); Donna Stienstra, Unpublished Dispositions: Problems of Access and Use in the 
Courts of Appeals 5 (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 1985). 
9. Judicial Conference of the United States, Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial 
Conference of the United States: March 16-17, 1964 at 11 (U.S. Govt. Printing Off. 1964) 
[hereinafter 1964 Judicial Conference Report]. 
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Justice10 issued a report, Standards for Publication of Judicial 
Opinions, reconunending limited publication and citation that 
included a draft plan for the courts of appeals to adopt. 11 In that 
report, non-publication and non-citation seemed to go hand in 
hand because permitting citation w·ould create a market for these 
decisions. With this model in hand, the courts began to adopt 
rules limiting publication and citation. 12 
By 1974, each circuit had submitted plans to the Judicial 
Conference for how it would limit publication and citation. 13 
Despite their lack of unifonnity, or perhaps because of it~ the 
federal Judicial Conference was pleased with the state of affairs, 
viewing each of the circuits as a legal laboratory that would 
accumulate experience and refme the rules accordingly. 14 
However, the Conference's statements reveal that while it 
thought, ''the possible rewards of such experimentation are so 
rich," the plan was not necessarily a permanent solution.15 
Neither the 1964 Conference nor the 1973 Committee was 
inclined to deny precedential status to these new unpublished 
opinions.16 Publication plans would limit publication to those 
cases of greatest, broadest precedential value, but that did not 
inherently diminish the precedential value of other cases.17 In 
fact, the Advisory Council expressly considered a provision 
assigning unpublished opinions no precedential value, but it 
10. This committee will be referred to hereinafter as "The 1973 Committee." 
11. Standards for Publication, supra n. 4. 
12. ld. at app. I (setting out proposed text for model rule); see also Williams, supra n. 
5, at 770 n. 29 (quoting text of rule). 
13. David Gteenwald & Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., The Censorial Judiciary, 35 
U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1133, 1142 (2002); Stienstra, supra n. 8, at 8. 
14. Judicial Conference of the United States, Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial 
Conference ofthe United States: March 7-8, 1974 at 12 (1974) [hereinafter 1974 Judicial 
Conference Report]; see also Stienstra, supra n. 8, at 9, 13 (noting that it was the initial 
hope that several years of experience would allow the development of a single model for 
use across the federal circuits, and also noting the 1978 Judicial Conference stance to 
continue experimentation under a variety of plans). 
15. 1974 Judicial Conference Report, supra n. 14, at 12 (indicating that "the 
Conference agreed that it should not be discontinued until there is considerably more 
experience under the diverse circuit plans"). 
. . 
16. Williams, supra n. 5, at 770-71 n. 29. 
17. 1964 Judicial Conference Report, supra n. 9, at 11 (setting out text of resolution 
approved at those proceedings: "That the judges of the courts of appeals and the district 
courts authorize the publication of only those opinions which are of general precedential 
value and that opinions authorized to be published be succinct"). 
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purposely avoided making such a suggestion to avoid the 
"morass of jurisprudence" such a debate would entail.18 Initially, 
most federal courts of appeals took a similar approach by 
adopting publication plans that did not mandate a lesser or 
different precedential status for unpublished decisions but 
merely avoided their precedential effect by making them non-
citeable.19 However, within a few years, the federal court rules 
made these unpublished cases non-precedential.20 
While this may seem a small and innocuous step to some, 
particularly those who have studied and practiced law solely in 
the period when unciteable and non-precedential unpublished 
opinions were the norm, a decision to remove precedential value 
from some decisions was a radical paradigm shift. For the frrst 
time in the history of Anglo-American common law, courts were 
free to render opinions that played no part in prescribing the law 
in similar future cases. Future factually similar cases would find 
no refuge, by precedent or reason, in these prior "unpublished" 
decisions. These unpublished cases were now neither evidence 
of the law nor the law itself. As Judge Richard Arnold 
explained: 
If we mark an opinion as unpublished, it is not precedent. 
We are free to disregard it without even saying so. Even 
more striking, if we decided a case directly on point 
yesterday, lawyers may not even remind us of this fact. The 
bar is gagged. We are perfectly free to depart from past 
opinions if they are unpublished, and whether to publish 
h . . 1 h . 21 t em ts enttre y our own c otce. 
That this fundamental shift in jurisprudence has caused 
significant debate is not surprising. What is surprising however, 
is that even though the debate has addressed the propriety of 
both non-citation and non-precedent, the rulemaking has focused 
on the procedural half of the matter (citation) and not the 
substantive half (precedent). With the adoption of Rule 32.1, 
lawyers are no longer "gagged," at least as to unpublished 
decisions rendered after January 1, 2007; however, the 
18. Standards for Publication, supra n. 4, at 20. 
19. Williams, supra n. 5, at 771. 
20. /d. at 772-73. 
21. Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, 1 J. App. Prac. & Process 
219,221 (1999). 
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unpublished cases they cite are still of less than full precedential 
value.22 
The issue of citation was the subject of a lengthy debate 
and rulemaking process under the Rules Enabling Act.23 The 
result was Rule 32.1, which permits citation to unpublished 
opinions rendered after January 1, 2007.24 This Rule followed 
several years of contentious debate.25 The "unpublished-
opinions issue has been the subject of prolonged and, at times, 
even bitter controversy."26 As noted at the beginning of this 
paper, Professor Schiltz conunented in describing the breadth of 
this debate that "[ w ]hen over 500 of the best judges, lawyers, 
and law professors in America get into a fight over a proposed 
rule, no stone will be left unturned, and no argument will be left 
unmade."27 Unfortunately, while the citation issue was resolved 
by new Rule 32.1,28 one stone in this discussion remained 
22. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 advisory comm. n. (pointing out that the rule "says 
nothing about what effect a court must give to one of its unpublished opinions or to the 
unpublished opinions of another court," and noting as well that it "addresses only the 
citation of federal judicial dispositions that have been designated as 'unpublished' or 'non-
precedential'--whether or not those dispositions have been published in some way or are 
precedential in some sense" (emphasis in original)). 
23. See 28 U .S.C. §§ 2071-77 (2008) (available at http://uscode.house.gov). 
24. The rule provides: 
(a) Citation Permitted. A court may not prohibit or restrict the citation of federal 
judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written dispositions that have been: 
(i) designated as "unpublished," "not for publication," "non-precedential," 
"not precedent," or the like; and (ii) issued on or after January l, 2007. 
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1. 
25. Schlitz, Much Ado About Little, supra n. 1, at 1429-30 ("On the day that I became 
Reporter, the issue of unpublished opinions was the most controversial issue on the 
Advisory Committee's agenda. Eight years later, the issue of unpublished opimons 
continues to be the most controversial issue on the Advisory Committee's agenda. I have 
devoted more attention to the unpublished-opinions issue than to all of the other issues the 
Advisory Committee has faced-combined.''); Schiltz, Citation of Unpublished Opinions, 
supra n. 1, at 23 ("This seemingly modest proposal in essence, a proposal that someone 
appearing before a federal court may remind the court of its own words is extraordinarily 
controversial. . . . Only once before in the history of federal rulemaking has a proposal 
atuacted more comments."). See also Adam Liptak, Federal Appeals Court Decisions May 
Go Public, 151 N.Y. Times A21 (Dec. 25, 2002) (summarizing then-current situation in 
various federal and state appellate courts). 
26. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little, supra n. I, at 1458 (referring to Fed. R. App. P. 
32.1 ). 
27. Schiltz, Citation of Unpublished Opinions, supra n. 1, at 30. 
28. State courts continue to be divided on the issue. See e.g. Melissa M. Serfass & 
Jessie Wallace Cranford, Federal and State Court Rules Governing Publication and 
• 
• 
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unturned: the precedentiaJ status of these unpublished opinions. 
This fundamental question is explicitly avoided by Rule 32.1: 
Rule 32.1 is extremely limited~ . . . It says nothing about 
what effect a court must give to one of its unpublished 
opinions or to the unpublished opinions of another court. 
Rule 32.1 addresses only the citation of federal judicial 
dispositions that have been designated as "unpublished'·' or 
"non-precedential" whether or not those dispositions have 
been oublished in some way or are precedential in some 
19 
sense. 
However, while the Committee took no explicit position on 
what precedential weight is to be accorded these "unpublished" 
decisions, the Committee has implicitly created a regime in 
which such decisions are accorded persuasive, but not binding, 
precedential weight. So at best, the Rule itself takes no position. 
More practically and realistically, the Rule creates a scheme that 
accords such decisions only a lesser, persuasive authority an 
authority on par with a treatise, law review article, or extra-
jurisdictional decision, and a far cry from the binding 
precedential authority given to a similar case fortunate enough 
to be designated for publication. 
While all parties are likely weary from the recent struggle 
over citation of unpublished opinions, all interested parties 
ought to return "once more unto the breach"30 to examine, 
discuss, debate, and resolve the issue of the precedential status 
of these unpublished decisions. This article is intended to 
stimulate and reinvigorate that debate by refocusing the 
discussion on precedent now that the issue of citation has been 
determine,d. Part III of this article will briefly outline the history 
of publication and precedent in ancient, early English, and 
founding-era common law in the United States. Part IV will 
similarly examine the modem United States publication practice. 
Part V will canvass the debate over the precedential status of 
Citation of Opinions: An Update, 6 J. App. Prac. & Process 349 (2004). Although this 
comprehensive survey remains a useful source of historical infonnation, the reader should 
note that, because there has been much activity in the field since 2004, much of the 
infonnation in it is outdated. 
29. Fed R. App. P. 32.1 advisory comm. n. (emphasis in original). 
30. William Shakespeare, Henry V, act 3, sc. 1 (available at http://www.shakespeare-
literature.com/Henry_ V/lO.htrnl) (accessed Nov. 3, 2008; copy of relevant page on file 
with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). 
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unpublished opinions focusing on the period of limited 
publication. Denying the precedential status of decisions of the 
federal courts suffers potential Constitutional infirmities, 
fundamentally alters the conunon law method of jurisprudence, 
and offends our community understanding of the conunon law 
legal system. After reviewing the arguments over whether courts 
may continue the practice of declaring some opinions non-
precedential, Part VI will then discuss whether courts ought to 
continue denying precedential status to some opinions and touch 
briefly on proposed solutions that -address the practical needs of 
the federal judiciary. 
One cannot deny the pragmatic difficulties that the federal 
court system faces in adjudicating the ever-increasing number of 
case-s. In 1970, the Courts of Appeals disposed of 10,699 
cases,J1 while in 2005, the Courts disposed of 67,582 cases.32 
During that same period the number of active circuit judges 
increased much more modestly, from ninety-seven to 167.33 
Clearly, the primary hurdle in returning all cases to full 
precedential value is their sheer volume. 34 Without minimizing 
this difficulty, answers must be found to address this issue that 
properly respect the fundamental aspect of the common law 
system that ''judges must respect what they have done in the 
past, whether or not it is printed in a book."35 
III. HISTORY OF PUBLICATION AND PRECEDENT 
There is an inherent human desire for stability and 
continuity in decisionmaking. Looking to the past for guidance 
31. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, United States Courts of Appeals 
Workload Statistics for the Decade of the 1970's at 2 (1980) (tbl. Bl). 
32. U.S. Courts, Federal Court Management Statistics, U.S. Courts of Appeals·-
Judicial Caseload Profile, http://www~uscourts.gov/courtsofappeals.html (hereinafter 2006 
Caseload Profile] (click "Federal Court Management Statistics," then click "Courts of 
Appeals'' under "Federal Court Management Statistics 2006,"' then select "National 
Totals," and click "Generate'' to view two-page chart) (accessed Nov. 6, 2008; copy on file 
with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). 
33. /d. See also James C. Duff, Annual Report of the Dire~tor, 2006 {Admin. Off. of 
the U.S. Cts. 2007); Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts., Judicial Facts and Figures 1 (2006), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/2006/alljudicialfactsfigure-s.pdf (accessed Oct. 
8, 2008; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). 
34. Arnold, supra n. 21, at 221.-22. 
35. /d. at 225. 
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and direction is thus inherent in an institutionalized justice 
system.36 Whether explicitly binding or not, decisions of the past 
.. 
have a powerful impact on judges' decisions, for "out of self-
doubt, h11mility, or respect for prior generations, judges 
throughout history have often sought guidance from those who 
came before them."37 Ancient civilizations had some signs of 
this respect for what had come before, but it is in twelfth-century 
England that the roots of our modem conception of precedent, 
publication, and common law can be found. This tradition of 
common law, though not identical to that which we use today, 
was understood by the founding generation to include unfettered 
citation and precedent. 
A. Ancient Publication and Precedent 
Ancient civilizations in Greece, Rome, and Egypt all relied 
upon past decisions to guide them in resolving disputes, and the 
Egyptians had even · repared a system of law reports to remind 
not the same as a duty to follow precedent. Stare decisis, the 
obligation to follow prior decisions· even those the judge 
disagrees with is a function of the common law.39 Courts of 
ancient Greece, Egypt, or Rome may have followed prior 
decisions, but they do not seem to have viewed themselves as 
"'bound' by them."4° For example, early Roman praetors 
published edicts, which were principles derived from actual 
36. Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis as a Constitutional Requirement, 104 W.Va. L. Rev. 
43 (2001). 
3 7. /d. at 54. 
38. See Carleton Kemp Allen, Law in the Making 171-76 (7th ed., Clarendon Press 
1964). 
· 39. William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *70 (stating that 
"precedents and rules must be followed, unless flatly absurd or unjust"). See also James 
Kent, Commentaries on American Law, vol. I, *473-76 (Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., ed., 
12th ed. Little, Brown & Co. 1873) (stating that the best evidence of the common law is 
found in the decisions of the courts, that those decisions are precedents for future cases 
resting on analogous facts, which judges are bound to follow unless it can be shown that 
the law was misunderstood, and that this is just, because when a rule has been deliberately 
adopted and declared, members of the community ought to be able to rely upon it to govern 
their contracts and affairs). 
40. Allen, supra n. 38, at 170. 
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controversies brought before them.41 These edicts were then 
republished at the outset of a new praetor's terrn of service and 
each remained in effect throughout his terms as a "perpetual 
edict. "42 While not limiting on the authority of the praetors, 
these edicts served to establish and demonstrate to the public the 
judicial customs that would be followed and the principles 
applied to a given dispute.43 
During the sixth century, Roman emperor Justinian would 
consolidate the judicial, legislative, and executive power in his 
own hands and prohibit the publication of interpretations of the 
law, believing that use of past decisions as a guideline for 
resolving present disputes led to inconsistencies in the law.44 
Out of Justinian's model, European civil law was developed.45 
But the use of prior decisions to aid in resolving current disputes 
would be seen again, in even stronger form, in English common 
law. Modem English courts (that is, courts of England since the 
reign of Henry II), and by extension American ones, developed 
into common law systems giving a special authority to prior 
decisions.46 
B. Early English Publication and Precedent 
The law of England preceding the reign of Henry II in the 
mid-twelfth century was exceedingly local and relied heavily on 
local customs.47 Indeed, there were three separate systems of 
law in England following the Norman Conquest: the laws of 
Wessex, the laws of Mercia, and the Danelaw.48 In application, 
the law fractured even further: 
41. Anika C. Stucky, Student Author, Building Law, Not Libraries: The Value of 
Unpublished Opinions and Their Effects on Precedent, 59 Okla. L. Rev. 403, 409 (2006) 
(citing Henry Campbell Black, Handbook on the Law of Judicial Precedents, or The 





46. Mortimer N.S. Sellers, The Doctrine of Precedent in the United States of America, 
54 Am. J. Comp. L. 67, 67-68 (2006). 
4 7. J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History 14-15 (3d ed. Butterworths 
1990). 
48. /d. at 15. 
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[T]here were differences of detail, particularly in 
procedure, in each of the thirty-two counties. There were 
the courts of shires, hundreds and boroughs, the courts of 
lords, and the courts of the king. Trial by oath, ordeal or 
battle was universal; but the details varied from place to 
place and according to the status of the parties. Proceedings 
were oral, and therefore legal tradition was unstable.49 
71 
Litigation was reportedly as uncertain as a game of dice. 5° 
Such was the state of the law in the first half-century or so 
following the Norman Conquest, but Henry II eventually united 
England under a common system of laws against which local 
custom could not stand. 51 A treatise of the law under Henry II, 
traditionally attributed to Sir Ranulf de Glanvill (and often 
called simply Glanvill), indicates a coherent system of law 
involvin both a central court and itinerant (circuit) court 
of law so important that the arguments of members of the bar 
and the court itself were being recorded in books.53 These 
arguments and the decisions of the court, once recorded, served 
as tools for the learning of the law, navigation of the court 
system by practitioners, and an aid to consistency in 
decisionmaking by courts. 
In the 1250s, Henry de Bracton, who was an accomplished 
circuit and assize jud~e as well as a member of the nascent court 
of the King's Bench, 4 attempted to explain the principles and 
procedures of English law through a collection of cases (the 
Note Book) and an accompanying treatise (Treatise on the Laws 
of England) commonly referred to simply as Bracton.55 These 
49. /d. 
50. /d. (citing Leges Henrici Primi (c. 1118)). 
51. /d. at 16. Baker's delightful tum of phrase is that, "[a ]gainst that unifonn system, 
local custom would thereafter be seen at best as exceptional and at worst as exceptionable." 
!d. 
52. !d. at 15-16, 22. 
53. /d. at 23. 
54. Bryce Lyon, A Constitutional and Legal History of Medieval England 334 (2d ed. 
W.W. Norton & Co. 1980). 
55. Henry de Bracton, De legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae [On the Laws and 
Customs of England] (1569) (George E. Woodbine ed., & Samuel E. Thome trans., 
Belknap Press 1968) (searchable Latin and English text also available at http://hlsl5.law 
.harvard.edulbracton) (accessed Nov. 12, 2008; copy of title page on file with Journal of 
Appellate Practice and Process). See also J. W. Tubbs, The Common Law Mind~· Medieval 
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works collected and discussed in detail five hundred cases, 
which Bracton believed were illustrative of English law. 56 He 
collected and made notes regarding over two thousand cases, 
whether for his use on the bench or specifically for his writing is 
_.. . own. 57 His collection and reliance upon cases demonstrates 
a strong belief in the value of precedents, and he stated that "if 
like matters arise let them be decided by like (si ta.men similia 
erinerint per simile iudicentur), since the occasion is a good one 
for proceeding a similibus ad similia."58 
Bracton's selection of cases, choosing older decisions of 
respected judges) such as Martin Pateshull and William Raleigh, 
over those of his contemporaries, indicates a disdain for his 
contemporaries' departure from past decisions, and the work 
was written, according to its preface, to prevent the newer 
generation of judges from unwittingly leaving the proper course 
settled by their wise predecessors in past cases.59 Bracton's 
treatise was an important development in the history of both 
publication and precedent because it both indicated existing 
reliance upon precedent and facilitated future reliance upon and 
use of prior cases: 
The influence of Bracton on the common law in succeeding 
centuries, though variable, has been significant. Bracton 
summed up the law as it had developed by the middle of 
the thirteenth century and passed it on to future generations 
of lawyers. He accomplished for the law in the thirteenth 
century what Blackstone accomplished for it in the 
eighteenth. For a century after its appearance, Bracton's 
great book dominated English legal thought and study.60 
Famed English legal historian Frederick William Maitland 
labeled the era "the age of Bracton" and called the work "crown 
and Early Modern Conceptions 1-20 (Johns Hopkins U. Press 2000); Baker, supra n. 48, at 
201-02. 
56. See T. Ellis Lewis, The History of Judicial Precedent I, 46 L.Q. Rev. 207, 209·212 
( 1930). Some evidence suggests that this collection of cases from the plea rolls was started 
much earlier (c. 1220-30) and that Bracton was merely the final editor and publisher. See 
Baker, supra n. 47, at 201-02. 
57. See Lyon, supra n. 54, at 334; Lewis, supra n. 56, at 209-12; Tubbs, supra n. 55, at 
18. 
58. Tubbs, supra n. 55, at 18·19. See also Lyon, supra n. 54, at 334. 
59. Baker, supra n. 47, at 225. 
60. Lyon, supra n. 54, at 435-36. 
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and flower of English medieval jurisprudence. "61 Whether taken 
as evidence of extant practice or noted for its influence on the 
generations of lawyers to follow, Bracton's treatise is important 
for its use of cases to support arguments about the law.62 
Soon after Bracton's efforts, and certainly by 1260, the 
practice of recording the arguments and decisions, in "the very 
words of judges and pleaders" was being followed.63 Indeed, the 
Year Books reveal that both counsel and the court in these 
arguments were themselves citing to prior decisions and openly 
admitting that their decisions would be viewed as precedent in 
later cases. 64 One such case reveals a judge, perhaps speaking 
directly to a case reporter, saying, "one may safely put that in his 
book for law."65 However, it is important to note that these case 
reports were not crafted by the courts in the manner of modern 
American decisions. They were taken down by private reporters 
who often made errors, but these errors were thought to be 
avoided in the long term by reference not merely to a single 
precedential case, but to long and frequent repetition of a given 
type of common usage ("common learning") among the bar.66 
This type of learning was brought to a court's attention in the 
fortn of reference to prior cases, each of which brought 
something to the perception of common learning being upon the 
side of the advocate. 
The Year Books certainly reveal both the use and 
importance of precedent in the common law system as early as 
the mid-thirteenth century. But they also reveal that precedent is 
not tied inextricably to publication and certainly not to formal, 
lengthy, dissertational written opinions so common in American 
courts today.67 
61. Id. at 333-34. Maitland himself quoted Edmund Burke expressing this concern 
about the end of Year Books and published reports: "To put an end to reports is to put an 
end to the law of England." Frederick William Maitland, Frederick William Maitland, 
Historian 112-13 (Robert Livingston Schuyler ed., U. of Cal. Press 1960). 
62. Tubbs, supra n. 55, at 20. 
63. Baker, supra n. 47, at 225. 
64. ld. 
65. /d. (citing Midhope v. Prior of Kirkham (1313) 36 SS 178, per Stanton, J.). 
66. !d. at 226. 
67. Jd. at 204 (explaining that even when the only record of decision was the courts' 
rolls, lawyers and judges would rely upon their own memories and understanding of the 
cases' decisions, "vouch[ing] the record" as needed). The lengthy dissertational model has 
been dubbed the "Friendly treatment" or "the Learned Hand model" after judges who were 
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The next major step in the history of case reporting and 
precedent was the publication by Sir Edward Coke of a thirteen-
volume treatise of past cases, typically referred to as "The 
Reports.''68 This is not to say that Coke's works were the only 
systematic case reports of the era. Others include Plowden's 
Commentaries and Bulstrode' s careful reporting of decisions of 
King's Bench under James I and Charles I, as well as many less 
complete reports.69 Sir Coke's volumes were the most well 
known, likely due to his comprehensiveness,-style, and personal 
accomplishments.70 Both Coke's Reports and his personal 
attempts to claim more of the King's power over the law for the 
courts themselves served to increase the power of precedent.71 
For example, Coke cited to both ancient and recent precedent in 
his attempts to limit the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastic-al ,and 
chancery courts, to deny the King~ s power to make arrests or 
alter the common law, and to argue that acts of' Parliament 
contrary to common law ("common right and reason'') were 
void.72 
Coke put common law and precedent at the center of the 
judicial exercise. While still not as strict as the concept of 
binding precedent would become in later years, the idea of a 
body of precedent, which would become increasingly binding 
through long use and experience, was viewed as a strength of the 
common law system. 73 Indeed, this refinement through repeated 
application was viewed as an important element of the common 
law, which Coke perceived as having been "refined" by "long 
known for such writings. Schiltz, Citation of Unpublished Opinions, supra n. 1, at 1485-88 
(noting a nostalgic reverence for the type of careful deliberation and lengthy opinions 
rendered by preeminent Judge Henry J. Friendly of the Second Circuit). See also William 
M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari: 
Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 273, 278 (1996) (discussing 
"the Learned Hand model," consisting of oral argument in most cases,. discussions among 
the members of the bench, and judges writing their own opinions instead of relying on 
drafts composed by clerks or staff attorneys). 
68. Healy, supra n. 36, at 62. 
69. Baker, supra n. 47, at 209-10. 
70. Stucky, supra n. 41, at 413. 
71. Healy; supra n. 36, at 63. 
72. /d. 
73. /d. For an example of the inexorable command of vertical binding precedent in 
modem American courts~ see Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982) (noting that "a 
precedent of this Court must be followed by the lower federal courts no matter how 
misguided the judges of those courts may think it to be"). 
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and continual experience" of judges seeking to ever refine the 
law further by "declaring its principles with even greater 
precision and renewing it by application to the matter at hand."74 
Coke's idealistic vision of improving the law itself through 
accumulation of applications of the law should be realized in 
modern common law systems. We possess the ability to record 
both argument and decisions with greater certainty, to retain 
those records more permanently, and to disseminate the 
decisions to a wider audience. More applications of the 
principles of law to facts, such that the principles are tested and 
refmed, improves our understanding of the principles and gives 
greater certainty to those seeking to conform their conduct to 
them. 
In the wake of increasing interest in precedents, and their 
greater availability in the form of written reports, the bar was 
faced with two critical problems in ascribing the decisions of 
courts the kind of binding authority that they now possess in 
modem American courts. The first problem facing the courts in 
Coke's era was the still-prevalent belief in natural law. The 
belief in universal, unchanging principles of justice and right 
unavoidably raised the question of how the decisions of prior 
cases could be "the law" when "the law" was derived from a 
higher authority.75 This was not an insurmountable challenge to 
the development of binding precedent, given that the source of 
natural law was itself in the process of being wrested away from 
the crown and into the hands of the judiciary. Both Coke and 
later English jurists subscribed to a declaratory theory of law 
that served as a compromise between natural law and the rising 
importance of precedent. 76 The declaratory theory states that 
while not, strictly speaking, law themselves, decisions were "the 
best proof of what the law is."77 Indeed, while they were less 
willing to ascribe binding precedential authority to any single 
74. Healy, supra n. 36, at 66 (citing John Greville Agard Pocock, The Ancient 
Constitution and the Feudal Law 35 (Cambridge U. Press 1987) and H. Jefferson Powell, 
The Modern Misunderstanding of Original Intent, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1513, 1537, & 1537 
n. 91 (1987)). 
75. Healy, supra n. 36, at 67. 
76. /d. at 67-68. 
77. /d. at 62 (quoting Coke); Blackstone, supra n. 39, at *69 (stating that cases, "are the 
principal and most authoritative evidence, that can be given, of the existence of such a 
custom as shall foun a part of the common law''). 
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decision, its adherents were keenly attuned to finding the 
"current of authorities" or a "strong and uniform . . . train of 
decisions." 78 The second issue impeding the increased reliance 
on prece,dent as binding authority was the poor quality of the 
reports throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 79 
Judges of the era were unable to rely with much certainty on the 
accuracy of a report unless they had confidence in the 
competence and credibility of the reporter himself. 80 This too 
was not too much of a challenge for the common law. By the 
mid-eighteenth century, reports of greater accuracy and 
reliability were made, which increased the ability of judges to 
more faithfully adhere to precedent.81 
C. Modern English Publication and Precedent 
With the rise of better publication standards came greater 
adherence to the dictates of precedent. Throughout the latter half 
of the eighteenth century, a major proponent of this view was Sir 
William Blackstone. 82 Blackstone perceived the adherence to 
precedent as not just a worth¥: idea, but as part of a judge's duty 
under the declaratory theory. 3 That is, it was the duty of judges 
to state and apply the law rather than to make and remake it: 
For it is an established rule to abide by former precedents, 
where the same points come again in litigation: as well to 
keep the scale of justice even and steady, and not liable to 
waver with every new judge's opinion; as also because the 
law in that case being solemnly declared and detennined, 
what before was uncertain, and perhaps indifferent, is now 
become a permanent rule, which is not in the breast of any 
subsequent judge to alter or vary from according to his 
private sentiments: he being sworn to detertnine, not 
78. Healy, supra n. 36, at 68 (quoting in part James Ram, The Science of Legal 
Judgments, 9 Law Libr. 76 (JohnS. Littell 1835)). 
79. /d. See also T. Ellis Holdsworth, History of Judicial Precedent IV., 48 L.Q. Rev. 
230-31 (1932). 
80. See Allen, supra n. 38, at 219 (noting that "the doctrine of precedent had reached an 
advanced stage of development in the eighteenth century," but that "the process which was 
to establish the theory, in its full modem acceptation, was not yet complete"). 
81. Allen, supra n. 38, at 209; Tubbs, supra n. 55, at 181. 
82. Healy, supra n. 36, at 70. 
83. Blackstone, supra n. 39, at *69. 
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according to his own private judgment, but according to the 
known laws and customs of the land; not delegated to 




Blackstone viewed adherence to precedent as the generally 
applicable rule and judicial discretion to ignore precedent as the 
exception an exception that was limited to instances in which 
the precedent was "manifestly absurd or unjust" or 
"contradictory to reason."85 Especially telling about the rise of 
the power of precedent in this period is that Blackstone's 
jurisprudential opposite, Lord Mansfield, also perceived an 
increased adherence to precedent, even as he questioned 
Blackstone's assertion that it was the judge's duty.86 While 
contemporaries Blackstone and Mansfield disagreed about the 
power of the courts and the extent to which precedent bound 
courts, the matter was decided in dramatic fashion in the case of 
Perrin v. Blake,87 in which Blackstone's adherence to prior 
decisions won out over Mansfield's attempt to cast aside the old 
decisions as feudal in origin and outdated.88 Following this 
major step in the rise of binding precedent, the effect of 
precedent became well enmeshed in English jurisprudence: 
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, courts began to 
regard a line of decisions as absolutely binding, though 
they could still depart from a single decision, or even two 
decisions, for sufficient reasons. Gradually that exception 
also disappeared and by the latter half of the nineteenth 
century, courts asserted an obligation to follow all prior 
cases, no matter how incorrect. Even the House of Lords, 
which had never regarded its own precedents as binding., 
declared in 1861 that it was absolutely bound by its past 
d . . 89 eClSlOllS. 
84. /d. 
85. /d. at *70. 
86. Allen, supra n. 38, at 211 (stating that Mansfield "had a deep impatience of the 
unintelligent and mechanical use of precedent merely for its own sake and without any true 
relevance to the underlying principles involved in a legal issue"); David Liebennan, The 
Province of Legislation Determined: Legal Theory in Eighteenth-Century Britain 126 
(Cambridge U. Press 1989) (noting that Mansfield "never entirely ignored precedents"). 
87. 96 Eng. Rep. 392 (K.B.), 10 Eng. R. C. 689, 4 Bur. (Eng.) 2579 (1772). 
88. Healy, supra n. 36, at 72. 
89. /d. (footnotes omitted). 
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Blackstone's ideas of precedent, and of common law, are 
well-documented in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, 
which have been called "the magnum opus of the eighteenth 
century" and "perhaps the most stylish and readable contribution 
ever made to English legal literature. "90 More important, 
Blackstone's Commentaries, as they became known, were 
extremely influential in both England and America in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.91 As the eighteenth 
century gave way to the nineteenth century, both a philosophical 
shift and increasingly accurate case reports ushered in an era in 
which decisions were both published and precedential in much 
the way they are today. 
D. Early American Publication and Precedent 
"American courts have always adhered to a common law 
system that is dependent upon precedent. "92 Though the exact 
contours of the cotnmon law system varied among the colonies 
and changed over time, the implicit reliance on inherited ideas 
about the law is difficult to deny. As Justice Story explained, 
The case is not alone considered as decided and settled, but 
the principles of the decision are held, as precedents and 
authority, to bind future cases of the same nature. This is 
the constant practice under our whole system of 
jurisprudence. Our ancestors brought it with them when 
they first emigrated to this country; and it is, and always 
has been, considered as the great security of our rights, our 
90. Baker, supra n. 47, at 219. 
91. William S. Brewbaker III, Found Law, Made Law and Creation: Reconsidering 
Blackstone's Declaratory Theory, 22 J. L. & Religion 255, 255 (2007) (asserting that "Sir 
William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England is arguably the single most 
influential work of jurisprudence in American history") (footnote omitted). See also 
Herbert J. Storing, William Blackstone 1723-1780, in History of Political Philosophy 622-
34 (Leo Strauss & Joseph Cropsey eds., 3d ed., U. Chi. Press 1987) (outlining Blackstone's 
essential ideas and method); Wilfrid Prest, Blackstone as Architect: Constructing the 
Commentaries, 15 Yale J.L. & Human. 103 (2003); Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering 
Blackstone, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1996); Harold J. Bennan & Charles J. Reid, Jr., The 
Transformation of English Legal Science: From Hale to Blackstone, 45 Emory L.J. 437, 
489-96 (1996); S.F.C. Milsom, The Nature of Blackstone's Achievement, 1 Oxford J. Leg. 
Stud. 1 (1981); Rupert Cross, Blackstone v. Bentham, 92 L.Q. Rev. 516 (1976). 
92. Suzanne 0. Snowden, Student Author, "That's My Holding and I'm Not Sticking To 
It!" Court Rules That Deprive Unpublished Opinions of Precedential Authority Distort the 
Common Law, 79 Wash. U. L.Q. 1253, 1256 (2001) (footnote omitted). 
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liberties, and our property. It is on this account, that our law 
is justly deemed certain, and founded in permanent 
principles, and not dependent upon the caprice or will of 
. 1 . d 93 parttcu ar JU ges. 
79 
However, American courts from their earliest days faced 
the same barriers to the use of precedent as English courts: 
belief in natural law and lack of quality reports.94 As in England, 
these impediments were overcome. Blackstone's Commentaries 
and his ideas were as resonant with American lawyers as they 
were with English lawyers. Edmund Burke noted, "I hear that 
they have sold nearly as many of Blackstone's Commentaries in 
America as in England."95 A later writer's study of Blackstone 
revealed that "[t]he Commentaries became the chief if not the 
only law books in every [colonial] lawyer's office, and the most 
important if not the only textbooks for [colonial] law 
students."96 Numerous scholars have noted the profound effect 
of Blackstone's common law scholarship on the thinking of both 
the Revolutionary and Founding generations of America.97 
Blackstone's Commentaries have been described as the 
"principal source" of legal education for Alexander Hamilton98 
and an awe-inducing inspiration to the young James Kent.99 In 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, Blackstone's 
philosophi< was married with increasing reporting of case 
decisions. 00 Some judges actively collected, reported, and 
digested the laws of their states themselves; others, like 
Chancellor James Kent of New York, worked closely with a 
reporter. 101 Much as it had in England, the law had become less 
93. Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 377 
(Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) (quoted in Anastasoff v. US., 223 F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir. 
2000), vacated as moot on other grounds en bane, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000)). 
94. Healy, supra n. 36, at 73-74. 
95. Edmund Burke, speech, On Conciliation with America (Mar. 22, 1775), in Edmund 
Burke, Pre-Revolutionary Writings 206, 225 (Ian Harris ed., Cambridge U. Press 1993). 
96. David A. Lockmiller, Sir William Blackstone 170 (U.N.C. Press 1938). 
97. See e.g. William D. Bader, Some Thoughts on Blackstone~ Precedent, and 
Originalisnt, 19 Vt. L. Rev. 5, 6 (1994). 
98. Jacob Ernest Cooke, Alexander Hamilton 29 (Charles Scribner's Sons 1982). 
99. Bader, supra n. 97, at 11 (citing William Kent, Memoirs and Letters of James Kent 
LL.D. 18 (Little, Brown & Co. 1898)). 
I 00. Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Lalv, 88-91 (Touchstone 3d ed. 
2005). 
101. /d. at89. 
• 
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dependent upon natural or divine law and more a law of 
artificial reason. 102 It also became more the function of a 
professional, well-trained legal profession with an interest in 
increasing the power of the court system. 103 Toward that end, 
lawyers worked for the establishment of more cotrunon law 
rules and practices. 104 
This move was quite successful though early America had 
two additional problems to overcome before Blackstonian 
adherence to precedent could flourish. First, it had to receive the 
common law from England, develop its own common law, or 
both. While Maryland had declared itself to be governed by the 
common law in 1642, other colonies did not follow suit until the 
early eighteenth century; by the time of the revolution, however 
most had formally or informally adopted the common law.105 
Second, the post-Revolutionary legal system106 had to weather 
the growing pains of a system of law both sprung from and 
estranged from English common law and principles. Viewing 
themselves as distinctly separated from the common law of 
England and in the process of developing a common law of their 
own, judges of the era seemed to discard precedents on a variety 
of grounds.107 One such ground was to simply take the exception 
Blackstone had given and declare the precedents illogical, 
unreasonable, or contrary to public policy. 108 Others viewed 
English precedents as conflicting with a more important source 
of authority, state law.109 At the core of these decisions was the 
l 02. Compare Mark L. Jones, Fundamental Dimensions of Law and Legal Education: 
An Historical Framework, 39 John Marshall L. Rev. 1041, 1099-1102 (2006) (recounting 
at length the circumstances of Lord Coke's explanation of artificial reason in the law) and 
Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 551, 585 
(2006) (discussing Coke's description of artificial reason) with Carl F. Stychin, The 
Commentaries of Chancellor Kent and the Development of an American Common Law, 37 
Am. J. Legal Hist. 440, 451-52 (1993) (discussing Kent's similar view of American law as 
founded upon such "cultivated and artificial reasoning"). 
103. Healy, supra n. 36, at 76; Stychin,supra n. 102 at451-52. 
104. Healy, supra n. 36, at 74-75. 
105. ld. 
106. To call it a "system" using the singular is a generalization made in attempt to take a 
broad view. It was, of course, several colony or state systems, although they shared this 
problem sufficiently to make this generalization reasonable. 
107. Healy, supra n. 36, at 79-80. 
I 08. I d. at 79. 
109. /d. 
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idea that En lish rules were inapplicable to American 
law out of the hard rock of basic principle."11 However, as 
states resolved these issues by receiving the parts of English 
common law that their lawyers believed were applicable and by 
developing their own common law precedents, precedent took-
and has maintained a prominent position in American 
jurisprudence.112 
Throughout the nineteenth century, stare decisis 
strengthened in the United States as the above impediments 
were overcome.113 The landmark case of Marbury v. Madison 
emphasizes the importance of each judicial decision as an 
element of the developing case law, for "[i]nherent in every 
judicial decision is a declaration and interpretation of a general 
principle of law."114 The centrality of adherence to precedent in 
American law is also illustrated by Justice Story's well-known 
comment, which is of particular interest in the present context of 
courts issuing non-precedential decisions: "A more alarming 
doctrine could not be promulgated by any American court than 
that it was at liberty to disregard all former rules and decisions, 
and to decide for itself, without reference to the settled course of 
antecedent principles.;'115 From Justice Story's time to today, 
adherence to precedent and the application of stare decisis have 
been a prominent, if not the most prominent, feature of 
American law. Indeed, "[o]ld common-law attitudes toward 
precedent are so deeply ingrained in the behavior of American 
lawyers and judges that they hardly rise to the conscious 
level,"116 and "American attitudes toward precedent are the 
attitudes of Coke, Blackstone, Marshall, and Kent, although 
110. I d. at 79-80. 
111. Friedman, supra n. 100, at 88. 
112. Sellers, supra n. 46, at 67. 
113. Healy, supra n. 36, at 87. 
114. Anastasojf v. U.S., 223 F.3d 898, 899 (citing Marbury v. Madison, S U.S. 137, 
177-78 (1803)). Justice Marshall's famous declaration that "(i]t is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is," and his somewhat less 
famous, but no less important, statement that "( t ]hose who apply the rule to particular 
cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule, both appear in Marbury at 5 U.S. 
177. 
115. Story, supra n. 93, at§ 377. 
116. Sellers, supra n. 46, at 6 7. 
• 
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courts no longer feel the need to cite to these authors, or the 
decisions on which they relied;"117 Yet, the "alarming doctrine'' 
perceived by Justice Story· arguably exists today, when over 
eighty percent of all decisions of the United States federal courts 
are unpublished and essentially non-precedential, leaving courts 
unbound today by what they did yesterday. That the concepts of 
precedent and stare decisis are inherent in our legal system is 
easy to see, but how we have reached a, point when they are 
avoidable in the vast majority of federal cases is more difficult 
to understand. 
IV. MODERN AMERICAN PUBLICATION AND PRECEDENT 
The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw the 
rise of comprehensive case reports, and with that development 
came a renewed concern that this body of case law would prove 
too much for the legal system to deal with. This concern 
ultimately led to rules limiting publication of opinions, and, for 
the first time in common law history, rules limiting the citation 
of opinions. Whether implicitly or explicitly, the rules the.n came 
to deny precedential status to these opinions. However, the 
twentieth century also brought with it technological innovation 
that allows for better management of and access to the ever-
increasing body of law. Moreover, lawyers' and judges' 
attitudes towards these allegedly unimportant opinions suggests 
that they are anything but unimportant. 
A. Comprehensive Publication and the Concerns It Engenders 
As noted above, while precedent and case publication are 
not preconditions for each other, 118 the existence of reliable case 
reports does strengthen the use of pre~edent. 119 The desire for an 
American common law led to the creation of various state 
reporters, starting with Ephraim Kirby's 1789 Connecticut 
Reports and Francis Hopkinson's Judgments in Admiralty in 
117. !d. at 73. 
118. Baker, supra n. 47, at 204 (explaining that even when the only record of decision 
was the courts' rolls, lawyers and judges would rely upon their own memories and 
understanding of the cases' decisions, "vouch[ ing] the record'' as needed). 
119. Allen, supra n. 38, at 223-30 (discussing early English reports and reporters). 
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Pennsylvania (also published that year). 120 By 1803, states had 
begun designating official state reporters to increase the 
reliability of reports and create more systematic coverage. 121 
What had once been the province of enthusiastic practitioners 
became a govertnnent function, and while the governn1ent 
production of an official reporter did give lawyers and judges a 
common reference it was often slow and not as useful as the 
former reporters. 121 Rather than being produced by an interested 
practitioner or an efficient publisher, official reports of the era 
were left in the hands of political appointees. 123 But that 
condition would not last forever. John B. West and the West 
Publishing Company would change the face of legal publishing 
by producing more efficient, complete, and systematic reports. 
West's goal was interesting in two respects. First, he 
sought, "to collect, arrange in an orderly manner, and put into 
convenient and inexpensive form in the shortest possible time, 
the material which every judge and lawyer must use."124 This 
statement reveals the importance, visible even to a non-lawyer, 
that the legal system placed on its decisions. Second, West chose 
to publish all judicial decisions, rather than choosing to publish 
only a selected subset of them. This move was a departure from 
past practice and had its critics, but West's perception of the 
market was right "[l]awyers chose the comprehensive style of 
reporting, preferring that all precedent be available."125 
Lawyers would want to read, and want to be able to rely 
upon, all previous decisions in which a court applied the law in a 
similar case. This desire has been repeatedly expressed by 
lawyers. It can be seen in both the advocating for greater 
120. Robert C. Berring, Legal Research and Legal Concepts: Where Form Molds 
Substance, 15 Cal. L. Rev. 15, 19, & 19 n. 20 (1987). 
121. /d. at 19. 
122. /d. at 20. 
123. Thomas A. Woxland, HForever Associated With the Practice of Law": The Early 
Years of the West Publishing Company, 5 Leg. Ref. Serv. Q. 115, 119, 120 (Spring 1985) 
(noting that in the early years "[t]he office of the state reporter was usually a patronage 
position, occupied by a political crony rather than an efficient publisher," and that court 
reporters were "given the exclusive right to record, print, and publish the decisions" of 
particular courts). 
124. /d. at 118-19 (citing A Symposium of Law Publishers, 23 Am. L. Rev. 396, 406 
(1889)). 
125. Berring, supra n. 120, at 21. 
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acceptance of the common law and the striving for greater, and 
better, publication of court decisions. 
This preference for access to the courts' actual opinions 
was poignantly shown by the rejection of the American Law 
Institute's attempt to replace case law with a Restatement that 
extracted the "best" principles of law. 126 Faced with a greatly 
expanding number of decisions and a popular universal 
reporting system, the American Law Institute perceived a mass 
of case law in need of reduction and distillation. 127 Its goal was 
to craft a restatement of the law that would obviate the need for 
citation to cases by extracting the best principles and ignoring 
the rest. 128 But lawyers proved unwilling to rely on a secondary 
source when the words of the courts themselves were before 
them, and they continued to cite cases and to rely upon the 
Restatement as a useful, but secondary, source. 129 
While supplanting case decisions with summaries was 
ineffective in reducing the increasing ntJmber of opinions to be 
written, researched, and relied upon, simply choosing to return 
to an era of limited publication was effective. In fact, it has been 
so successful that over eighty percent of all federal decisions are 
now unpublished. 
B. The Birth of Limited Publication Plans 
While increases in cases and reported opinions were noted 
throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the 
first rumblings about limiting citation began in the Third and 
Fifth Circuits in the 1940s.130 Very little consensus was 
achieved, however, until 1964, when the Federal Judicial 
Conference recommended that the Courts of Appeals should 
report only those decisions that would be of "general 
precedential value'' in order to deal with "the ever increasing 
practical difficulty and economic cost of establishing and 




130. Reynolds & Richman, No-Citation Rules, supra n. S, at 1169 & 1169 n. 17. 
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maintaining private and public law library facilities. "131 Little 
action was taken on this suggestion until in 1973 the Council on 
Appellate Justice issued Standards for Publication of Judicial 
Opinions, recommending limited publication and citation and 
including a draft plan for the courts of appeals to adopt. 132 In 
that report, non-publication and non-citation seemed to go hand 
in hand because permitting citation would create a market for 
these decisions. With a model in hand, the courts began to adopt 
rules limiting publication and citation. 133 By 1974, each circuit 
had submitted plans to the Judicial Conference for how it would 
limit publication and citation. 134 Prior to these plans, the federal 
courts of appeals had essentially all their opinions published.135 
Neither the 1964 Conference nor the 1973 Advisory 
Council was inclined to deny precedential status to these new 
unpublished opinions.136 Publication plans would limit 
publication to those cases of greatest, broadest precedential 
value, but did not inherently diminish the precedential value of 
other cases. 137 In fact, the Advisory Council expressly 
considered a provision assigning unpublished opinions no 
precedential value, but it purposely avoided making such a 
suggestion to avoid the "morass of jurisprudence" such a debate 
would entail. 138 Instead, it recommended merely denying 
citation of the unpublished opinions as precedent and saying 
nothing about their actual precedential value.139 Initially, the 
courts of appeals took a similar approach by adopting 
publication plans that did not mandate a lesser or different 
131. 1964 Judicial Conference Report, supra n. 9, at 11 (quoted in Arnold, supra n. 21, 
at 219). 
132. Standards for Publication, supra n. 4. 
133. /d. at app. I; see also Williams, supra n. 5, at 770-71 n. 29. 
134. Greenwald & Schwarz, supra n. 13, at 1142; see also Reynolds & Richman, No-
Citation Rules, supra n. 5, at 1170-71. 
135. Berring, supra n. 120, at 15-20. (noting West Publishing Company's policy of 
publishing all case opinions rather than some subset of them in a movement toward 
complete publication); Jon A. Strongman, Student Author, Unpublished Opinions, 
Precedent, and the Fifth Amendment: Why Denying Unpublished Opinions Precedential 
Value is Unconstitutional, 50 U. Kan. L. Rev. 195 (2001) (noting that the 1970s proved a 
breaking point for the practice ofunifonn publication of federal circuit opinions). 
136. Williams, supra n. 5, at 770-71 n. 29 (quoting 1973 report). 
13 7. 1964 Judicial Conference Report, supra n. 9, at 11. 
138. Standards for Publication, supra n. 4, at 20. 
139. /d. 
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precedential status for unpublished decisions; they simply 
restricted citation to unpublished opinions. 140 However, within a 
few years, most federal court rules made these unpublished 
cases non-precedential. 141 
Such a progression, from non-published to non-citeable to 
non-precedential, seems logical and in its own way almost 
necessary. 142 Limited publication is not a new idea; it dates back 
to the earliest reporters, who were selective in what they 
published.143 But declaring decisions to be unciteable, and 
moreover, not precedent, was contrary to the entire history of the 
common law system. This removal of decisions from the body 
of common law was a fundamental shift in the common law 
system that was truly unprecedented. 144 Even in the early days 
of Yearbooks or the unsettled post-Revolution days of early 
American courts, no matter how sparse the record, cases could 
always be cited to the court as evidence of its past rulings. Now, 
however, federal courts were unwilling to be bound by what 
they had done in similar cases in the past; in fact, they were 
140. Williams, supra n. 5, at 771. 
141. /d. at 771-73. 
142. "Unpublished" cases that remained citeable and precedential would be sought out 
despite their fonnal publication status, but creating a rule that a decision is both non-
citeable and non-precedential effectively removes that decision from the body of common 
law. Only by restricting opiruons on all three grounds (publication, citation, and precedent) 
could one hope to make some opinions truly "disposable." This, of course, was 
unsuccessful because practitioners placed value on these opinions despite their diminished 
status. See generally e.g. Robel, Practice of Precedent, supra n. 5 (examining recent 
surveys of federal judges and lawyers); Robel, Myth, supra n. 5. 
143. Robert J. Martineau, Restrictions on Publication and Citation of Judicial Opinions: 
A Reassessment, 28 U. Mich. J.L. Refonn 119, 121 (1994). 
144. Please forgive the pun, but synonyms did not adequately capture the concept quite 
as well, because the shift plainly is without precedent. English and early American practice 
unifonnly allowed citation to and reliance upon prior decisions regardless of their 
publication status. Modern English practice is similar to the historical practice in England: 
Unreported cases are unlikely to be cited but may be cited, if appropriate. See Robert J. 
Martineau, Appellate Justice in England and the United States: A Comparative Analysis 
104 (William S. Hein & Co. 1990). But see F. Allan Hanson, From Key Numbers to 
Keywords: How Automation Has Transformed the Law, 94 L. Libr. J. 563, 565-66 (2002) 
(quoting Roderick Munday, The Limits of Citation Determined, 80 L. Socy. Gaz. 1337 
(1983) (claiming that the British courts are "restricting the use of unreported materials 
which the computer revolution has made available to the profession," and noting that, "[i]n 
particular, the House of Lords ... has effectively outlawed the citation of unreported cases 
in argument before it")). 
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unwilling to even be told about it, 145 not because they had 
decided it inapplicable, but because another panel of the court 
had de·cided at the time of the decision that it would not aid 
future decision-makers. 
This shift was born not out of a philosophic or 
jurisprudential need to prune the law; rather, it was created 
because of a need to reduce the expense of publishing, 
collecting, and maintaining law libraries as well as reducing the 
workload of the federal judiciary and lawyers. 146 From that 
perspective of pra a tic concerns, the early 1970s proved to be 
a turning point.14 Between 1950 and 1970, federal case filings 
rose from 2678 to 11,440, while federal judgeships rose from 
sixty-four to ninety. 148 Simply on a case-per-judge basis, judges' 
workloads more than tripled over a twenty-year period. In 
response, the 1973 Committee sought a pragmatic solution,149 
which was adopted and eventually extended by the federal 
courts. Yet many of the Committee's pragmatic concerns are no 
longer valid in light of the present state of legal information 
technology and practices. And those that remain must be 
weighed against the inherent value of precedent to our legal 
system, either as an intrinsic limit imposed by our Constitution 
or as a proper practice for the good of our legal system. These 
issues are discussed further in Part IV. 
C. Recent Technological Developments in Publication 
Technological advances have drastically altered the 
landscape of legal publishing and legal research over the last 
145. Arnold, supra n. 21, at 221 (pointing out that "(t]he bar is gagged," but that "[w]e 
are perfectly free to depart from past opinions if they are unpublished, and whether to 
publish them is entirely our own choice"). 
146. See Standards for Publication, supra n. 4, at 6-8. The reader will note that, aside 
from a general comment that "[ u ]nlimited proliferation of published opinions constitutes a 
burden and a threat to a cohesive body of law," id. at 6, the balance of the Committee's 
seven factors indicating that publication should be limited is made up of pragmatic 
concerns about workload and logistics many of which are wholly inapplicable in today' s 
legal infonnation setting. 
147. Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Challenge and Reform, 391-93 (tbl. A.2) 
(Harvard U. Press 1996). 
148. I d. at 392, 397, 398. 
149. Standards for Publication, supra n. 4, at 21 (stating that the recommendation to 
address only citation and not precedent "deals with use rather than philosophical effect"). 
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thirty to forty years. These changes alone cry out for a 
reevaluation of the concept of limited publication and 
precedent. 150 At the time of the 1964 conference first formally 
proposing limited publication of federal OP.inions, computer-
assisted legal research was, at best, a theory. 151 By 1973, when 
the Federal Judicial Center's Advisory Council released its 
suggested standards for limited publication of judicial opinions, 
computer-assisted research was in its earliest stages. 152 The first 
LEXIS system was released in April 1973, and by the fall of 
first Westlaw system was in place in April 1975, 54 the federal 
Courts of Appeals had already created rules regarding limited 
publication and the precedential value of unpublished opinions. 
Since then, computer-assisted legal research systems have been 
refined and improved dramatically.155 Indeed, advances in 
information communication have revolutionized legal research 
and access to legal infortnation: "Legal infon11ation is no longer 
available exclusively in print, and the researcher is now no 
longer constrained by the limitations of the printed page," so this 
information can be stored, indexed, and retrieved digitally with 
just a few keystrokes. 156 Moreover, such access through 
commercial databases is increasingly available online without 
the need for dedicated in-office hardware or CDs full of cases. 
This includes "unpublished" decisions, which are widely 
available both through West's and LEXIS's online services, but 
also in West's Federal Appendix, which has been publishing 
"unpublished" cases since 2001. 157 
150. Kirt Shuldberg, Student Author, Digital Influence: Technology and Unpublished 
Opinions in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 541, 551 (1997) (asserting that 
"[t)hese historic rationales for the limited publication/no-citation plans warrant re-
examination in light of current technology"). 
151. /d. at 556. 
152. /d. 
153. William G. Harrington, A Brief History of Computer-Assisted Legal Research, 77 
L. Libr. J. 543, 553 ( 1985). 
154. /d. 
155. /d. at 554; Shuldberg, supra n. 150, at 558. 
156. Shuldberg, supra n. 150, at 556. 
157. Scott E. Gant, Missing the Forest for a Tree: Unpublished Opinions and New 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, 41 B.C. L. Rev. 705, 709-10 (2006). 
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This electronic and internet revolution is not solely the 
province of private reporters, however. In 2002, Congress 
enacted. the E-Goverrunent Act, a law aimed at promoting 
greater communication between the government and the 
citizenry via electronic means. 158 In accordance with that law, 
the federal courts are in the process of making all civil court 
records (save those that are sealed) available online. 159 
The system of limited publication, non-citation, and non-
precedent was created in a legal setting limited to print resources 
and without the indexed and non-indexed searching capabilities 
of any computer-assisted legal research systems. In their current 
formats, however, those systems make it possible to search cases 
(and other sources) through both traditional indexed methods 
and via full-text searching. These advances in legal information 
technology should themselves justify a complete 
re-examination of the need for a limited publication and 
precedent regime. 
D. Citation and Precedent in the Federal Courts of Appeals 
Prior to Rule 32.1. 
The 1973 Advisory Committee's report avoided the 
"morass of jurisprudence" inherent in directly tackling the issue 
of precedential status of unpublished decisions. 160 The 
Committee shrewdly decided to refrain from declaring that 
unpublished opinions were not precedent. It instead took a 
position that "relies on the correspondence of publication and 
precedential value on the one hand, and of non-publication and 
non-precedential value on the other."161 Such a position "deals 
158. See 44 U.S.C. § 3501, n. (2007) (referring to Pub. L. 104-13, which requires the 
Chief Justice of the United States and all chief judges of federal courts to "cause to be 
established and maintained ... a website that contains the following infot tnation or links to 
websites with the following infonnation: . . . [a ]ccess to the substance of all written 
opinions issued by the court, regardless of whether such opinions are to be published in the 
official court reporter, in a text searchable fonnat") (available at http://uscode.house.gov). 
159. See Judicial Conference of the United States, Report of the Judicial Conference 
Committee on Court Administration and Case Management on Privacy and Public Access 
to Electronic Case Files (Sept. 2001) (available at http://www.privacy.uscourts.gov/ 
Policy.htm) (accessed Dec. 2, 2008; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and 
Process). 
160. See Standards for Publication, supra n. 4, at 20. 
161. /d. at 21. 
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with use rather than philosophical effect,"162 and leaves the 
declaration that otherwise precedential opinions are no longer 
part of the common law to the individual circuits. The 
Committee's reliance on practice was effective, as the federal 
circuits adopted non-publication rules and eventually augmented 
them with non-precedent rules. 163 So, with little consideration of 
what the 1973 Committee had written off as "philosophical 
effect," the rules of the federal courts of appeals quietly 
removed many of their decisions from the body of precedent. 
The number of decisions rendered as "unpublished" has risen to 
just over eighty-four percent. 164 The correspondence between 
non-publication and non-precedential value anticipated by the 
Committee has come to pass. 
Immediately prior to the adoption of the new Rule 32.1, all 
thirteen circuits had a limited publication rule in place that 
allowed for designation of some opinions as unpublished. 165 In 
their criteria for deciding which cases were published and which 
were not, all thirteen circuits' rules contained criteria that 
generally touched upon the issue of precedent. 166 In addition, all 
thirteen circuits had some rule in place that governed the citation 
of unpublished opinions. 167 However, only two circuits accorded 
any of their unpublished opinions the same status as published 
decisions. 168 
1. Publication 
All thirteen circuits had rules allowing for limited 
publication of judicial opinions. 169 There was little uniformity 
162. /d. 
163. Williams, supra n. 5, at 772. 
164. Judicial Business Table S-3, supra n. 6 (showing percent unpublished in the 
twelve-month period ending Sept. 30, 2006 to be 84.1 %). 
165. Serfass & Cranford, supra n. 28, at 351-57 (tbl. 1). See also Melissa M. Serfass & 
Jessie L. Cranford, Federal and State Court Rules Governing Publication and Citation of 
Opinions, 3 J. App. Prac. & Process 251, 253-57 (tbl. 1) (2001). The reader should note 
that virtually all of the rules cited in these articles have since been updated. However, the 
Serfass and Cranford articles provide accurate infotrnation about the rules as they existed 
when each was published. 
166. Serfass & Cranford, supra n. 28, at 351-57. 
167. /d. 
168. See id. 
169. /d. 
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among the rules regarding publication, 170 and only two points 
regarding these rules are of interest here. First, the rules varied 
from those that presumed opinions would be published to those 
that stated a policy against publication.171 Second, several 
circuits' rules epitomized the 1973 Committee's belief that by 
designating certain opinions unpublished, the issue of precedent 
would be answered inherently. Four circuits (the Third, Tenth, 
Eleventh, and Federal Circuits) explicitly stated that the decision 
to publish depended, at least in part, upon whether the deciding 
court viewed the opinion as precedential.172 These circuits 
outright conflated the concepts of unpublished and 
unprecedential, deciding as a single issue whether opinions 
would be published and precedentia1. 173 For example, the Third 
Circuit rule referred to its unpublished decisions as its "not 
precedential opinions."174 Such a statement suggests that the 
''correspondence'' foreseen by the 1973 Committee was 
accepted and applied by courts. Without the appellate system's 
ever considering the jurisprudential underpinnings or having a 
national debate on the issue, unpublished came to mean both 
"unciteable" and "non-precedential'' in most circuits.175 Of 
course, when we speak of "publication" in the context of the 
rules, we mean only that the court has designated the opinions as 
"published" or ''unpublished." As noted above, nearly all federal 
appellate decisions are now and for several years have been-
published in both commercial online databases and the Federal 
170. !d. 
171. /d. The reader might compare, for example, Serfass and Cranford's summary of 
First Circuit Rule 36(b), which pointed out that "(i]n general, the court thinks it desirable 
that opinions be published and thus be available for citation'' and Fifth Circuit Rule 4 7.5 .I, 
which provided that "opinions that may in any way interest persons other than the parties to 
a case should be published" with, for example, their summary of Federal Circuit Internal 
Operating Procedure 10, which reminded practitioners that "[t]he workload of the appellate 
courts precludes preparation of precedential opinions in all cases," and pointed out that 
"[ u ]nnecessary precedential dispositions, with concomitant fuU opinions, only impede the 
rendering of decisions and the pr~paration of precedential opinions in cases which merit 
that effort." 
172. /d. at 351-57. 
173. /d. 
174. Id. at 352 (quoting 3d Cir. I.O.P 5.7). 
175. Id. at 351-57. 
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Appendix, as well as, increasin~ly, on the courts' own websites 
under the E-Govert1ment Act. 17 · 
2. Citation 
The 1973 Committee recognized that limiting publication 
would be of no avail if citation to unpublished opinions 
remained unrestricted. 177 Since the mid-1970s, all federal courts 
of appeals have had some form of limited-citation rule, though 
the rules varied widely in the extent of their restrictions. At the 
time of the adoption of Rule 3 2.1, four circuits had rules 
forbidding citation to unpublished opinions entirely. 178 The 
remaining nine circuits allowed citation to some degree when 
the litigant believed no published opinion would serve as 
well.179 Of those nine, three circuits (the First, Eighth, and 
El~venth),. specifically recogn~zed that .unf:ublished opinions 
might be cited for their persuastve authority. 80 Even among the 
nine circuits that allowed citation under certain circumstances, 
most expressed some disapproval of the practice either by 
saying that citation was "disfavored"181 or by using phrases like 
"should not normally be cited."182 Only the D.C. Circuit 
explicitly a roved citation as precedent without language of 
about limited gublication or precedential effect, that are replaced 
byRule32.1. 4 
Declaring unpublished opinions to be non-citeable had the 
direct effect of denying their precedential effects in almost every 
176. Gant, supra n. 157, at 709-10. 
177. Standards for Publication, supra n. 4, at 18-19. 
178. See Serfass & Cranford, supra n. 28, at 351-57. 
179. /d. 
180. /d. 
181. This was the language used by the First, Fourth, Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh 
Circuits. /d. at 351-56. Note that Eleventh Circuit Rule 36-2 was citation-friendly, but that 
its I.O.P. 5 stated that "[t]he court does not favor reliance on unpublished opinions." /d. at 
356. 
182. /d. at 353. 
183. /d. at 356. (quoting D.C. Cir. R. 36(c)(2), which indicated that while the decision to 
issue an unpublished decision meant that the deciding panel saw "no precedential value" in 
the opinion, the rules plainly allowed citation as precedent, which left the detennination of 
precede.ntial effect up to the court to which the opinion was cited). 
184. See Fed. R. App. 32.1 & advisory comrn. nn. 
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circuit. 185 The extent to which these decisions might be treated 
as precedent varied widely across the circuits from those that 
accorded them no value to those that accorded at least some of 
them full precedential value.186 
3. Precedent 
The 1973 Conunittee's proposal to remove unpublished 
opinions from the body of citeable law effectively answered the 
question of whether those decisions are precedential. In a 
modem jurisprudential version of "out of sight out of mind,'' 
unpublished decisions continued, from a rules perspective, to be 
unciteable until the advent of Rule 32.1, and by extension, they 
were usually unprecedential. 
Of the thirteen circuits, only two, the Fifth and D.C. 
Circuits, retained any precedential status to their unpublished 
opinions. The Fifth Circuit gave precedential value to decisions 
prior to January 1, 1996, while the D.C. Circuit gave 
precedential value to decisions after January 1, 2002.187 Neither 
of these rules made it clear that they ?lea~t b~ndin& precedential 
effect, but that seems to be the tmpltcatton. 1 Four other 
circuits' rules suggested that their unpublished decisions might 
have some persuasive value.189 The remaining six circuits 
denied unpublished opinions any precedential . effect, either 
explicitly or by completely forbidding citation.190 The denial of 
binding precedential status expressly or by implication was 
nearly ubiquitous in the federal courts of appeals, though a few 
of them left some room open for a litigant to argue that a 
decision had persuasive value. 191 Although all circuits have now 
brought their citation rules into congruence with Rule 32.1, the 
185. Serfass & Cranford, supra n. 28, at 351-57. 
186. Compare e.g. Serfass & Cranford, supra n. 28, at 354 (summarizing 7th Cir. R. 
53(b)(2)(iv), which stated that unpublished orders should not be cited or used as 
precedent), with e.g. id. at 353 (quoting from 5th Cir. R. 47.5.3, which stated that 
''(u]npublisbed opinions issued before January 1, 1996, are precedent," but cautioned that 
they should not nonually be cited). 
187. See id. at 353; 356. 
188. /d. 
189. See generally id. 
190. See generally id. 
191. It appears that persuasive value would be the same value given to decisions of 
courts in other jurisdictions; law review articles, secondary sources, and the like. 
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new federal rule has not altered the state of affairs with respect 
to precedent. 
E. Rule 32.1 
It was a long road from the creation of limited publication 
and citation plans in 1973 to the 2006 enactment of Rule 32.1, 
which restored citeability to unpublished decisions (at least 
those issued after January 1, 2007). 
1. History of the Rule 
Upon enactment of the limited publication and citation 
plans by all the circuits in 1973, the Federal Judicial Conference 
was satisfied, viewing each of the circuits as a legal laboratory 
that would . accumulate experience and refine the rules 
accordingly.192 It did seem to acknowledge, however, that the 
plan was not necessarily a permanent solution.193 Still, the 
relevant report indicates that "the possible rewards of such 
experimentation are so rich, the Conference agreed that it should 
not be discontinued until there is considerably more experience 
Conference that a common plan might develop. 95 It did not. Nor 
was the issue revisited formally by the federal government until 
the Federal Courts Study Committee was created in 1988 by 
Congress. 
The FCSC published a report in 1990 finding that "non-
publication and non-citation rules present many problems."196 
Recognizing that the decision to limit publication and citation 
was always one of pragmatism and never one of principle, the 
Committee explained that "[t]he policy in courts of appeals of 
not publishing certain opinions, and concomitantly restricting 
192. 197 4 Judicial Conference Report, supra n. 14, at 12. 
. . 
193. /d. (stating that "[t]he Conference noted the view of its Committee and its 
Subcommittee that further experimentation may well lead to the amendment of the diverse 
circuit plans") 
194. /d. 
195. /d. (expressing the expectation "that eventually a somewhat more or less common 
plan might evolve"). 
196. Federal Courts Study Committee, Report, 22 Cotul. L. Rev. 733, 871 (1990). 
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their citation, has always been a concession to perceived 
necessity.''197 In addition, the FCSC noted that both doctrinal 
issu~s a~d applic~tio.n issues ~~pport~d ~uestioning ~f the non-
publtcatton/non-cttatton rules. · Whtle It was essentially a call 
for the Judicial Conference to "review policy" on the matter, and 
not a policy suggestion or analysis in and of itself, the FCSC 
report seemed to suggest that a return to universal publication 
might very well have been called for: 
Universal publication has enough problems of its own that 
we cannot recommend it now; but inexpensive database 
access and computerized search technologies may justify 
revisiting the issue, because these developments may now 
or soon will provide wide and inexpensive access to all 
. • 199 
optntons. 
Though the 1990 Judicial Conference did not agree and 
refused to study the matter, the FCSC's forecast has undeniably 
come to pass; today, unpublished courts of appeals decisions are 
routinely published in the Federal Appendix and online in both 
commercial and government-operated databases. 200 And despite 
the Judicial Conference's rejection of the FCSC's 1990 
recommendation for revisiting the issue,201 the same 
recommendation for further study was made two months later by 
a long-tem1 project within the Judicial Conference itself.202 The 
Local Rules Project, which had been created by the Judicial 
Conference in 1984, was in the midst of a review of all of the 
federal courts' local rules to determine which rules were most in 
conflict. 203 One such area of conflict and concern was the 
multiplicity of local rules governing publication and citation. 204 
197. !d. 
198. /d. (noting that "[ s ]heer bulk prohibits universal publication in traditional hard-copy 
volumes" and also acknowledging the "easy applications of established law to fact" in 
many routine cases). 
199./d.at871-72. 
200. Gant, supra n. 157, at 709-10. 
20 I. Report of the Judicial Conference of the United States: September 12, 1990 at 88 
(noting Judicial Conference opposition to FCSC recommendation that "[a] representative 
ad hoc committee under the auspices of the Judicial Conference should review policy on 
unpublished court opinions in light of increasing ease and decreasing cost of database 
access"). 
202. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little, supra n. 1, at 1437. 
203. /d. 
204. /d. 
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The Local Rules Project specifically recommended that the issue 
was appropriate for resolution by a national rule and that the 
Advisory Committee should consider amending the Federal 
Rules of Appellate Procedure to implement such a rule.205 
The Judicial Conference Committee took the 
recommendation and asked the Advisory Committee to consider 
the issue. 206 While the reconunendation was placed on the 
Advisory Committee's agenda, it languished in what a later 
Advisory Committee Reporter would characterize as 
"rulemaking hell."207 Between a reluctance to address an issue 
that the Judicial Conference had recently declined to study and 
the Advisory Committee's more substantial task in "restyling" 
all of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure into plain 
language with a consistent style, no action was taken on the 
issue throughout the mid-1990s. 208 In 1997, the Advisory 
Committee completed the restyling project and, under the 
direction of a new chair and a new reporter, it turned its 
attention to the unpublished-opinions issue.209 The Advisory 
Committee's initial poll of the Circuits' chief judges indicated 
that they were "virtually unanimous in their opposition to any 
rulemaking on the topic,"210 and the Committee somewhat 
reluctantly decided to "bow to the political reality"211 that "rules 
regarding unpublished decisions have no chance of clearing the 
Judicial Conference in the foreseeable future."212 Still, the 
Advisory Conm1ittee had questions about the issue, including a 




208. !d. at 1437-38. 
209. ld. at 1438·39. See also Judicial Conference of the United States, Advisory 
Committee on Appellate Rules, Minutes September 1997 Meeting pt. VII(C)(3), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/ap9-97.htm (Sept. 12, 1997) [hereinafter Fall 1997 
Minutes] (accessed Dec. 12, 2008; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and 
Process). 
210. Judicial Conference of the United States, Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules, 
Minutes-spring 1998 Meeting, pt. (V)(C), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/0498 
appellateminutes.htm (Apr. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Spring 1998 Minutes] (emphasis in 
original) (accessed Dec. 12, 2008; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and 
Process). 
211. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little, supra n. 1, at 1440. 
212. Spring 1998 Minutes, supra n. 210. 
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unpublished decisions available, in any manner, to commercial 
publishers like West and LEXIS.213 Also, the Solicitor General 
believed that a rule should be proposed notwithstanding the 
judges' objections.214 The Committee had spoken, however, and 
the issue would remain dormant until January 2001, when the 
Solicitor General would again urge the Advisory Committee to 
adopt a national standard governing the citation of unpublished 
o.piniorts. 215 
Though both the Chair and the Reporter of the Committee 
were uninterested in taking up the issue, the Solicitor General 
and se':eral Co~ttee members b~lieved that judi~ial sentiment 
on the tssue mtght have changed stnce 1997.21 Thts was a well-
founded belief given the selection of several new chief judges 
and the then-recent decision of the Eighth Circuit in Anastasoff 
v. United States,211 which held that a federal court is 
constitutionally required to treat all its decisions as precedent.218 
Nonetheless, for scheduling reasons, the Advisory Committee 
tabled the discussion until the next meeting, which did not occur 
until April 2002.219 In preparation for this meeting, the new 
chair, then-Judge Samuel A. Alito of the Third Circuit, now a 
Justice of the United States Supreme Court, polled the chief 
judges once again on both the issue itself and the Solicitor 
General's proposal for a uniform rule.220 
The uniforn1 rule proposed by the Solicitor General at that 
time was not the Rule 32.1 that would later be enacted; it was a 
213. See Schiltz, Much Ado About Little~ supra n. 1, at 1441. 
214. Spring 1998 Minutes, supra n. 210. It is interesting to note that during the 
discussion of this agenda item, one committee member "wondered whether the Committee 
might propose a rule addressing only the question of whether unpublished decisions should 
be treated as precedential," while another asked if it might "be worthwhile to pursue 
rulemaking on tlte isolated question of the citation of unpublished opinions." Neither 
narrow question was taken up, however, as the perception was that the judges were against 
"any rulemaking on the topic." /d. (emphasis in original). 
215. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little, supra n. 1, at 1441 (citing Letter from Seth P. 
Waxman, Solicitor Gen. of the U.S., to Will Garwood, Chair, Advisory Cornm. on App. R. 
1 (Jan. 16, 2001) (on file with Wash. & Lee L. Rev.) [hereinafter Waxman Letter]). 
216. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little, supra n. 1, at 1443. 
217. 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en bane). 
218. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little, supra n. 1, at 1443. 
219. /d. at 1444. 
220. /d. (citing Ltr. from Samuel A. Alito, Jr., J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the 3d Cir., Chair, 
Advisory Comm. on App. Rules, to R. Lanier Anderson, III, C. J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the 
11th Cir. (Feb. 22, 2002) (on file with Wash. & Lee L. Rev.) [hereinafter A/ito Letter]). 
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rule focused on uniforn1ity across the circuits that had three 
main features: First, citation of unpublished opinions would 
continue to be disfavored; second, citation ·would be expressly 
allowed on issues of res judicata, law of the case, collateral 
estoppel, double jeopardy, sanctionable conduct, abuse of writ, 
fact or adequacy of notice, and the like; and third, citation would 
also be allowed when a party reasonably believed that the 
unpublished opinion persuasively addressed a material issue that 
was unaddressed by any published opinion.221 The chief judges' 
response to this proposal was far different from the one in 1997. 
Instead of being unanimous, the judges' individual responses 
were quite varied. The chief judges of three circuits, the Second, 
Seventh, and D.C., did not respond.222 The chief judges of three 
circuits, the Third, Tenth, and Eleventh, expressed support.223 
The chief judges of five circuits, the First, Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, 
and Federal, expressed opposition.224 And the chief judges of the 
remaining circuits, the Fifth and Sixth, expressed division 
among their judges and a disinclination to alter standard 
procedure, respectively.225 
It was this great variation in opinion, the Anastasoff 
decision, and the then-recent liberalization of some circuits' 
rules on citation that signaled a sea change in opinion on the 
issue~ For example, the D.C. Circuit had recently altered its rule 
to permit citation of opinions after January 1, 2002, "as 
precedent,"226 and the internal operating procedures then in 
force in the Third Circuit indicated that the court itself did not 
cite unpublished opinions, but they did not restrict litigants from 
doing so.227 In addition, the First Circuit had embarked on the 
comment process to enact its own rule permitting citation in 
221. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little, supra n. 1, at 1441-42 (citing Waxman Letter, 
supra n. 215). 
222. /d. at 1444 (citing A/ito Letter, supra n. 220). 
223. Jd. 
224. 1d. at 1444-45. 
225. /d. 
226. Serfass & Cranford, supra n. 28, at 356 (describing D.C. Cir. R. 28(c)(l)(b), now 
no longer in force). The provisions of fonner Rule 28(c)(l)(b) are now incorporated into 
D.C~ Cir. R. 32.l(b)(l)(B). 
227. /d. at 352 (describing foimer 3d Cir. I.O.P 5.7, now no longer in force). See also 
Serfass & Cranford, supra n. 165, at 253 (describing fonner 3d Cir. I.O.P. 5.8, apparently 
in force before fonner 3d Cir . l.O.P. 5.7 became effective, and which contained virtually 
the same language). 
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some circumstances, which later became First Circuit R. 32.3.228 
This change of perception about the importance of the issue was 
reflected in the Advisory Committee's vote to propose an 
amendment to the Federal Rules that would include a national 
rule on the citation of unpublished opinions.229 
After finally taking up the issue, the Advisory Committee 
turned its attention to the content of the proposed rule. The 
possibilities ran the gamut from opposing all national 
rulemaking to requiring all opinions to be written, published, 
and precedential~ but the likely range of rules fell within a much 
narrower field.2 0 Professor Schiltz played a pivotal role in 
framing the debate and the actual rule by drafting three 
alternative proposed rules.231 Alternative A specifically 
authorized courts to issue opinions that were non-precedential 
and pertnitted the citation of such opinions without restriction. 
Alternative B addressed only the issue of citation, permitting it 
without restriction, but made no mention of precedential status 
for such opinions. Alternative C hewed most closely to the 
Solicitor General's position, pertnitting citation in a limited set 
of circumstances and making no mention of precedential 
status.232 Alternative A was quickly rejected, as the Advisory 
Committee, like the 1973 Committee before it, did not want to 
get involved in the messy issue of precedential status.233 
Between the other two, the Committee quickly rejected 
Alternative C in favor of Alternative B.234 Alternative B, which 
228. Serfass & Cranford, supra n. 28, at 351 (describing fonner 1st Cir. R. 32.3, since 
rescinded). 
229. Judicial Conference of the United States, Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules, 
Minutes-spring 2002 Meeting, http://www. uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/app0402.pdf pt. 
(V)(H) {Apr. 22; 2002), [hereinafter Spring 2002 Minutes] (accessed Dec. 12, 2008; copy 
on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). 
230. See e.g. Spring 1998 Minutes1 supra n. 210, at pt. (V)(C) (summarizing committee 
members' discussion of various alternatives). See also Spring 2002 Minutes, supra n. 229 
(setting out committee members' suggestions and concerns). 
231. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little, supra n. l, at 144 7 49. 
232. !d. at 1448. 
233. Judicial Conference of the United States, Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules, 
Minutes Fall 2002 Meeting 35 (pt. (V)(F)), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/app 
1102.pdf (Nov. 18, 2002) (noting that conunittee members "were unanimous in wanting to 
limit the involvement of the Committee to the issue of citation'') (accessed Dec. 12, 2008; 
copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). 
234. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little, supra n. 1, at 1448. 
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removed all restrictions on the citation of unpublished opinions 
while not addressing their precedential force, was broader, but 
als.o more controversial, than Alternative C.235 But as Professor 
Schiltz reports, there was a feeling that "if the Advisory 
Committee was going to pick a fight, it should at least pick one 
wor:t~ fi~hting," and that Alternative C would remain a fallback 
posttton. 36 
In November 2002, the newly minted Rule 32.1 was 
approved by the Advisory Committee with only stylistic 
changes,237 and in June 2003, it was approved for publication by 
the Standin . Committee with no changes and very little 
proposed amendments drew numerous comments by letter and 
several requests to testify before the Advisory Committee.239 
Most of the conunents opposed the rule; however, the vast 
majority of those came from a single circuit the Ninth and 
were "extremely repetitive," which suggested to Professor 
Schiltz that 
[o]bviously, there had been an organized campaign to 
generate comments opposing Rule 32.1, as many of those 
comments repeated sometimes word-for-word the same 
basic ''talking points" that had been distributed by 
opponents of the rule. 240 
Even after acknowledging these comments, the Advisory 
Committee was firm in its support of the rule. At the 
Committee's April 2004 meeting, every member, save one, 
spoke in favor of the rule, and most did so in very serious terms, 
arguing that "an Article III court should not be able to forbid 
parties from citing back to it the public actions that the court 
235. /d. 
236. /d. at 1447-48. 
. . 
237. For example, the admonition, "[a] court must not impose" was shifted from active 
to passive voice to read, "[N]o restriction may be imposed," so as not to unnecessarily 
antagonize the judges inclined to oppose the rule. See Schiltz, Much Ado About Little, 
supra n. 1, at 1449. 
238. Judicial Conference of the United States, Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure, Minutes Meeting of June 9-10, 2003 8-9 (June 9-10, 2003), http://www. 
uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/ST06-2003-min.pdf (noting then-Judge Alito's presentation of 
the new rule and Judge Sirica's single comment about it) (accessed Dec. 12, 2008; copy on 
file with Journal of Appellate Practice· and Process). 
239. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little, supra n. 1, at 1450 ... 5 l. 
240. ld. at 1451. 
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itself has taken" and pointing out that 
[i]t is antithetical to American values and to the common 
law system for a court to forbid a party or an attorney from 
calling_ the court's attention to its own prior decisions, from 
arguing to the court that its prior decisions were or were not 
correct, and from arguing that the court should or should 




Committee members called no-citation rules "extreme'' and 
"ludicrous," and one member~judge noted that limited citation 
rules made federal circuit judges the only govenunent officials 
who can shield themselves from being confronted with their past 
actions. 242 Members likewise dismissed concerns that permitting 
citation would slow the wheels of justice by increasing 
disposition times or make for rougher justic:e by encouraging 
shorter opinions.243 Committee members, including three circuit 
judges from circuits that had already liberalized citation to 
unpublished opinions, noted that no such delays or other 
problems were occurring in their circuits.244 Only a single 
Committee member s oke out against the citation of 
differing caseloads throughout the circuits justified different 
approaches. 246 
Although the Advisory Committee was clearly in support 
of the propose,d rule,- it was difficult to determine whether the 
judiciary on balance was for it or against it~ To address this 
issue, the Standing Committee returned the proposal to the 
Advisory Committee to have the issue studied further by the 
Federal Judicial Center and the Administrative Office of the 
241. Judicial Conference of the United States, Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules 
and Procedure, Minutes-Spring 2004 Meeting 8 (Apr. 13-14 2004), http://www.uscourts 
.gov/rules/Minutes/app0404.pdf (accessed Dec. 12, 2008; copy on file with Journal of 
Appellate Practice and Process). 
242. /d. 
243. /d. (referring generically to "parade of horribles" forecast by commentators 
opposing new rule). 
244. Jd. 
245. ld. The member called the unpublished opinions "junk law" and stated that the 
rulemaking body ought to wait for consensus on the issue. 
246. Id. 
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United States Courts.247 Both the FJC and AO did study the 
issue, and both studies refuted the claims made by opponents o.f 
proposed Rule 32.1.248 First, the AO study found that a 
permissive citation policy had no appreciable impact on either 
median dis · osition times or the nurnber of summary 
revealed that those judges believed, by a wide margin, that 
permitting citation of unpublished opinions would not increase 
the courts' workload either in checking citations or in preparing 
unpublished opinions with greater care.250 Third, the FJC's 
survey of judges in the two circuits that had re.cently liberalized 
their rules on citation (the First and D.C. Circuits) revealed that 
judges in those circuits had experienced no appreciable change 
in their workload and that their method of dealing with 
unpublished decisions had remained unchanged.251 Fourth, the 
FJC's survey of attorneys found that attorneys also predicted or 
reported no appreciable change in their workloads as a result of 
more permissive citation practices.252 Many attorneys reported 
that they already researched unpublished opinions, and most 
predicted that the rule would be a positive change in their 
practices. 253 
24 7. Judicial Conference of the United States, Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure, Minutes Meeting of June 17-18, 2004 11 (June 1 7-18, 2004 ), http://www. 
uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/ST06-2004-min.pdf (accessed Dec. 12, 2008; copy on file with 
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process); Schiltz, Much Ado About Little, supra n. 1, at 
1453. 
248. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little, supra n. 1, at 1454-57. 
249. /d. at 1454-55 (citing Memorandum from John K. Rabiej, Chief, Rules Comrn. 
Support Off., Admin. Off. of the U.S. Courts,_ to Advisory Comm. on App. Rules 1 (Feb. 
24, 2005)). 
250. Tim Reagan et al., Citations to Unpublished Opinions in the Federal Courts of 
Appeals 10, http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/citatio2.pdf/$file/citatio2.pdf (Fed. 
Jud. Ctr. 2005) & id. at 38 (tbl. J, entitled ''Unpublished Citation's Additional Work';) 
(accessed Jan. 5, 2009; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process); 
Schiltz, Much Ado About Little, supra n. 1, at 1454-55. 
251. Reagan et al., supra n. 250, at 12-13 & id. at 43 ( tbl. 0, entitled "Work after Local 
Rule Change"); Schiltz, Much Ado about Little, supra n. I, at 1455-56. 
252. Reagan et al., supra n. 250, at 17 & id. at 49 (tbl. U, entitled "Impact on Work of 
New Rule"); Schiltz, Much Ado about Little, supra n. l, at 1456. 
253. Reagan et al., supra n. 250, at 15-17 & id. at 45-48 (tbls. Q-T, entitled, 
respectively, "Wanted to Cite This Court's Unpublished Opinion," "Wanted to Cite 
Another Court's Unpublished Opinion," "Would Have Cited This Court's Unpublished 
Opinion,'' & "Would Have Cited Another Court's Unpublished Opinion"); Schiltz, Much 
Ado About Little, supra n. 1, at 1456. 
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By mid-2005, a national rule on the citation of unpublished 
opinions seemed virtually assured. Members of the two key 
committees were persuaded by the FJC and AO studies that a 
national rule on the issue was appropriate. Two members of the 
Advisory Conunittee still held out for a more limited rule akin to 
what the Solicitor General had initially proposed, but that 
Committee approved Rule 32.1, as written, in April2005.254 The 
Standing Committee unanimously approved the rule at its June 
2005 meeting.255 While the issue was much closer in the Judicial 
Conference, that body resolved the impasse with an amendment 
that limited the freedom of citation to decisions issued after 
January 1, 2007.256 The Supreme Court approved the new rule 
without comment, and Congress did not act to block the rule.257 
On December 1, 2006, Rule 32.1 took effect, but due to the post-
January 1, 2007, limitation it affected no decisions for one full 
month.258 
254. Judicial Conference of the United States, Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules 
and Procedure, Minutes Meeting of April 14-15, 2005 at 16 (Apr. 14-15 2005), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/app0405.pdf (accessed Jan. 5, 2009; copy on file 
with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). Readers interested in the committee 
discussion preceding the vote of approval might wish to review the rest of the material in 
Section IV(A) of these minutes. 
255. Judicial Conference of the United States, Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure, Minutes Meeting of June 15-16~ 2005 10-11, http://www.uscourts.gov 
/rules/Minutes/ST06-2005-min.pdf (June 15-16, 2005) (accessed Jan. 5, 2008; copy on file 
with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). Although the text of the rule itself was 
unaltered at this meeting, the Advisory Committee did vote to release with the rule only a 
shortened version of the Committee Note. /d. at 11. 
256. Judicial Conference of the United States Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial 
Conference of the United States 36-37, http://www.uscourts.gov/judconf/sept05proc_final 
.pdf (Sept. 20, 2005) (accessed Jan. 5, 2009; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice 
and Process). 
257. See Ltr. from John G. Roberts, Jr., C.J. of the U.S., to J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker, 
U.S. House of Rep. 1, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Letters_Orders.pdf (Apr. 12, 2006) 
(transmitting attached order that amends then .. existing rules to include new F.R.A.P. 32.1) 
(accessed Jan. 5, 2009; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). See 
also Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071, 2074(a) (2008) (pennitting the federal courts 
generally to make rules in the absence of Congressional objection and pennitting a rule 
published before May 1 of a given year to take effect after December I of that year if 
Congress takes no action to prevent its doing so) (available at http://uscode.house.gov). 
258. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 (providing, in subsection (a)(ii) that it applies only to opinions 
issued on or after January I, 2007). 
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2. The Text of Rule 32.1 
The new rule, by its terms, addresses only the issue of 
citation: 
(a) Citation Per111itted. A court may not prohibit or restrict 
the citation of federal judicial opinions, orders, judgments, 
or other written dispositions that have been: 
(i) designated as "unpublished," "not for publication," 
''non-precedential," ''not precedent," or the like; and 
(ii) issued on or after January 1, 2007. 
(b) Copies Required. If a party cites a federal judicial 
opinion, order, judgment, or other written disposition that is 
not available in a publicly accessible electronic database, 
the party must file and serve a copy of that opinion, order, 
jud?ID~n~, o! di~~sition with the brief or other paper in 
whtch tt ts ctted, · 
and the comment explicitly states: 
Rule 32.1 is extremely limited. It does not require any court 
to issue an unpublished opinion or forbid any court from 
doing so. It does not dictate the circumstances under which 
a court may choose to designate an opinion as 
"unpublished" or specify the procedure that a court must 
follow in making that deten11ination. It says nothing about 
what effect a court must give to one of its unpublished 
opinions or to the unpublished opinions of another court. 
Rule 32.1 addresses only the citation of federal judicial 
dispositions that have been designated as "unpublished'' or 
''non-precedential" whether or not those dispositions have 
been oublished in some way or are precedential in some 
sense.~60 
This rule, which takes no position on the precedential status of 
these unpublished though now citeable opinions, has 
addressed, to borrow the phrasing of the 1973 Committee, only 
259. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
260. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, advisory comm. n. on 2006 amendments (emphasis in 
original). 
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the ''use" issue and not the greater issue of its "philosophical 
effect. "261 
Once again, the policy and rulemaking authority has 
avoided the "morass of jurisprudence"262 involved in discussing, 
debating, and deciding on the more critical issue of what 
precedential effect these unpublished decisions should have~ 
Instead, the system's development is left once again to follow 
the supposedly natural "correspondence" between publication 
and precedential value.263 Relying upon that correspondence:....___· 
the natural trend of treating citeable things as precedent and 
unciteable things as non-precedent has led to the patchwork 
rules that have governed since the mid-1970s. If part of the goal 
of Rule 32.1 was to bring uniformity to the issue, it has mostly 
failed.264 But more importantly, it has not only failed to resolve 
the critical issue of whether these decisions are precedent, it has 
chosen not even to address that issue.265 Instead, the policy of 
the 1973 Committee, to allow the pragmatic tail to wag the 
jurisprudential dog, has been repeated. The policy that initially 
led to the uneven rules regarding publication, citation, and 
precedent, which in tum led to the Rule 32.1 debate and 
proposal, is now being repeated. 
What remains to be done, in the wake of Rule 32.1, is to 
wade into the "morass of jurisprudence" and confront the issue 
of precedential status. It is an issue of both principle and 
pragmatism, of what we must do and what we ought to do. To 
continue to pass on the important question in favor of the more 
approachable question is to perpetuate a jurisprudence of doubt. 
261. Standards for Publication, supra n. 4, at 21 (stating of the recommendation to 
address only citation and not precedent that "[i]t deals with use rather than philosophical 
effect"). 
262. /d. at 20. 
263. !d. at 21 (stating that the recommendation "relies on the correspondence of 
publication and precedential value on the one hand, and of non .. publication and non-
precedential value on the other."). 
264. It has not even brought unifonnity on the citation issue, as it is limited in 
application to decisions issued after January I, 2007. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.l(a)(ii). This 
is, at most, a partial partial solution. 
265. Schiltz, Much Ado about Little, supra n. 1, at 1448 ("[M]embers concluded that the 
Advisory Committee should not embrace one side or the other of the debate over the 
constitutionality of issuing nonprecedential opinions. Rather, the Advisory Committee 
decided to limit its involvement to the issue of citation. To date, the Advisory Committee 
has not wavered from this position."). See also Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 advisory comm. n. 
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What follows is an examination of the various doubts expressed 
over the denial of the precedential status of some decisions 
under the misnomer "unpublished opinions." These doubts are 
both principled and pragmatic; that is, they address both 
potential constitutional infirmities and perceived practical 
problems with the practice of declaring some decisions ex ante 
to be non-precedential. 
V. THE DEBATE OVER PRECEDENTIAL STATUS OF UNPUBLISHED 
DECISIONS 
For the vast majority of the history of common law courts 
in America and England, the publication status of an opinion 
was not directly determinative of its precedential value. That is, 
while it may have been difficult for litigants to find a court's 
past decisions, nothing prevented a litigant from bringing such a 
decision to the court's attention or suggested that the court need 
not follow it.266 While the 1973 Committee's recommendation, 
on its face, claims only to deal with whether an unpublished case 
can be cited as precedent and not whether it is precedent, for all 
practical purposes, this is a distinction without a difference. The 
1973 Committee knew full well that the inability to cite a case 
effectively removed it from the body of precedent as well as 
from view; moreover, the Committee was aware that the trend 
would be to treat non-citable items as non-precedents owing to 
the "correspondence of publication and precedential value on the 
one hand, and of non-publication and non-precedential value on 
the other. "267 
From the beginning, limited publication and citation rules 
in the federal courts of appeals were heavily criticized.268 As a 
1985 FJC Staff Report explains, "[ o ]f the recent innovations, 
none has been more controversial than the practice of disposing 
of some cases without a published decision."269 And a note 
266. See Baker, supra n. 47, at 204 (pointing out that, even in the earliest days of 
reporting cases, "[t]he rolls continued to be the most authoritative source of precedents into 
later times, and it was common for counsel to 'vouch the record' when citing a previous 
case.") 
267. Standards for Publication, supra n. 4, at 21. 
268. Stienstra, supra n. 8, at 2. 
269. !d. See also id. at 13-14 (discussing commentators' concerns about unfairness). 
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critical of non-citation rules and the non-precedent effect that 
followed them, for example, examines the limited publication 
and citation rules existing in the federal courts of appeals in the 
late 1970s, then proceeds to examine the rules' effect on the 
precedential status of unpublished cases.270 Stating that "[t]hese 
practices raise several problems,"271 the author considers the 
importance of all cases in clarifying the law, the difficulty 
unpublished opinions cause in the appeals process and several 
potential Constitutional infirmities in the practice.172 Similarly, 
an authoritative article published in the late 1970s examines the 
arguments in favor of limited publication and citation and finds 
them both fundamentally flawed and vulnerable to considerable 
counterattack.273 In fact, its authors note at the start of their 
description of the arguments in favor of the then-existing rules 
that 
[t]he argument in favor of the limited publication and no-
citation rule has not been carefully and completely 
delineated. Conunentators have been content to 
characterize it as ~an argument based on judicial econorv4' 
although some oftts other aspects have also been noted.2 
The article then proceeds to lay bare the unstated premises of the 
limited-citation argument, refuting them at every turn and 
270. David Dunn, Student Author, Unreported Decisions in the United States Courts of 
Appeals, 63 Cornell L. Rev. 148 (1977). 
271. !d. at 135. 
272. !d. at 135-45. 
273. See generally Reynolds & Richman, No-Citation Rules, supra n. 5. In addition to 
. . 
this seminal article on the issue, Reynolds and Richman have been prolific in their further 
examination of this and related issues, and in publishing their scholarship in this area. See 
e.g. William M. Richman, Much Ado About the Tip of an Iceberg, 62 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 
1723 (2005); William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, Justice and More Judges, 15 
J .L. & Pol. 559 (1999); William M. Richman, An Argument on the Record for More 
Federal Judgeships, 1 J. App. Prac. & Process 37 (1999); William M. Riclunan, Rationing 
Judgeships Has Lost Its Appeal, 24 Pepp. L. Rev. 911 (1997); William L. Reynolds & 
William M . . Richman, The New Certiorari Courts: Congress Must Expand the Numb~.r of 
Judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals to Restore Their Traditional Role, 80 Judicature 206 
(Mar.-Apr. 1997); William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, Studying Deck Chairs on 
the Titanic, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 1290 (1996); William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, 
Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certioriari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 
Cornell L. Rev. 273 (1996); Reynolds & Richman, Limited Publication, supra n. 5. 
274. Reynolds & Richman, No-Citation Rules, supra n. 5, at 1181 (footnotes omitted). 
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ultimately adding significant counterarguments based on judicial 
responsibility and accountability.275 
From the outset, considerable doubt about the wisdom of 
limited publication, citation, and precedent has existed: 
The case against the limited publication/no-citation rules is 
a strong one. The premises upon which the rules are based 
are subject to serious question, and powerful arguments can 
be advanced against the entire concept. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that a significant number of critics have spoken 
against the system- a critics from the bench, the bar, a.nd the 
schools. 
Furthermore, the widespread adoption of the limited 
publication/no-citation rules a major change in the 
operation of the circuit courts has been accomplished 
with relativelv little public debate or legislative 
• • • 276 partiClpatlOD. 
Still, such critics and their strong criticisms were unable to alter 
the system, which was by then firmly fixed on limited 
publication and citation as the pragmatic solution to the ever-
increasing federal caseload. Though both the 1973 Cornn1ittee 
and every official rulemaking body since has avoided the 
underlying jurisprudential issues, both the issues and the 
accompanying criticisms of the scheme remain. 
A. Criticisms of the Premises of Limited Publication, Citation, 
and Precedent 
The justificatory arguments in favor of limited publication 
and limited citation have already been aptly outlined 
elsewhere.277 It will nonetheless be helpful to take a similar 
approach here, re-framing those arguments and revisiting them 
in light of the courts' additional experience, the expanded 
scholarship on the issue, and the opinion-publication realities 
that presently exist. 
275. /d. at 1167-1205. 
276. Id. at 1205 (footnotes omitted). 
277. The analysis in this section owes much to that undertaken by Professors Reynolds 
and Richman in No Citation Rules, supra n. 5. See generally id. 
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The premises278 for preventing publication are essentially 
three-fold: ( 1) appellate opinions can be divided into those that 
make law and those that apply law, only the forn1er of which 
need to be published; (2) publication of all opinions imposes 
costs on both the opinion creators (courts) and opinion 
consumers (the public); and (3) judges can determine before 
drafting an opinion whether a case is one that will make law or 
one that merely applies law.279 
The premises for preventing citation were essentially two-
fold: (1) the costs savings envisioned by limiting publication 
would be lost if citation were allowed; and (2) allowing citation 
of unpublished opinions would result in unfairness between 
litigants.280 These premises have now been largely rejected as 
inaccurate and also as having been overcome by more important 
concems.
281 Given that Rule 32.1 has resolved this issue in favor 
of citation, there is no need to explicate this argument at great 
length.282 But because the reasons for denying citation are often 
imported into discussions of denying precedential status, it will 
be touched on briefly. 
Finally, the premises for preventing opinions from being 
precedential are almost entirely implied, following without 
separate principled consideration from the first two issues.283 
Essentially, those premises are also two-fold and mirror the 
278. The use of the word "premises" is intended only to suggest underlying reasons that 
have been specified for examination; it is not intended to suggest that this discussion 
purports to be a fonnal logical proof. Like the surveys of the relevant arguments in favor of 
no-citation rules in the articles that preceded this one, this is simply an effort to state 
clearly, and to address directly, the reasons for limiting publication, citation, and precedent. 
279. Reynolds & Richman, No-Citation Rules, supra n. 5, at 1188-89; Standards for 
Publication, supra n. 4, at 6-8. 
280. Reynolds & Richman, No-Citation Rules, supra n. 5, at 1188-89; Standards for 
Publication, supra n. 4, at 19. 
281. Penelope Pether, Sorcerers, Not Apprentices: How Judicial Clerks and Staff 
Attorneys Impoverish US. Law, 39 Arizona St. L.J. 1, 7 (2007) (noting the adoption of Fed. 
R. App. P. 32.1 pennitting citation, and characterizing the "charges leveled at 
institutionalized unpublication" as "multiplicitous and damning"). See also Stephen R. 
Barnett, No-Citation Rules under Siege: A Battlefield Report and Analysis, 5 J. App. Prac. 
& Process 473, 497 (2003) (noting that the citadel of non-citation was then falling). 
282. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1. 
283. See Standards for Publication, supra n. 4, at 20-21 (relying entirely on the 
correspondence between functional publication and precedent rather than addressing the 
issue directly); Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 advisory comm. n. (taking no position on the issue of 
precedent). 
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reasons for preventing citation: (1) the costs savings envisioned 
by limiting publication and citation would be lost if decisions 
were truly precedential; and (2) allowing unpublished cases to 
have precedential value would result in unfairness between 
litigants. In light of the developments in legal research 
technology and the recent decision to allow all unpublished 
cases to be cited, the foundation for denying certain decisions 
precedential status is terribly weak- even before one addresses 
the potential Constitutional infirmities and pragmatic objections. 
B~ Premises Supporting the Prevention of Comprehensive 
Publication 
The argument in favor of limiting publication of court 
decisions is essentially a practical argument of judicial and 
litigant economy.284 It relies on three premises: (1) appellate 
opinions can be divided into those that make law and those that 
apply law, only the former of which need to be published; (2) 
publication of all opinions impose,d costs on both the opinion 
creators (courts) and opinion consumers (the public); and (3) 
judges can determine before drafting an opinion whether a case 
is one that will make law or one that merely applies law. Each of 
these premises is significantly flawed. 
1. The Law-Making/Law-Applying Distinction 
The most general and theoretical premise is that court 
decisions serve one of two purposes. A given decision either 
makes law law-making) or merely applies the law (dispute-
resolving).28 According to this model, a given decision either 
makes new law by expanding the scope of existing law or 
writing a new principle into the body of law, or simply applies 
284. Reynolds & Richman, No-Citation Rules, supra n. 5 at 1188-89 (noting the 
argument that "[p ]ublication of all appellate opinions is excessively costly" with respect to 
both judges' time devoted to writing additional opinions and lawyers' time expended on 
researching an expanded group of opinions). 
285. Standards for Publication, supra n. 4, at 2-3. 
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the law without altering it.286 If this dichotomy is meaningful, 
then one would need only to look at the law-making decisions to 
know the law and could safely ignore the dispute-resolving 
cases, which merely apply the law to other circumstances. 
This distinction itself is flawed in several respects. First, it 
is false; it is a distinction without a meaningful difference. Any 
decision, even one that merely applies the law to facts identical 
to a prior case, makes law. The existence of multiple cases on a 
given point adds to the predictive power of precedent. Because 
the court has decided similar cases repeatedly, frequently, or 
recently a lawyer may reasonably assume that it is more likely to 
do so in the present case. The strength of the precedent, that is 
how likely a court will be to justify departure from it, can be 
detennined from these qualities. In plain terms, an advocate 
would rather argue from a line of cases showing repeated and 
frequent application of law to similar facts that have been re-
affirmed recently, than merely rely on a single case. Repeated 
applications demonstrate acceptance of a principle of law by 
multiple courts and multiple panels, with each additional case 
adding to the "well-established" line of authority advocates so 
love to reference. Frequent application indicates a robust 
principle in active use, which makes it harder for a court to 
depart from that rule than would a single holding, which could 
be viewed as idiosyncratic or aberrational. Recent applications 
of the principle allow for an argument that the principle has not 
faded over time in its applicability to modem societal and legal 
circumstances. All of these benefits presume identical factual 
settings, a true rarity,287 but even in those cases, significant 
predictive benefit can be garnered by later litigants. 
Second, very few cases are identical in all respects to other 
decided cases, and in this respect even minor variations matter. 
286. !d. (contrasting opinions that "pen nit the parties and their attorneys to see that the 
judges have considered their positions and arguments and to see the reasoning on which the 
court reached its conclusion" with opinions that "provide the stuff of the law," which are 
described as those that "pet rnit an understanding of legal doctrine, and . . . accommodate 
legal doctrine to changing conditions"). 
287. See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 571,577 (1987) (pointing out 
that "[n]o two events are exactly alike," and that "[f]or a decision to be precedent for 
another decision does not require that the facts of the earlier and the later cases be 
absolutely identical," for "[ w ]ere that required, nothing would be precedent for anything 
else"). 
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When a court decides that a case is factually similar enough to 
come within the ambit of a given precedent, or when it decides 
that it is factually dissimilar enou,gh to fall outside the rule 
articulated in a particular precedent, that adds something to the 
law, even if the distinction is minor. The typical common law 
action, after all, doe-s -not -present binary questions about the 
applicability or non-applicability of a general legal rule,: such as 
whether the tort of negligence requires causation. "Instead, the 
determination of liability or no liability typically involves subtle, 
circumstance-based questions like whether the defendant's 
particular conduct, considered in light of decided cases, itself 
amounts to a breach of duty."288 Thus, each new, slightly 
different, case represents an expansion, retraction, or 
clarification of the law's reach, however, slight. Each case adds 
something to the contours of the law. 
Third, the publication of so-called dispute-resolving 
opinions serves an important institutional g.oal in allowing for 
proper review. Where decisions are not published,-they are set 
outside the courts' normal range of vision, which reduces the 
likelihood of en bane or Supreme Court review. Take, for 
example, the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Rivera-
Sanchez,289 in which the court acknowledged that no less than 
twenty unpublished circuit opinions had been rendered on an 
unresolved issue, and that those decisions had obviously divided 
three ways on the proper rule to be applied.290 Not only would 
288. Danny J. Boggs & Brian P. Brooks, Unpublished Opinions &, the Nature of 
Precedent, 4 Green Bag 2d 17, 23 (2000). See also Healy, supra n. 36, at 66 (remarking on 
Lord Coke, s belief that judges should "refine" the law by "declaring its principles with 
even greater precision and renewing it by application to the matter at hand," and citing 
John Greville Agard Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law (Cambridge U. 
Press 1987) and H. Jefferson Powell, The Modern Misunderstanding of.Original Intent, 54 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1511 (1987)). 
289. 222 F.3d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that twenty cases .over a two-ye(l! 
period had been resolved by unpublished opinion, yielding inconsistent outcomes until the 
Ninth Circuit requested, in contravention of its own restrictive rules on citation, a list of 
these opinions from counsel). 
290. /d. Of the twenty decisions identified in Rivera-Sanchez, eleven decisions ruled in 
favor of one procedure, six in favor of another, and three remanded to force the district 
courts to take a position on the proper process. See also St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. 
Brotherhood of Ry., Airline and S.S~ Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station 
Employees, 484 U.S. 907 (1987) (Mem.) (Brennan, J. and White, J., dissenting from denial 
of certiorari) (pointing out that Fifth Circuit's unpublished opinion created a split between 
the circuits on an '"important question of federal law" that "could easily result in the same 
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publication of these decisions have established a clear rule for 
the circuit and avoided needless litigation, if the disparity 
persisted due to an actual split between panels, it would have 
allowed for an en bane resolution. 
Similarly, lack of published opinions shields decisions from 
Supreme Court review. Since the limited publication rules went 
into effect in the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court has granted 
certiorari on very few unpublished appellate decisions, though 
that number is rising.291 This occurs because a circuit's decision 
not to publish a given case signals that the case is routine, even 
when it is not. For example in Edge Broadcasting Company v. 
United States,292 the Fourth Circuit declared a federal statute 
limiting lottery advertising unconstitutional in an unpublished 
opinion. In its reversal of that decision, the Supreme Court 
expressed surprise and dismay that a Court of A peals could 
of cases from Supreme Court review also occurs because lack of 
detailed published opinions creates a less thorough record, 
which itself discourages Supreme Court review. For example, in 
County of Los Angeles v. Kling,294 the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari and issued a summary reversal in a case that the Ninth 
Circuit had decided in a brief, unpublished, non-citeable 
opinion, but Justice Stevens dissented, calling the Ninth 
Circuit's practice "plainly wrong" and noting: 
As this Court's summary disposition today demonstrates, 
the Court of Appeals would have been well advised to 
collective .. bargaining contract, or identical ones, being interpreted in different ways in 
different circuits"). 
291. David C. Vladeck & Mitu Gulati, Judicial Triage: Reflections on the Debate Over 
Unpublished Opinions, 62 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1667, 1684 & 1684 n. 61 (2005) (noting 
that the court took only twelve such cases in the 1974 to 2000 tenns and another twelve in 
the 2001 to 2004 tenns ). See also David R. Cleveland, Draining the Morass: Ending the 
Jurisprudential Unpublication System, 92 Marq. L. Rev. 685 (2009). Of course, if 
unpublished decisions were easy applications of settled law to obvious facts, the Supreme 
Court should be granting certiorari in zero cases with unpublished decisions. 
292. 956 F.2d 263 (tbl.) (per curiam), 1992 WL 35795 (4th Cir. 1992). Note that this 
opinion appears to have been released for publication only on August 31, 1993. See Edge 
Broad. Co. v. U.S., 5 F. 3d 59 (4th Cir. 1992 ). 
293. U.S. v. Edge Broad. Co, 509 U.S. 418, 425 n. 3 (1993) ("We deem it remarkable 
and unusual that although the Court of Appeals affutned a judgment that an Act of 
Congress was Wlconstitutional as applied, the court found it appropriate to announce its 
judgment in an unpublished per curiam opinion."). 
294. 474 u.s. 936 (1985). 
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discuss the record in greater depth. One reason it failed to 
do so is that the members of the panel decided that the 
issues presented by this case did not warrant discussion in a 
published opinion that could be "cited to or by the courts of 
this circuit, save as provided by Rule 21 (c)." . . . That 
decision not to publish the opinion or permit it to be 
cited like the decision to promulgate a rule spawning a 
body of secret law was plainly wrong. 
The brevity of analysis in the Court of Appeals' 
unpublished, non-citable opinion, however, does not justify 
the Court's summary reversal. 
• • • 
For, like a court of appeals that issues an opinion that may 
not be printed or cited, this Court then engages in decision-
making without the discipline and accountability that the 
. f . . . . 295 preparation o· optntons requtres. 
Finally, by not publishing opinions, the courts of appeals 
avoid creating clear circuit rules, thus obfuscating circuit splits. 
This is not to say, however, that the Supreme Court never takes 
notice of unpublished opinions it does296 or that the Court 
has accepted t~e ~pea~s co~' claims that these. decisions are 
non-precedent1al.2 Netther ts true. Nevertheless, tt seems clear 
that non-publication interferes with the proper review process in 
federal cases. Indeed, the concern that this is occurring has been 
noted by individual Jll:stices of the. ~upre~e Court. ~or exampleS 
though the Court dented certtorart tn Smlth v. Unlted States,29 
Justice Blackmun noted that ''[b]ecause the Court of Appeals' 
unpublished opinion cannot be squared with our harmless-error 
precedents, I would vacate the judgment and direct the Court of 
Appeals to review the sentence under the proper standard,'' 
295. Id. at 938, 940 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes and internal citations omitted). 
296. See e.g. Michael Hannon, A Closer Look at Unpublished Opinions in the United 
States Courts of Appeals, 3 J. App. Prac. & Process 199, 241-50 (2001) (collecting 
Supreme Court decisions and denials of writs involving unpublished decisions in an 
appendix). 
297. See e.g. C.I.R. v. McCoy, 484 U.S. 3, 7 (1987) ("The Court of Appeals exceeded its 
jurisdiction regardless of nonpublication and regardless of any assumed lack of 
precedential effect of a ruling that is unpublished."). 
298. 502 U.S. 1017 (1991) (Blackmun, O'Connor, & Souter, JJ., dissenting from denial 
of writ of certiorari). 
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stating in addition that 
[t]he fact that the Court of Appeals' opinion is unpublished 
is irrelevant. Nonpublication must not be a convenient 
means to prevent review. An unpublished opinion may 
have a lingering effect in the circuit and surely is as 
important to the parties concerned as is a published 
. • 299 
optnton. 
115 
Similarly, in Waller v. United States,300 two justices dissented 
from a denial of certiorari on the ground that a recent 
unpublished decision of the Ninth Circuit put it at odds with the 
First Circuit.301 
In addition to promoting proper review, publication of 
dispute-resolving opinions serves another important function: 
preserving judicial accountability and the perception of judicial 
accountability. What was once perceived as the "weakest" 
branch302 is now perceived as increasingly powerful, and by 
some, as too powerful. 303 Calls for greater judicial accountability 
and transparency are likewise on the rise. The idea that an 
appellate court can make law that is good in only a single 
instance and not to be relied upon by later litigants is contrary to 
the public's sense of how a court ought to proceed. We have 
long viewed courts as our guardians of fairness and protection 
against all others individuals, .organizations, and even the other 
two branches of govertunent. 
299. /d. at 1019-20 & 1020 n.*. 
300. 504 U.S. 962 (1992) (White & O'Connor, Jl, dissenting from d~nial of writ of 
certiorari). 
301. /d. at 964-65 (White & O'Connor JJ., dissenting); see also Hyman v. Rickman, 446 
U.S. 989, 990-92 (1980) (Blackmun, Brennan) & Marshall, JJ., dissenting from denial of 
writ of certiorari on the ground that the unpublished opinion at issue was in conflict with 
opinions of other circuits on the issue of right to appointed counsel). 
302. See The Federalist No. 78 at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (reprinted in The Federalist 
Papers (New Am. Lib./Mentor Books 1961)). 
303. See e.g. Kathleen Hall Jamieson & Michael Hennessy, Public Understanding of 
and Support for the Courts: Survey Results, 95 Geo. LJ. 899, 901 (2007) (citing data from 
two national surveys indicating that twenty-eight percent of Americans polled believed that 
the Supreme Court "has too much power"); Jonah Goldberg, Senate ~'Show Trial'' is 
Product of a Too-Poweiful Court, USA Today llA (Jan. 11, 2006) (taking position that 
Senate;s rigorous examination of nominees for Supreme Court is justified by significant 
power invested in Justices, here likened to ''unelected monarchs"); Lance Eric Neff, Keys 
to the Kingdom: Interpretive Power and Societal Influence During Two Ages, 7 Fla. 
Coastal L. Rev. 697, 700-01 & 701 n. 19 (2006) (noting that the judiciary is commonly 
perceived as being ''too powerful" and relatively unaccountable). 
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2. Costs to the Courts and the Public 
Assuming that decisions can be meaningfully divided into 
thos_e that need publishing and those that can safely remain 
unpublished, the second premise then states that the publication 
of all opinions imposes undue costs on both the courts and the 
public. These costs can be divided, for the sake of analysis, into 
four parts: the costs of creating decisions, the costs of 
publication, the costs of consumption, and the costs to the 
system. 
The costs of creating these decisions include the use of 
judicial resources sufficient to produce what might be called a 
publication-worthy opinion.304 In 1978, the perception was that 
greater study was needed to determine if there were any cost-
savings associated with the widespread use of unpublished 
opinions. 305 Given the current state of affairs, where all 
decisions, including those designated as ''unpublished,'' are 
published by commercial legal publishers, the courts' own 
websites, or both, it seems untrue that the costs of publication 
are deleterious to the courts.306 The costs of publication, which 
are essentially the costs of publishing and disseminating: the 
decisions, were once claimed to 'be too great for publishers to 
bear: "The burden on the publishing industry to continue to 
supply a complete reporting services [sic] at prices that are 
reasonably tolerable appears to be beyond their capacity."307 It is 
unclear what support ever existed for this proposition, but any 
concerns about the cost of publication being too great for the 
publishers seems thoroughly undercut by the increasing use of 
computer-assisted legal research, online access to legal 
databases, and the courts' own provision of full-text searchable 
opinions pursuant to the £-Government Act.308 
304. See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1176-77 (9th Cir. 2001) (characterizing the 
"solemn judicial act" of opinion writing as "an exacting and extremely time-consuming 
task"). 
305. Reynolds & Riclunan, No-Citation Rules, supra n. 5, at 1191. 
306. Shuldberg, supra n. 150, at 558 (forecasting, more than a decade ago, that the 
library of the future might be designed for readers who "sit at computer tenninals searching 
through compact discs or on-line infonnation rathe.r than browsing through bookshelves~"). 
307. Standards for Publication, supra n. 4, at 8. 
308. Shuldberg, supra n. 150; at 558. 
• 
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Another cost often claimed to justify limited publication is 
the cost of consumption. This includes the c-osts of maintaining 
libraries as well as the costs of searching the opinions once 
published. 309 The former cost, while .real, is adequately 
addressed by technology, government provision of opinions, and 
so forth. The latter is unavoidable unless literal publication can 
be prevented. While the courts can designate certain opinions as 
unpublished, it cannot prevent litigants from taking the time to 
review them a practice that litigants seem eager to engage 
in.310 Litigants will continue to do so now that such decisions are 
citeable. This cost, like the cost of actual publication, seems to 
be willingly borne by litigants who want to know what the court 
has done in the past. This impulse reflects a strong intuitive 
sense of how the courts work (and should work), which no 
amount of limiting publication can rebut.311 
Finally, a perceived cost that is occasionally mentioned, 
and has been since the advent of universal publication of court 
decisions, is that the system itself may be crushed under the 
avalanche of new opinions. There is simply, the argument goes, 
too much case law for the legal system to work with, which will 
lead to unspecified ills .. 312 This argument is difficult to counter 
because of its lack of specificity. Some have suggested that it 
reflects nothing more than "a longing for an earlier, simpler day 
when an attorney supposedly could practice out of Blackstone 
and a few volumes of state reports."313 In addition, it is a 
difficult sentiment to credit when some judges suggest that the 
problem is that there are too few precedents rather than too 
309. Standards for Publication, supra n. 4, at 7-8. 
310. Robel, Practice of Precedent, supra n. 5, at 405-06 (examining then-recent surveys 
of federal judges and lawyers); see also Robel, Myth, supra n. 5, at 949 (noting in a 
discussion ·of lawyers' interest in unpublished opinions that it would, for example, be 
difficult to "discemn a "pattern" of the court's favoring or disfavoring certain arguments or 
types of cases "if one were limited to the court's. published expressions"). 
311. Robel, Practice of Precedent, supra n. 5, at 406 (pointing out that "unpublished 
opinions are routinely (indeed, promiscuously) cited by the federal courts of appeals and 
reHed upon by the federal district courts") . 
.312. Standards for Publication,- supra n. 4, at 6 (asserting that "[t]he limits on the 
capacity of judges and lawyers to produce., research and assimilate the substance of judicial 
·opinions are dangerously near"). 
313. Reynolds & Richman, No-Citation Rules, supra n. 5, at 1191. 
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many.314 Moreover, the fear of a crush of case law is countered 
by both present practice and the desire of modem practicing 
lawyers to embrace more, not less, case law. For example, the 
number of federal appellate court dispositions either published 
(5506) or total (34,580) in the twelve-month period ending 
September 30, 2006, would no doubt have seemed outrageously 
high to a practitioner in 1915, but the number has not proven 
crushing to the system.315 Indeed, those whom this alleged cost 
would potentially crush have shown both a willingness to 
research additional (that is, unpublished) d.ecisions, even whe.n · 
they were unciteable and treated as non-precedents.316 
Moreover, the practitioners and judges in circuits that allow the 
citati.on of such o.pinions have re~o~ed. little . or no additional 
cost tn dotng so.31 At bottom, the ltmttatton of precedents based 
on the premise that it would be too much law for lawyers to 
work with must be rejected because it makes no sense and leads 
to a perverse conclusion: 
Surely proponents of this "fairness'' rationale cannot mean 
that the courts ought to adopt Harrison Bergeron-like rules 
that level the playing field by imposing artificial 
impediments on lawyers smart enough to follow 
developments in their field of specialty. Yet that is their 
. bl . t• . 318 1nescapa e tmp tcatton. 
314. Posner, supra n. 147, at 166. See also Commission on Structural Alternatives for 
the Federal Courts of Appeals, Working Papers at 48 (1998) (Thirty-seven percent of 
federal district judges surveyed indicated some area of circuit law as "inconsistent or 
difficult to know" and twenty-nine percent identified the problem as a lack of circuit 
decisions on point). 
315. Judicial Business Table S-3, supra n. 6, at 52 (showing data on published, 
unpublished, and total dispositions in period surveyed). 
316. Reagan et al., supra n. 250, at 15-17 (indicating that survey data shows attorneys' 
strong desire to use unpublished opinions); see also Robel, Practice of Precedent, supra n. 
5, at 401 (noting that "lawyers and judges value these opinions despite the rules limiting 
. . 
citation"). See also Robel, Myth, supra n. 5, at 957-58 (indicating that government-agency 
lawyers consult and use unpublished opinions); Schiltz, Much Ado about Little, supra n. 1, 
at 43-45 (collecting arguments in favor of Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 ). 
317. Reagan et al., supra n. 250, at 17 ( 49 tbl. U) (indicating that judges in circuits 
allowing citation have reported, on average, no appreciable impact in their work caused by 
allowing citation to the now published, unpublished decisions). See also Schiltz, Citation of 
Unpublished Opinions, supra n. 1, at 43-45 (collecting arguments in favor of Fed. R. App. 
P. 32.1 ). 
318. Boggs & Brooks, supra n. 288, at 21-22 (footnote omitted). 
'· 
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Finally, no one has yet fully tallied the cost of "running the 
unpublic-ation machine," but "[s]uch partial accounts of these 
processes as they exist suggest that they are an enormous drain 
on court resources."319 Moreover, it is quite possible that the 
current practice of preventing many cases from being published 
and precedential adds to the courts' workload: 
The current appellate practice of hiding precedents may 
have an adverse effect on the courts' workload. The greater 
the number of precedents, the greater the volume of law, 
the greater the number of solutions to legal issues, and the 
easier it would be to determine whether an authoritative 
answer to a legal issue has been judicially sanctioned. 
Assuming that most lawyers would not raise issues on 
appeal that an appellate court would consider already 
decided, an increased volume of law would serve to lower 
the number of appeals and the number of issues raised in 
those. cases th~t ~re cmpealed far more effectively than 
sanctions for frivoltty.3 
Whatever the support for limited publication on cost 
grounds initially, changes in teclmology and the undoing of 
citation limitations seem to indicate that little support for limited 
publication remains . 
3. Judicial Ability to Distinguish Law-Making from Law-
Applying Ex Ante 
The final premise, that judges can determine, before 
drafting an opinion, whether a case is of the law-making variety 
or merely dispute resolving, is both critical to the idea of limited 
publication and at the same time wholly without merit. This 
. . 
premise would suggest that it is critical to the idea of limited 
publication because it is the court's ability to designate some 
319. Pether, supra n. 5, at 1522 (footnote omitted). The evocative phrase "unpublication 
machine" refers to the entire process of producing unpublished decisions and then dealing 
with them after they are, perhaps ironically, published. Maintaining a two-track system and 
dealing with two tiers of cases carries unstudied costs. 
320. Cappalli, supra n. 5, at 769 (footnotes omitted) (citing, among other sources, 
Posner, supra n. 147 at 166 (suggesting that "the aggregate value of unpublished, opinions 
as sources of guidance to the bar and to lower-court judges ... might well outweigh the 
costs ... of publishing")). 
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cases as law-making (to be published) and dispute-resolving (not 
to be published) that allows for the judicial time-savings of 
writing a less thorough, detailed, and polished opinion. Without 
the ability to determine in advance whether a case will lead to a 
published decision, the court would gain very little in the way of 
cost savings.321 At the same time, the premise that judges can 
make this determination ex ante is inherently flawed. 
First, the concept that any case can be said to be purel 
Because there is a value in even the slightest change in the law 
as well as repetitions of the law's application, "[t]he legal 
system needs not merely the leading case but also the 
expansions and contractions of old, verbally stable rules that are 
found in humdrum applications, or what we might call the 'rules 
in operation.' "323 
Second, we are all poorly suited to predict the future. As 
Justice Stevens succinctly states: 
A rule which authorizes any court to censor the future 
citation of its own opinions rests on a false premise. Such a 
rule assumes that an author is a reliable judge of the quality 
and importance of his own work product. If I need 
authority to demonstrate the invalidity of that assumption, I 
refer you to a citizen of Illinois who gave a brief talk in 
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania that he did not expect to be long 
remembered. Judges are the last persons who should be 
authorized to detern1ine which of their decisions should be 
long remembered. 324 
Third, judges are poorly situated at the time they write an 
opinion to know what value that opinion may have to future 
litigants. The value of a decision as a precedent lies in its factual 
similarity to a case that follows it. The present system of 
allowing judges to decide prospectively which of their decisions 
are law and which are not "starkly reverses centuries of conunon 
321. Reynolds & Richman, No-Citation Rules, supra n. 5, at 1191-93. 
322. See Section V.B.1, supra. 
323. Cappalli, supra n. 5, at 769. 
324. John Paul Stevens, J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Remarks (Ill. St. B. Assn. Centennial 
Dinner, Springfield, IlL Jan. 22, 1977), quoted in Reynolds & Richman, No-Citation Rules, 
supra n. 5, at 1192 (quoting Brief for Amicus Curiae Chi. Council of Law. at 37, Browder 
v. Dept. of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257 (1978) (available at 1977 WL 189280)). 
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law tradition."325 The power and the duty to detennine the 
precedential effect of a decision has traditionally rested not with 
the precedent-making court but with the precedent-applying 
court.326 It is only with a set of new facts in hand, to which the 
rule is to be applied, that a court can deterrnine whether a prior 
case is or is not a valid precedent. 327 
Fourth, evidence suggests that many cases that are plainly 
law-making are being designated unpublished. 328 These include 
novel interpretations of the law, reversals of what the district 
court believed to be the law, split decisions, decisions at 
variance with other panels of the same appellate courts, and 
decisions that evidence circuit splits, to name a few.329 In fact, 
choosing incorrectly imposes additional costs on the system by 
hiding cases from review, preventing exposure of splits within 
and between circuits, depriving litigants of precedents from 
which to detertnine behavior and outcomes, encouraging 
identical cases to be brought when they could be avoided, 
disparate treatment of litigants, and erosion of respect for the 
courts.330 
In addition, those arguing from the premise that judges can 
distinguish readily between cases that make law and those that 
apply it presume that judges are making determinations about 
what will and will not be published based only on whether the 
case adds something new to the law. If judges are making 
publication decisions based on other facts, and both first-hand 
accounts and objective research indicate that this is so, then the 
system is even more flawed. Judge Richard Arnold of the Eighth 
Circuit expressed uneasiness at the system, which encourages 
strategic thinking among judges wishing to establish certain 
325. Cappalli, supra n. 5, at 772. 
326. /d. at 773. 
327. /d. Accord K.N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush 53 (Oceana Pub., Inc. 1973) 
(pointing out that "the true rule of the case [is] what it will be made to stand for by another 
later courf' (emphasis in original)). See also id. at 62-66. 
328. Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts 
Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 71, 120 (2001). See 
also e.g. US. v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. at 425 n. 3 (expressing surprise and dismay at 
one circuit's decision to render an unpublished decision charting new Constitutional 
ground). 
329. Merritt & Brudney, supra n. 328, at 113-14. 
330. See e.g. Section V.B. l, supra. 
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precedents or to avoid establishing others: 
[I]f, after hearing argument, a judge in conference thinks 
that a certain decision should be reached, but also believes 
that the decision is hard to justify under the law, he or she 
can achieve the result, assuming agreement by the other 
members of the panel, by deciding the case in an 
unpublished opinion and sweeping the difficulties under the 
rQg. Again, I'm not saying that this has ever occurred in 
any particular case, but a system that encourages this sort 
of behavior, or is at least open to it, has to be subject to 
question in any world in which judges are human beings.331 
Judge Wald of the D.C. Circuit was even more concerned and 
even more candid, pointing out that 
a double track system allows for deviousness and abuse. I 
have seen judges pwposely compromise on an unpublished 
decision incorporating an agreed-upon result in order to 
avoid a time-consuming public debate about what law 
controls. I have even seen wily would-be dissenters go 
along with a result they do not like so long as it is not 
elevated to a precedent. We do occasionally sweep 
troublesome issues under the rug, though most will not stay 
332 put for long. 
The full scope and effect of incidents like those Judge Wald 
experienced are difficult to measure. One study of published and 
unpublished decisions on asylum cases in the Ninth Circuit333 
has indicated that judges engage in strategic decisionmaking 
about publication that is unrelated to the precedential value of a 
particular case: 
[V]oting and publication are, for some judges, strategically 
intertwined: for example, judges may be prepared to 
acquiesce in decisions that run contrary to their own 
preferences, and to vote with the majority, as long as the 
331. Arnold, supra n. 21, at 223. 
332. Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial 
Writings, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1371, 1374 (1995) (discussing her own observations as a 
judge on the D. C. Circuit). 
333. David S. Law, Strategic Judicial Lawmaking: Ideology, Publication, and Asylum 
Law in the Ninth Circuit, 73 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 817, 823 (2005) (observing that "[t]he 
empirical literature on publication is sparse"). 
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decision remains unpublished, but can be driven to dissent 
if the majority insists upon publication.334 
123 
Other studies have indicated that many unpublished opinions are 
lengthy, complex, or otherwise seemingly deserving of 
publication.335 Finally, the prospect that some judges may be 
using unpublished opinions for reasons other than those 
envisioned by the limited publication rules has not gone 
unnoticed by the Supreme Court. In a recent interview, Justice 
Stevens expressed his concern with the use of unpublished 
opinions and his increased willingness to review them 
Q: Is the decision to grant or deny cert. influenced by 
whether the opinion from the court below is a published or 
nonpublished opinion? 
A: Well, I tend to vote to grant more on unpublished 
opinions, on the theory that occasionally judges will use the 
unpublished opinion as a device to reach a decision that 
might be a little hard to justify. 336 
While the number of federal cases filed continues to grow, 
there is little to suggest that limiting publication is an answer, 
much less a good answer, to reducing the stress on the courts. 
Whatever arguments once existed to recommend the practice of 
334. /d. at 820. 
335. See e.g. id. at 820-29 (collecting prior research); Brian P. Brooks, Publishing 
Unpublished Opinions: A Review of the Federal Appendix, 5 Green Bag 2d 259, 260-63 
(2002); Merritt & Brudney, supra n. 328, at 120 (finding that unpublished decisions have 
an effect on the substance of the law and that unpublished decisions are not simply routine 
applications of the law but contain "a noticeable number of reversals, dissents, or 
concurrences," and remarking on "significant associations between case outcome and 
judicial characteristics"); Robert A. Mead, "Unpublished" Opinions as the Bulk of the 
Iceberg: Publication Patterns in the Eighth and Tenth Circuits of the United States Courts 
of Appeals, 93 Law Libr. J. 589, 601-03 (2001) (examining publication rates by subject 
matter in the Eighth and Tenth Circuits over a six-month period and fmding great disparity 
in publication rates, especially in areas where the government is a litigant); Pamela Foa, 
Student Author, A Snake in the Path of the Law: The Seventh Circuit's Non-Publication 
Rule, 39 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 309, 315-40 (1977) (analyzing results of a six-month study of 
Seventh Circuit cases, which revealed that fifteen percent of unpublished cases were 
substantively significant and met the publication standards); Wald, supra n. 332, at 1374 
(noting that a six-month study had found that forty percent of unpublished D. C. Circuit 
cases arguably met the publication standards, and noting in addition that the percentage 
might be much higher in 1995). 
336. Jeffrey Cole & Elaine E. Bucklo, A Life Well Lived: An Interview with Justice John 
Paul Stevens, 32 Litig. 8, 67 (Spring 2006). 
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using unpublished opinions, they have been largely refuted and 
undercut by developments of the last thirty-five years. 
C. Premises Supporting a Bar on Citation to Unpublished 
Decisions 
The argument in favor of limiting citation is essentially one 
of a perceived necessity to support the practice of limited 
publication. Limiting citation to some portion of the courts' 
decisions serves no purpose of its own; there is no inherent 
value in preventing litigants from mentioning what the court has 
done in similar cases in the past. It is a practice undertaken to 
enable limited publication practices to exist. While the practice 
of limiting publication continues, the practice of limiting citation 
has come to an end with new Rule 32.1 at least in regard to 
decisions issued after January 1, 2007. However, because the 
premises underlying the limitation of citation of unpublished 
opinions so closely parallel those for denying unpublished 
opinions precedential status, and because the practice continues 
in some states, the citation issue will be examined briefly here. 
1. Cost Savings 
The core premise in favor of limiting citation of 
unpublished decisions is that such a limitation is necessary to 
prevent the decisions' use, which is in turn necessary because 
use would undermine the cost savings to judges, consumers, 
publishers, and the system itself. This premise is flawed. To the 
extent that the "sausage" of unpublished decisions is "not safe 
for human consumption" as Judge Kozinski has claimed,337 the 
preferable remedy would be to stop making the sausage in the 
present manner and make a better product, not to continue 
making it and throwing it away. 
Evidence suggests that both judges and attorneys bear little 
or no cost in citing these decisions because they are already 
researching them. In the modem legal publishing scenario, 
337. Alex Kozinski, In Opposition to Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
32.1, 51 Fed. Law. 36, 37 (June 2004). 
RETURNING PRECEDENTIAL STATUS TO ALL OPINIONS 125 
where unpublished decisions are nearly universally published in 
West's Federal Appendix, West's and LEXIS's online services, 
on the courts' own websites, and elsewhere, the costs of 
publication are already sunk -citation itself adds no additional 
costs to the equation. The heuristic lawyers use to find cases in 
online databases locates unpublished cases right along with 
published ones, and lawyers review them both. 338 In those 
circuits where citation has been recently allowed, very little 
additional costs in either researching or opinion writing have 
been noted.339 To the extent that cost was an issue it has been 
overcome by technological advances and the competing value of 
allowing litigants to tell a court what it has done in the past. 
2. Fairness to Litigants 
Part of the justification for limiting citation rests on the 
premise that unfairness would result by allowing those with 
better access to decisions to cite them. This premise was flawed 
when limited citation rules were imposed in the early 1970s and 
continues to be flawed, although for a different reason, in the 
modern setting. During the early era of non-citation rules, 
"unpublished" cases were truly not published and access to them 
was available only b actually visiting the court clerk and 
presumed that preventing citation of these decisions would 
prevent their use entirely and resolve the perceived unfairness 
338. See e.g. Stephen R. Barnett, The Dog That Did Not Bark: No-Citation Rules, 
Judicial Conference Rulemaking, and Federal Public Defenders, 62 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 
1491, 1535-36 (2005); Salem M. Katsh & Alex V. Chachkes, The Constitutionality of No-
Citation Rules, 3 J. App. Prac. & Process 287, 301-02 (2001). 
339. Reagan et al., supra n. 250, at 17 & id. at 49 (tbl. U, entitled "Impact on Work of 
New Rule") (indicating that judges in circuits allowing citation have reported, on average, 
no appreciable impact in their work caused by allowing citation to what might now be 
teuned published unpublished decisions). Note that "costs" in this context include time and 
effort as well as strictly monetary costs. 
Although Reagan's survey is still useful, now that Rule 32.1 has created a uniform 
rule permitting citation of unpublished decisions in all federal courts of appeals, a more 
unifonn national study can-and probably should be done to assess the costs, if any, 
associated with pennitting citation. 
340. Goering, supra n. 5, at 38 (noting that when limited publication and citation rules 
were first adopted, research in unpublished opinions was available only to institutional 
litigants with the incentive and ability to collect and index them). 
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that disparity of access caused.341 As the 1973 Committee 
explained, "[i]t is unfair to allow counsel, or others having 
special knowledge of an unpublished o inion, to use it if 
flawed at the outset for two reasons. 
First, large law firms, organizations, and other repeat 
players retained their advantage with respect to unpublished 
decisions and perhaps even gained additional advantage. These 
repeat players could still afford to cull the clerk's records for 
similar cases and unpublished decisions and could pull from 
them the winning reasoning. While they were unable to cite the 
decisions as authority, they could have superior knowledge 
. . 
about the court's recent rulings and access to the court's own 
reasoning and language. This information could be used in 
crafting their arguments to the court, which, it should be 
immediately apparent, gave them an incredible advantage: They 
could repeat to the court its own reasoning_, perhaps even in its 
own words.343 Thus, the advantage was maintained even without 
citation because repeat players and large institutions could do all 
this without ever having to cite that authority to the opposing 
side. 
Second, in this era in which so-called unpublished 
decisions are increasingly and now nearly ubiquitously . 
published, there is no real disparity between the parties.344 Any 
litigant with access to the Federal Appendix, online research 
systems, and, increasingly, the courts' own websites, now has 
access to the unpublished decisions of the courts.345 Moreover, 
researching those decisions does not appear to place a burden on 
the parties. Attorneys report that they already research such 
unpublished decisions. Also, to the extent the use of such 
opinions has recently increased, as in the D.C. Circuit after it 
341. Standards for Publication, supra n. 4, at 19-20. 
342. !d. at 19. 
343. K~tsh & Chachkes, supra n. 338, at 301-02 (noting that unpublished opinions are 
searched because lawyers find value in repeating the court's own reasoning and language 
back to it and noting cases in which courts have referred in later cases to language in 
unpublished opinions). 
344. Shuldberg, supra n. 150, at 558. 
345. /d. 
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liberalized its citation policy, attorneys have reported no 
significant increase in workload.346 
Limitation of citation was a practice founded largely on a 
perceived need to protect the cost gains of the limited 
publication regime., Practice, both initial and present, suggests 
that the limitation of citation is both ineffective and unnecessary 
to cost containment in the limited publication regime. The recent 
adoption of Rule 32:.1 suggests that litigants are unwilling to 
ignore unpublished decisions, primarily because they believe 
them to be of valu.e and are willing to bear the costs of 
researching them. Additionally, the rule will equalize the 
playing field between institutional repeat players and other 
litigants. 
D. Premises Supporting the Denial of Precedential Status to 
Unpublished Decisions 
As noted above, neither the 1973 Committee nor the 
drafters of Rule 32.1 have directly confronted the precedential 
status of unpublished decisions. The creation of limited 
publication and limited citation rules was undertaken with an 
understanding that limiting publication and citation would have 
the effect of limiting the precedential status of decisions,347 but 
whether such an effect was desirable or rested on sound 
jurisprudential premises seems not to have been an issue. 
Likewise, in crafting the new rule the Committee expressly 
avoided addressing the issue,348 but the Advisory Comtnittee-'s 
Reporter has acknowledged that the precedent question is an 
e~tr:me~y im~ortant one far more important than the issue of 
cttatton ttself. 49 
Defe.nse of the practice of limiting precedential status of 
unpublished opinions as a goal unto itself has often 'been 
346. Reagan et al., supra n. 250 .at 17 & id . .at 49 (tbl. U). 
347. See Standards for Publication, supra n. 4, at 20-21. 
348. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, advisory comm. nn. 
349. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little,. supra n. 1, at 1463 (stating that "Rule 32.1 is not, 
in fact, an important rule," but also acknowledging "that there are closely related issues:-
such as whether unpublished opinions should or must be treated as precedential that are 
extremely important"). 
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discussed as bound into the larger question of limiting 
publication, and it largely tracks the premises above. First, it is 
suggested that limiting precedential status is required to preserve 
the cost gains realized by limiting publication. Second, the 
premise holds that allowing unpublished cases to have 
,precedential value would result in unfairness between litigants. 
The flaw in the first of these is apparent given the market for 
unpublished opinions and their conunon usage by both litigants 
and courts, even in the absence of full precedential status., The 
flaw in the second is much the same as in the citation discussion: 
To the extent that any disparity of access to unpublished 
opinions exists, limiting precedential status does not resolve that 
disparity, and to the extent that no meaningful disparity now 
exists, the rule serves no purpose. 
The first premise states that if unpublished decisions are 
precedential, they will need to be prepared with greater care, a 
market will SP.ring up for their use, and litigants will need to 
research them. 350 It is plain to see that the last two have occurred 
even in the absence of precedential status, perhaps because the 
sense within the system that a court is bound to take note of 
what it has done yesterday and act similarly today is extremely 
strong.351 That belief has created a market for unpublished 
decisions and made the research of them standard practice 
among litigators. 
The second premise, which is similar to the unfairness 
concern with citation, states that allowing unpublished cases to 
have precedential value would result in unfairness between 
litigants. As noted in regard to citation, the rule does nothing to 
prevent that advantage of those in the know and, in fact, tends to 
increase their advantage, at least while access disparity exists. 
When no access disparity exists, and litigants would research the 
cases anyway, then the playing field is already equal and the rule 
prohibiting precedent is unnecessary. This is increasingly the 
case. Unpublished decisions are widely available and studies 
have indicated that they are searched anyway. 
How the courts decide to denominate their decisions (as 
published. or unpublished) is itself relatively unimportant. The 
350. Standards for Publication, supra .n. 4, at 20. 
3'5 l~ See generally e.g. Robel, Practice of Precedent, supra n. 5. 
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legal system has traditionally made whatever use of the 
decisions it finds appropriate and will continue to do so. 
Whether to allow citation of the_ decisions is a question 
answered, at least for the federal court system, by Rule 3 2.1, 
which prevents courts from restricting citation of decisions 
regardless of whether they are formally designated for 
publication or not. The real question, then, is whether decisions 
.may be designated as non-precedential, and, even if so,_ whether 
they ought to be. Whether they can be is subject to several 
challenges on Constitutional grounds ranging from core 
questions of the courts' powers under Article III to implied 
rights such as substantive: due process. 
1. Judge Arnold's Originalist Argument 
The ·most well known, as well as the most fundamental, 
alleged constitutional infinnity with the process of denying the 
precedential status of unpublished cases is that Article III of the 
Constitution does not give federal courts the authority to decide 
which of their cases are precedential and which are good only 
for a single time and place. The crux of this argument is that all 
cases decided by the federal courts -are precedent. The foremost 
proponent of this view, in both time and imrortance, was Judge 
Richard Arnold of the Eighth Circuit, 52 although some 
proposed a similar view of precedent prior to Judge Arnold's 
writings,353 and many picked up the banner after Judge Arnold's 
provocative decision in Anastasoff.354 Others, Ninth Circuit 
352. See Arnold, supra n. 21; Anastasoffv. U.S., 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir.), vacated 235 
FJd 1054 (8th Cir. 2000). 
353. See e.g. Bader; supra n. 97, at 9-11 (emphasizing the importance of precedent to 
the lawyers and judges of the Revolutionary generation); Re: Rules of U.S. Court of 
Appeals for Tenth Circuit; Adopted Nov. 18, 1986, 955 F.2d 36, 37 (lOth Cir~ 1992) 
(Halloway, Barrett, and Baldock, JJ., dissenting) (recognizing that "(e]ach ruling, 
published or unpublished, involves the facts of a particular case and the application of 
law to the case," and taking the p_osition that "all rulings of this court are precedents, like 
it or not, and we cannot consign any of them to oblivion by merely banning their citation"); 
Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 723 
(1988). 
354. See e;g. Penelope Pether, Take a Le.tter, Your Honor: Outing the Judicial 
Epistemology .ofHart v. Massanari, 62 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1553 (2005); Cappalli, supra 
n. 5; Sinclair, supra n. 5; Steve Sheppard The Unpublished Opinion: How Richard 
Arnold-'s Anastasoff Opinion is Saving America's Courts from Themselves, 2002 Ark. L. 
Notes 85 (2002); Stephen R. Barnett, From Anastasoff to Hart to West's Federal Appendix: 
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Judge Alex Kozinski among them, have rejected Judge Arnold's 
Constitutional analysis.355 
2. The Eighth Circuit Speaks: Anastasoffv. United States 
The Eighth Circuit in Anastasoff declared the Circuit's rule 
denying precedential status to unpublished opinions in violation 
of Article III. 356 The opinion, authored by Judge Arnold, held 
that denying decisions precedential status exceeded the court's 
judicial power.357 
The Anastasoff panel followed a prior unpublished 
opinion,358 believing itself Constitutionally required to do so 
because the panel issuing the unpublished opinion had 
previously rejected "precisely the same legal argument"359 made 
by the plaintiff before it. Citing to the text of then-cun·ent Local 
Rule 28A(i), which stated that "[u]npublished opinions are not 
The Ground Shifts Under No-Citation Rules, 4 J. App. Prac. & Process I (2002); Kenneth 
Anthony Laretto, Pr~cedent, Judicial Power, and the Constitutionality of uNo-Citation " 
Rules in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 1037 (2002); Charles R. 
Eloshway, Student Author, Say It Ain't So: Non-Precedential Opinions Exceed the Limits 
of Article Ill Powers, 70 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 632 (2002); Johanna S. Schiavoni, Student 
Author, Who's Afraid of Precedent?: The Debate Over the Precedential Value of 
Unpublished Opinions, 49 UCLA Law. Rev. 1859 (2002); Merritt & Brudney, supra n. 
328; Sheree L. K. Nitta, Student Author, The Price of Precedent: Anastasoff v. United 
States, 23 U. Haw. L. Rev. 795 (2001); Strongman, supra n. IJ5; Lance A. Wade, Student 
Author, Honda Meets Anastasoff.- The Procedural Due Process Argument Rules 
Prohibiting Unpublished Judicial Decisions, 42 B.C. L. Rev. 695 (2001); William J. 
Miller, Student Author, Chipping Away at the Dam: Anastasoff v. United States and the 
Future of Unpublished Decisions in the United States Court of Appeals and Beyond, 50 
Drake L. Rev. 181 (2001); Jennifer Adams, Student Author, Law Today; Gone Tomorrow, 
53 Baylor L. Rev. 659 (200 1 ). 
355. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001) (Kozinski, J.). See also, e.g., R. 
Ben Brown, Judging in the Days of the Early Republic.! A Critique of Judge Richard 
Arnold's Use of History in Anastasoff v. United States, 3 J. App. Prac. & Process 355 
(2001); John Harrison, The Power of Congress over the Rules of Precedent, 50 Duke L.J. 
503 (2000); Thomas R. Lee & Lance S. Lehnhof, Student Author, The Anastasoff Case 
and the Judicial Power To "Unpublish" Opinions, 17 Notre Dame L. Rev. 135 (2001). 
356. Anastasojf, 223 F.3d 898. 
357. !d. at 899 ("We hold that the portion of Rule 28A(i) that declares that unpublished 
opinions are not precedent is unconstitutional under Article III, because it purports to 
confer on the federal courts a power that goes beyond the 'judicial.'"). 
358. Christie v. U.S., No. 91-2375MN (8th Cir. Mar. 20, 1992) (per curiam) 
(unpublished). 
359. AnastasojJ, 223 F.3d at 899. 
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precedent," Anastasoff argued that, as a non-precedent, the 
earlier case did not bind the panel by which her case was 
heard. 360 The court disagreed: 
Although it is our only case directly in point, Ms. 
Anastasoff contends that we are not bound by Christie 
because it is an unpublished decision and thus not a 
precedent under 8th Circuit Rule 28A(i). We disagree. We 
hold that the portion of Rule 28A(i) that declares that 
unpublished opinions are not precedent is unconstitutional 
under Article III, because it purports to confer on the 
federal courts a power that goes beyond the "judicial."361 
In holding the Eighth Circuit's rule unconstitutional, the 
Anastas off decision reinvigorated a national debate on the issues 
of limited publication and citation.362 Though the Anastasoff 
case would eventually become moot, leading to the opinion's 
courts, lawyers, and commentators3 and rankled others.365 
Prior to deciding the Anastasoff case, Judge Arnold had 
exp~e.ssed concern about the process of all_owin~ unpublishe_d 
dectstons to be treated as non-precedenttal. 36 In both hts 
article367 and the original Anastasoff opinion,368 he expressed a 
firm belief that "all decisions have precedential significance."369 
His article closes by asking whether "the assertion that 
unpublished opinions are not precedent and cannot be cited,' is a 
360. Id. 
361. /d. 
362. Leane C. Medford et al.; Anastasoffv. U.S., 20 Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 26 (Nov. 2001) 
("Although vacated, Anastasoff breathed new life into a continuing controversy over the 
precedential effects of unpublished opinions, receiving national attention from the 
judiciary, legal commentators and practitioners."). 
363. Anastasojf v. U.S., 235 F.3d 1054, 1056 (8th Cir. 2000) (en bane) ("The 
' ' 
controversy over the status of unpublished opinions is, to be sure, of great interest and 
' ' ' 
importance, but this sort of factor will not save a case from becoming moot. We sit to 
decide cases, not issues, and whether unpublished opinions have precedential effect no 
longer has any relevance for the decision of this tax-refund case.") 
364. Seen. 354, supra. 
365. See n. 355, supra. 
366. Arnold, supra n. 21. 
367. /d. 
368. AnastasojJ, 223 F .3d 898. 
369. Arnold, supra n. 21, at 222. See also AnastasojJ, 223 F.3d at 899-900 (discussing 
various earlier articulations of the "doctrine of precedent,'' and noting that its components 
"were well established and well regarded at the time this nation was founded"). 
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violation of Article III, and the decision in Anastas off provides 
the answer: "fT]he portion of Rule 28A(i) that declares that 
unpublished opinions are not precedent is unconstitutional under 
Article III, because it purports to confer on the federal courts a 
power that goes beyond the 'judicial. "'370 In arriving at that 
conclusion1 the court in Anastasoff considered 
• the text of Article III, 
• the meaning of the relevant clause and the doctrine of 
precedent at the time of its framing, and 
• th.e message it sends to allow courts to decide cases 
and declare them ex ante to be non-precedential.371 
Though the most that can be claimed is_ that Article III 
implies the limitation proposed because no explicit discussion of 
precedent is contained in its text, Judge Arnold makes a 
compelling case. Article III states that ·"[t]he judicial power of 
the United States, shall be vested in one supreme court, and in 
such inferior courts ,as the congress may, from time to time, 
ordain and establish.''372 The critical phrase is "judicial power," 
which is explained no further within the text. What is meant (or 
was meant or understood by the Framers, if that is the method of 
Constitutional interpretation to be employed) by "judicial 
power" requires additional examination. Judge Arnold's thesis is 
that the phrase ''judicial power" is a grant of limited power and 
that power does not extend to rendering non-precedential 
opinions. 373 Anastas off sets forth an originalist argument 
supporting this conclusion.374 
As a first principle, Anastasoff finds that every judicial 
decision is a declaration of law, which must be applied in 
subsequent similar cases: 
Inherent in every judicial decision is a declaration and 
interpretation of a general principle or rule of law. This 
370. Anastasofl, 223 F.3d at 899. 
371. ld. at 899-904. 
372. U~S. Const. art~ Ill,§ 1, cL 1. 
373. Anastasoff, 223 F~3d at 899. 
374. ld. at 899-904. 
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declaration of law is authoritative to the extent necessary 
for the decision, and must be applied in subsequent cases to 
similarly situated parties. These principles, which form the 
doctrine of precedent, were well established and well 
regarded at the time this nation was founded. The Framers 
of the Constitution considered these principles to derive 
from the nature of judicial power, and intended that they 
wo~ld limit. the judici~l ~ow~~5delegated to the courts by Arttcle III of the Constttutton. 
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In support of this conclusion, the Anastasoff court cites Marbury 
v. Madison, which offers the perspective that '~[i]t is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to 
say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, 
must of necessity expound and interpret that rule."376 
In addition, the court examines the Framers' understanding 
of the doctrine of precedent as part of their notion of judicial 
power, in part by looking to the sources that influenced the 
Framers, such as the writings of Coke, Hale, and Blackstone.377 
In reviewing these sources, the court finds ample evidence that 
within the common law system, "the judge's duty to follow 
precedent derives from the nature of the judicial power itself."378 
Judge Arnold, like Blackstone, views each de-cision of the court 
to add to the body of law, "the law in that case, being solemnly 
declare_d and determined, what was before uncertain and 
perhaps indifferent, is now become a pennanent rule."319 The 
Anastasoff court then turns its attention to the writings of the 
Framers themselves, including James Madison's understanding 
of the courts as bounded by the "authoritative force" of "judicial 
judicial expositions of the law on succeeding judges," 1 and 
Alexander Hamilton's emphatic statement: 
375. /d. at 899-900 (footnotes omitted) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1 
Cranch 137, 177-78 (1803); James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Ga., 501 U.S. 529, 544 
(1991); Cohens v. Va., 6 Wheat. 264, 399 (1821)). 
376. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177. 
377. Anastaso.IJ, 223 F.3d at 900-04. 
378. /d. at 901 (footnote omitted). 
379. /d. (quoting Blackstone, Commentaries at *69). 
380. Jd. at 902 n. 10 (citing James Madison, Letter to Charles Jared Ingersoll (June 25, 
1831), reprinted in The Mind of the Founder: Sources of the Political Thought of James 
Madison 390, 390·93 (Marvin Meyers ed., rev. ed., Brandeis U. Press 1981)). 
381. /d. at 902. 
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[T]o avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is 
indispensable that they should be bound down by strict 
rules and precedents, which serve to define and point out 
their duty in every particular case that comes before 
them.382 
However, it was not only the Federalists whose writings 
reveal a well-established understanding of precedent as part of 
the judicial power in the new government, because "the Anti-
Federalists also assumed that federal judicial decisions would 
become authorities in subsequent cases"383 and were concerned 
that 
one adjudication will form a precedent to the next, and this 
to a following one. These cases will immediately affect 
individuals only; so that a series of determinations will 
probably take place before even the people will be 
infortned of them. 384 
Another Anti-Federalist, writing as "the Federal Farmer" 
expressed the concern that the federal courts to be established 
would have "no precedents in this country, as yet, to regulate the 
divisions in equity as in Great Britain; equity, therefore5 in the 
supreme court for many years will be mere discretion."38 These 
contemporary writings reveal an understanding that the courts 
under the new Constitution would be of binding authority.386 
While modern justifications of precedent tend toward the 
pragmatic, 387 for the Framers, the concept of precedent was part 
382. !d. at 902 (citing Federalist Papers No. 78, at 510). 
383. /d. at 902-03 (citing Essays of Brutus, XV (Mar. 20, 1788) in The Complete Anti-
Federalist vol. 2, 441 (Herbert J. Storing ed., U. Chi. Press 1981 ); Letters from The 
Federal Farmer No. 3 (Oct. 10, 1787), in id. at 244). 
384. Id. at 903 n. 13 (quoting Essays of Brutus, supra n. 383, at 441). 
385. Jd. (quoting Letters from The Federal Farmer No. 3, supra n. 383, at 244). 
386. ld. at 901-02; see also Richard W. Murphy, Separation of Powers and the 
Horizontal Force of Precedent, 18 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1075, 1101 (2003) (pointing out 
that "remarks on the subject of precedent of these most prominent Federalists and Anti-
Federalists show that they adhered to a theory of precedent basically consistent with the 
major common-law treatises of the day, and that they believed that the accumulating force 
of precedents would, over time, tend to authoritatively 'fix' the meaning of the 
Constitution," and noting that "[o]ne theme to be found in their remarks is that adherence 
to precedent forestalls the accumulation of arbitrary power in the courts"). 
387. See e.g. Schauer, supra n. 287, at 595-602 (noting that the authority of precedent is 
commonly supported by arguments (1) from fundamental fairness, i.e., that like cases 
should be treated alike; (2) from the need for predictability; and (3) from the recognition 
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and parcel of their understanding of judicial power, a power that 
was bounded by an obligation to find the law rather than make 
it. 388 That distinction meant much to the Framers, who were 
successors to and believers in a declaratory theory of 
adjudication. 389 Whether the courts make law or find law is a 
philosophic distinction with little meaningful difference 
presently, though it reveals much about the view of precedent 
that makes up the Framers' original understanding. What is 
apparent from the earliest days of English common law and 
throughout the framing of the Constitution is that each decision 
rendered by a common law court has traditionally been part of 
the common law, regardless of its publication status at least 
until the change in the early 1970s, of course.390 Though 
Constitutional interpretation is a process fraught with 
difficulties, it seems unlikely that the Framers would have 
intended a system (or understood one) that would allow federal 
courts to make decisions good in only single times and places 
and having no bearing on later decisions. 
Finally, the Anastaso.ff court carefully discriminates 
between the practice of limited publication, which was the 
traditional common law practice, and the practice of deciding ex 
ante to deny the precedential status of some opinions, which was 
unknown in the common law.391 Unpublished did not 
historically mean unprecedential, and to equate the two flies in 
the face of the expectations and experiences of English common 
law and those of the founding generation of this country.392 As 
Anastaso.ff notes, 
the Framers did not regard this absence of a reporting 
system as an impediment to the precedential authority of a 
judicial decision . . . [J]udges and lawyers of the day 
recognized the authority of unpublished decisions even 
that it is an aid to judicial decisionmaking, preventing unnecessary reconsideration of 
established matters). 
388. Anastasojf, 223 F.3d at 901-02. 
389. ld. 
390. ld. at 903. 
391. ld. 
392. Id. 
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when they were established only bJY memory or by a 
lawyer's unpublished memorandum.39 
This view of the Framers is consonant with that of earlier 
generations, who held both written reports and decisions in the 
rolls or manuscripts of the court to be valid authority.394 
It would be difficult to StJnunarize the Anastasoff court's 
position better than Judge Arnold himself did: 
[I]n the late eighteenth century, the doctrine of precedent 
was well-established in legal practice (despite the absence 
of a reporting system), regarded as an immemorial custom, 
and valued for its role in past struggles for liberty. The duty 
of courts to follow their prior decisions was understood to 
derive from the nature of the judicial power itself and to 
separate it from a dangerous union with the legislative 
power. The statements of the Framers indicate an 
understanding and acceptance of these principles. We 
conclude therefore that, as the Framers intended, the 
doctrine of precedent limits the "judicial power" delegated 
to the courts in Article III. 395 
In support of this conclusion, he provides a powerful quote from 
Justice Story's Commentaries on the Constitution of the United 
States: 
The case is not alone considered as decided and settled; but 
the principles of the decision are held, as precedents and 
authority, to bind future cases of the same nature. This is 
the constant practice under our whole system of 
jurisprudence. Our ancestors brought it with them, when 
they first emigrated to this country; and it is, and always 
has been considered, as the great security of our rights, our 
liberties, and our property. It is on this account, that our law 
is justly deemed certain, and founded in permanent 
principles, and not dependent upon the caprice or will of 
judges. A more alarming doctrine could not be promulgated 
by any American court, than that it was at liberty to 
disregard all former rules and decisions, and to decide for 
393. Id. (citing Peter Karsten, Heart Versus Head: Judge-Made Law in Nineteenth-
Century America 30 (U.N.C. Press 1997) and Jesse Root, The Origin of Government and 
Laws fn Connecticut (1798), reprinted in The Legal Mind in America 38-39 (Perry MiHer 
ed., Anchor Books 1962)). 
394. See id. at 903 n. 14; see also Baker, supra n. 47, at 204. 
395. Anastasojf, 223 F.3d at 903. 
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itself, without reference to the settled course of antecedent 
principles. 396 
137 
Some have argued that the practice of declaring certain 
(now most) decisions of the federal courts to be non-
precedential is not a cause for alartn. 397 The better perspective, 
however, is that the practice causes an even more insidious harm 
than cutting the courts free from precedent. Allowing courts to 
choose at the time of opinion writing what decisions are and are 
not precedent allows them to deprive the conunon law of 
valuable precedents, to make law good only for a single time 
and place, to treat similar cases dissimilarly, and to cause some 
issues to evade review.398 Such a practice is less blatant, but no 
less offensive to the Constitution and conunon law history. 
Though the government would eventually concede the 
point to the taxpayer, making the Anastasoff case moot, many 
seized upon the vacated Anastasoff opinion to challenge the 
policy of non-citation and non-precedent.399 Indeed, the decision 
reinvimorated the federal rulemaking process that led to Rule 
32.1.4 0 But Rule 32.1 does not resolve the core issues of the 
precedential status of unpublished decisions and whether 
designating cases non-precedential falls within or without the 
Article III power of the court. 
396. /d. at 903-04 (quoting Story, supra n. 93, at§§ 377-78). 
397. See e.g. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2001) ("We believe 
Anastasoff overstates the case. Rules that empower courts of appeals to issue 
nonprecedential decisions do not cut those courts free from all legal rules and precedents; if 
they did, we might find cause for alarm."). 
398. See e.g. Pether, supra n. 281, at 7-8 (2007) ("Given its origins, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that the charges leveled at institutionalized unpublication are multiplicitous 
and damning. They include the identifying of damaging 'rule of law effects' of the 
practice, such as enabling powerful and repeat player litigants to rig the system of 
precedent so it operates in their favor; unconstitutionality; lack of transparency and judicial 
accountability, the enabling of judicial corruption or the engendering of public suspicion 
that it is occurring, and the producing of public and practitioner disrespect for the judicial 
system."); Patrick J. Schiltz, Citation of Unpublished Opinions, supra n. 1, at 43-58 
(collecting arguments in favor of Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 ). 
399. See note 354, supra. 
400~ Medford et al., supra n. 362, at 26 (pointing out that, "[a]lthough vacated, 
Anastasoff breathed new life into a continuing controversy over the precedential effects of 
unpublished opinions, receiving national attention from the judiciary, legal commentators 
and practitioners.") 
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3. The Ninth Circuit Replies: Hart v. Massanari 
The Anastasoff decision was widely praised.401 However, 
the case did have its critics.402 Perhaps the most vocal of those 
was Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit, who responded to 
Anastasoff in Hart v. Massanari.403 In Hart, Judge Kozinski 
attacked Anastasoff s constitutional interpretations and advanced 
several countervailing Rragmatic reasons for declaring some 
cases non-precedential.4 4 In Hart, the court examined whether 
an attorney should be disciplined for citing to an unpublished 
decision in violation of then-current Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3, 
which stated: "Unpublished decisions of this court are not 
binding precedent. .. [and o§enerally] may not be cited to or by 
the courts of this circuit. "4 
In the view of the Hart court, Article III provides no 
limitation on judicial power that would prevent a federal court of 
appeals from issuing non-precedential opinions: 
Unlike the Anastasoff court, we are unable to find within 
Article III of the Constitution a requirement that all case 
dispositions and orders issued by appellate courts be 
binding authority. On the contrary, we believe that an 
inherent aspect of our function as Article III judges is 
managing precedent to develop a coherent body of circuit 
law to govern litigation in our court and the other courts of 
this circuit. We agree with Anastasoff that we and all 
courts must follow the law. But we do not think that this 
means we must also make binding law every time we issue 
. d . . 406 
a merits ectston. 
401. Seen. 354, supra. 
402. Seen. 355, supra. 
403. 266 F .3d 1155 (9th Cir. 200 I). 
404. /d.; see also Pether, supra n. 354, at 1556 (undertaking "a detailed critical discourse 
analysis of the construction of a revisionist history of the United States doctrine of 
precedent in Harf'). 
405. Hart, 266 F.3d at 1159 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 9th Cir. R. 36-3). Appellant's 
counsel had relied upon the constitutional argument outlined by Anastasojf, which the 
Ninth Circuit rejected. !d. at 1180 (holding former Rule 36-3 constitutional but declining to 
impose sanctions because counsel's conduct in testing the rule's constitutionality was not a 
''willful" violation). 
406. /d. at 1180. 
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a. The Hart Analysis 
1. AnastasoffOverstates the Case. 
To support its conclusion, the Hart court first asserted that 
Anastasoff overstates the case: 
We believe that Anastasoff overstates the case. Rules that 
empower courts of appeals to issue nonprecedential 
decisions do not cut those courts free from all legal rules 
and piefedents; if they did, we might find cause for 
alarm. 0 
It viewed the declaration of some cases to be non-precedent as 
part of the courts' attempt to create a cohesive, pre-planned 
body oflaw.408 
However, declaring decisions non-precedent at the time of 
opinion is not a cause for alarm because it is so drastic, but 
because it is so subtle. While allowing judges to ignore 
precedent would permit them to choose what they want the law 
to be in any given case, allowing them to decide what cases are 
precedent has the similar effect of allowing them to choose what 
they want the law to be (or not be) in all future cases. Moreover, 
focusing as it does on only the originalist Constitutional 
interpretation, Anastasoff actually understates the case against a 
non-precedent regime. Other modes of Constitutional 
interpretation exist and other arguments, Constitutional and 
otherwise, also exist. 
2. Article III's Grant of "Judicial Power'' is Not 
Limited. 
Second, the court in Hart asserted that the "judicial power" 
language in Article III contains no limitations, but is merely 
descriptive.409 In making that point, the opinion concedes that 
other sections of Article III, such as the references to "Cases'' 
and "Controversies,'' have b.een held to be limitations, but 
407. /d. at 1160. 
408. /d. at 1177 (noting that the federal courts of appeals "select a manageable number 
of cases in which to publish precedential opinions, and leave the rest to be decided by 
unpublished dispositions or judgment orders"). 
409. /d. at 1160. 
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suggests that the general reference to ':'judicial power" is 
unlikely to state a similar limitation.410 The Hart court's stated 
reasons for this conclusion are 
• no other case has held the judicial power clause to 
state a limitation; 
• there are many other practices of the federal courts 
that are not similarly challenged as beyond the limits 
of judicial power; and 
• the Constitution would seem to provide that Congress 
could abolish the inferior federal courts altogether and 
therefore could modify the courts' ambit to issue non-
precedential opinions without offending the 
Constitution.411 
The first two of these arguments do not touch the 
Anastasoff opinion in any meaningful way. First, that a 
provision has not been read in a particular fashion in the past 
does not preclude a present reading of it in that fashion. Second, 
that other established practices do not rise to the level of ultra 
vires extra-judicial acts does not speak one way or another about 
the constitutionality of the non-precedent rules then in force in 
most circuits. Finally, that the Constitution would seem to 
provide that Congress could abolish the inferior federal courts 
altogether and therefore could modify the courts' ambit to issue 
non-precedential opinions without offending the Constitution is 
not a sound argument. As Hart acknowled ed, the greater power 
to command the courts to act in some unconstitutional manner is 
not a lesser power than the power to abolish the inferior courts, 
merely a different one. That Congress could abolish the inferior 
federal courts does not automatically vest in it a right to require 
the courts to act in some particular fashion, let alone an 
unconstitutional one. Thus, this argument ultimately begs the 
question rather than resolving it. More important, it is not the 
... 
410. Id. 
411. I d. at 1160-61. 
412. /d. at 1161. 
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power of Congress at issue in either Hart or Anastasoff; the 
heart of the matter here is whether the courts may, consistent 
with their judicial power, render decisions that are not 
precedent. Whether Congress could specifically order them to 
do so is neither relevant nor helpful to the analysis. 
3. Judge Arnold Got the History Wrong. 
Assuming for the sake of argument that the "judicial 
power" clause offers a limitation on judicial power and is 
implicated here, Hart next proceeds to attack the historical 
analysis in Anastasoff. Before doing so, however, it foists upon 
Anastasoff a false premise, one that Anastasoff does not require. 
That is, Hart suggests that to succeed in its constitutional 
analysis, Anastasoff must demonstrate that the Framers 
understood a rigidity of precedent similar to that present in the 
federal court system today.413 The opinion then proceeds to 
demonstrate that the Framers' understanding of precedent was 
not nearly as rigid.414 However, the analysis in Anastasoff does 
not rely on a claim that the Framers held a view of precedent 
identical (in terms of rigidity or any other factor) to that 
followed in the courts today; it is focused on whether the act of 
the federal courts in issuing non~precedential opinions falls 
outside what the Framers would have considered "judicial 
power. "415 
After all of that, the court in Hart conceded the point 
critical to Anastasoffs analysis (that precedent was well-
established at the time of the Constitution's framing), while 
contesting a point that is inunaterial (the precise strictness with 
which precedent was then applied): 
While we agree with Anastaso.ff that the principle of 
precedent was well established in the common law courts 
by the time Article III of the Constitution was written, we 
do not agree that it was known and applied in the strict 
sense in which we apply binding authority today.416 
413. /d. at 1162-66. 
414. /d. 
415. Anastaso.IJ, 223 F.3d at 903 (concluding that "as the Framers intended, the doctrine 
of precedent limits the 'judicial power' delegated to the courts in Article III''). 
416. Hart, 266 F.3d at 1174. 
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The Hart analysis thus misses the larger point. The 
constitutional argument in Anastasoff is not that the Framers 
understood strict, binding, horizontal and vertical precedent 
between and among the Supreme Court, the Courts of Appeals, 
and the District Courts (only the first of which existed explicitly 
at the time);417 rather, it argues that the Framers understood and 
intended that each decision rendered by the federal courts would 
make law and contribute to the body of common law on which 
later decisions rest.418 That is enough. The Framers were 
familiar with both limited publication. and a less stringent 
meaning of precedent than is now applied, but they did 
understand, and arguably intended, that the decisions of the 
courts, whatever their individual and cumulative worth, would 
be added to the common law and would then shape the law of 
this nation. Instead, by present practice in most circuits, an 
average of eighty percent of all decisions are removed from the 
body of common law.419 
In addition, the court in Hart conflates the issues of 
publication and precedent throughout its discussion of the 
history.42° For example, the court takes pains to describe the 
inadequacies of the early common law and founding-era case 
rep~rts an? no~e~ t?at the increased ~uality of. case reports led to 
an tncreastng rtgtdtty of precedent.42 From thts, the court argues 
that the era before quali reports was one without an 
417. "Horizontal precedent" refers to the binding power of decisions of a coordinate-
level court, and "vertical precedent" refers to the binding power of a superior-level court. 
418. Anastasojf, 223 F.3d at 904-05. The relevant language bears quoting in full: 
/d. 
[W]e stress that we are not here creating some rigid doctrine of eternal 
adherence to precedents. Cases can be overruled. Sometimes they should be. On 
our Court, this function can be perfonned by the en bane Court, but not by a 
single panel. If the reasoning of a case is exposed as faulty, or if other exigent 
circumstances justify it, precedents can be changed. When this occurs, however, 
there is a burden of justification. The precedent from which we are departing 
should be stated, and our reasons for rejecting it should be made convincingly 
clear. In this way, the law grows and changes, but it does so incrementally, in 
response to the dictates of reason, and not because judges have simply changed 
their minds. 
419. Judicial Business Table S~3, supra n. 6. 
420. Hart, 266 F.3d at 1162-66~ 
421. /d. at 1166-69. 
422. /d. 
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two issues of publication and precedent. While the improved 
accuracy and ubiquity of case reports can be credited as a factor 
in strengthening the concept of precedent within the common 
law,423 it does not follow logically that precedent was unknown 
or impossible in the face of limited publication.424 
The crux of the Hart decision reveals the most critical point 
of disagreement between the two cases. Anastasoff relies on the 
assuttlption that cases are decided on the law and left to future 
panels to apply to later cases, thus creating the law.425 
Conversely, the Hart opinion relies on the assumption that 
courts rule in order to develop a coherent and internally 
consistent body of case law.426 If the Hart theory is correct, 
which would mean that judges are and ought to be - deciding 
prospectively which of their decisions are law and which are not 
for the purpose of crafting a body of coherent case law, this 
"starkly reverses centuries of common law tradition."427 
4. The System Advocated in Anastasoffis Unworkable. 
Finally, the court in Hart makes its pragmatic argument 
that writing a precedential opinion is "an exacting and extremely 
time-consuming task."428 This overstates the importance of a 
lengthy, dissertational opinion, which is not the sine qua non for 
all precedential cases. Courts are bound by what earlier courts 
have done, not what they have said, and in many cases a short 
description of the decision, the authority relied upon, and the 
operative facts that bring this case within the ambit of the prior 
authority will be entirely sufficient.429 In addition, while the 
pragmatic concern is undeniable, the rulemakers have avoided 
423. Allen, supra n. 38, at 230 (pointing out the importance to an eighteenth·century 
judge of establishing a reporter's reliability). See generally Berring, supra n. 120. 
424. See Section III.D., supra. 
425. Anastasojf, 223 F.3d at 905 (characterizing the creation of new decisional law as 
incremental); accord Cappalli, supra n. 5, at 773 (explaining that it is the precedent-
applying court that detennines a decision's precedential effect); Llewellyn, supra n. 327, at 
52, 63-66 (noting that it is the precedent-applying court that detennines the scope of the 
precedent-writing court's decision, the words used by the precedent-writing court 
notwithstanding). 
426. Hart, 266 F.3d at 1176. 
427. Cappalli, supra n. 5, at 772. 
428. Hart, 266 F.3d at 1177. 
429. See e.g. Cappalli, supra n. 5, at 771-72. 
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the jurisprudential in favor of the pragmatic for far too long. 
Judge Arnold states this view eloquently in Anastasoff: 
It is often said among judges that the volume of appeals is 
so high that it is simply unrealistic to ascribe precedential 
value to every decision. We do not have time to do a decent 
enough job, the argument runs, when put in plain language, 
to justify treating every opinion as a precedent. If this is 
true, the judicial system is indeed in serious trouble, but the 
remedy is not to create an underground body of law good 
for one place and time only. The remedy, instead, is to 
create enough judgeships to handle the volume, or, if that is 
not practical, for each judge to take enough time to do a 
competent job with each case. If this means that backlogs 
will grow, the price must still be paid. At bottom, rules like 
our Rule 28A(i) assert that courts have the following 
power: to choose for themselves, from among all the cases 
they decide, those that they will follow in the future, and 
those that they need not. Indeed, some fonns of the non~ 
publication rule even forbid citation. Those courts are 
saying to the bar: "We may have decided this question the 
opposite way yesterday, but this does not bind us today, 
and, what's more, you cannot even tell us what we did 
yesterday." As we have tried to explain in this opinion, 
such a statement exceeds the J·udicial power, which is based 430 . . . . 
on reason, not fiat. 
The Eighth Circuit's then-current rule served to bar citation of 
unpublished opinions, thus hiding them, not in fact, but in legal 
effect, from the litigants' and courts' use. New Rule 32.1 allows 
the litigants to tell the court what it has done yesterday, but it 
does nothing to resolve the underlying question of how a court 
must treat its prior decisions.431 
VI. CURRENT STATUS OF THE ARTICLE Ill DEBATE 
The final chapter on this constitutional debate has not yet 
been written, for Anastasoff was vacated as moot on other 
grounds,432 and Hart answered the question only for the Ninth 
Circuit. Though Rule 32.1 addresses the citation issue, the 
430. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 904 (italics in original). 
431. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1. 
432. Anastasojf, 235 F.3d 1054. 
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underlying issue of precedential status rernains.433 Many believe, 
as the dissenting judges of the Tenth Circuit did back in 1986 
when they opposed the practice of issuing non-precedential 
opinions, that 
[e]ach ruling, published or unpublished, involves the facts 
of a particular case and the application of law, to the case. 
Therefore all rulings of this court are precedents, like it or 
not, and we cannot consign any of them to oblivion .... No 
matter how insignificant a prior ruling might appear to us, 
any litigant who can point to a prior decision of the court 
and demonstrate that he is entitled to prevail under it should 
be able to do so as a matter of essential justice and 
fundamental fairness. To deny a litigant this right may well 
have overtones of a constitutional infringement because of 
the arbitrariness, irrationality, and unequal treatment of the 
rule.434 
But the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue, though 
n1Jn1erous petitions for certiorari have been filed on it,435 and at 
least three Justices have expressed a view of the history of 
precedent similar to that described by Judge Arnold.436 
433. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, advisory comm. n. 
434. Re: Rules of U.S. Court of Appeals for Tenth Circuit. Adopted Nov. 18, 1986, 955 
F.2d 36, 36-38 (1992) (Halloway, Barrett, & Baldock, JJ. dissenting) (citation and footnote 
omitted). 
435. Twice during the early stages of limited publication and citation, the Supreme 
Court chose not to address the issue. See Do-Right Auto Sales v. U.S. Ct. of Appeals, 429 
U.S. 917 (1976) (denying writ of mandamus filed following Seventh Circuit's striking of 
citation to unpublished opinion from party's brief); Browder v. Dir., Dept. of Correction, 
434 U.S. 257 (1978) (after granting certiorari on publication issue, Court did not address 
it). See also Dunn, supra n. 270, at 142-43 (discussing arguments and opinions in Do· 
Right); Br. ofPetr. at 7, 50-56, Browder v. Dir., Dept. of Correction, 434 U.S. 257 (1978), 
1977 WL 204850 (indicating that a court's "inherent power to withhold any of its opinions 
from publication and to a priori deprive such opinions of precedential value" was among 
the questions presented in Browder, and then raising arguments against the non-publication 
policies of the courts below). See also Cleveland, supra n. 291. 
436. Rogers v. Tenn., 532 U.S. 451, 472 n. 2 (2001) (Scalia, Stevens; & Thomas, JJ. 
dissenting) ("[t]he near-dispositive strength Blackstone accorded stare decisis was not 
some mere personal predilection. Chancellor Kent was of the same view: 'If a decision has 
been made upon solemn argument and mature deliberation, the presumption is in favor of 
its correctness; and the community have a right to regard it as a just declaration or 
exposition of the law, and to regulate their actions and contracts by it.' 1 J. Kent, 
Commentaries *475 .. *476 (emphasis added). See also Hamilton's statement in The 
Federalist: 'To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they 
should be bound down by strict rules and precedents which serve to define and point out 
• 
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Moreover, the rule-making bod for the federal courts has 
remains unresolved. 
Other Constitutional interpretive doctrines exist, beyond 
the originalist battlefield on which both Anastasoff and Hart · 
engaged this issue. Those modes of interpretation could be 
applied to the issue now that the related issue of citation of 
unpublished opinions has been resolved by Rule 32.1, and it is 
time for courts, rulemakers, and commentators to return their 
attention to the core of the matter: precedent. At least one aspect 
of that issue of precedent involves resolving the question of 
whether the issuance of non-precedential opinions lies within or 
without the "judicial power" granted to the federal courts., But 
consideration of that issue does not raise the only constitutional 
infirmity of the practice. 
A. Equal Protection 
In addition to the Article III judicial power argument, it has 
been suggested that the scheme of declaring some decisions 
non-precedential violates the Equal Protection Clause.438 The 
~i~t of t~is cl.aim is that the fcractice treats similarly situated 
ltttgants tn a dtsparate manner.4 9 
The core guarantee of the Equal Protection clause is that 
similarly situated persons should be treated alike,440 and the 
Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that Fifth and Fourteenth 
their duty in every particular case that comes before them.' The Federalist No. 78, p. 471 
(C. Rossiter ed. 1961 )")(emphasis in original). 
437. Standards for Publication, supra n. 4, at 20-21. See also Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
advisory comm. n. 
438. See generally e.g. Strongman, supra n. 135; Wade, supra n. 354; Miller, supra n. 
354. 
439. Strongman, supra n. 135, at 220. 
. . 
440. See e.g. Plyler v Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (citing F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. 
Va., 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)). Equal protection is guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment in regard to state action and the Fifth Amendment in regard to federal action. 
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (noting that "it would be unthinkable that the 
same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government'' through the 
Fifth Amendment than on state governments through the Fourteenth). 
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Amendment equal protection are congruent.441 From this it 
follows that the federal courts must treat similarly situated 
litigants alike unless an appropriate justification for disparate 
treatment exists. 
Equal protection involves twin inquiries: (1) the standard of 
review applicable to the government's conduct, and (2) whether 
the challenged discrimination is sufficiently justified under that 
standard. The standard of review applicable to the issuance of 
non-precedential opinions is arguably strict scrutiny, because 
this is the standard applied to cases involving a suspect class or 
the inhibition of a fundamental right.442 If so, the conduct at 
issue the use of non-precedential opinions is not sufficiently 
justified to meet that standard. The practice of designating 
opinions as unpublished and non-precedential certainly 
implicates a fundamental right, and it might also be regarded as 
involving a suspect class.443 
1. Unequal treatment of similarly situated parties. 
The discrimination that occurs in a regime of non-
precedential opinions is that similarly situated litigants, indeed 
even the san1e litigant in the same factual setting, may be treated 
differently by the courts. This is exemplified by a pair of cases 
in which the Dallas Area Rapid Transit authority received 
diametrically opposed decisions from the Fifth Circuit without 
explanation in a span of just three years. In 1999, a district court 
held that "DART is a political subdivision of the state of Texas, 
and is therefore immune from suit under the Eleventh 
441. See e.g. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n. 2 (1975) (pointing out that 
"[t]his Court's approach to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has always been 
precisely the same as to equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment," and 
citing Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 
(1974), and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)). 
442. See e.g. Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (applying strict 
scrutiny to a statute limiting free speech). 
443. See e.g., Pether, supra n. 5, at 1444-1445 (citing M. Margaret McKeown, J., U.S. 
Ct. of App. for the 9th Cir., What is "Authority"? Panel Presentation, Assoc. of Am. Law 
Schools (Jan. 3-6, 2001) (suggesting a "private history" of the origins of the limited 
publication initiative rooted in screening out civil rights and prisoner appeals)). 
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Amendment,"444 which holding the Fifth Circuit affirmed 
without comment in an unpublished opinion.445 The Supreme 
Court denied certiorari, so the litigants in DART (and similarly 
situated litigants) must have felt about as secure as possible that 
the rule establishing their immunity was settled in the Fifth 
Circuit. So it seemed fitting that when the question of DART's 
Eleventh Amendment inununity was again brought before the 
district court in 2000, the court held that "[i]t is firmly 
established that DART is governmental unit or instrumentality 
of the State of Texas" and therefore entitled to Eleventh 
Amendment immunity,446 relying on the Fifth Circuit's 
affrrmance in Anderson just one year prior. However, this time 
the Fifth Circuit held that DART was not entitled to Eleventh 
Amendment immunity, despite Fifth Circuit case law that dated 
back to 1986.447 
The Fifth Circuit was wholly dismissive of the prior result 
in Anderson (and two similar cases), stating that "[a]lthough all 
three cases upheld DART's immunity from suit, they are neither 
binding nor persuasive in this context."448 So, because the prior 
case holding DART immune was unpublished, it was not 
accorded precedential weight under the relevant Fifth Circuit 
Rule,449 and the court felt free to depart from the earlier case 
without distinguishing it in some fashion (which it could not 
because the legally relevant facts were identical) or overruling 
the law on which the case was based.450 Though the Fifth Circuit 
denied an en bane hearing, several judges dissented: 
444. Anderson v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, No. CA3:97-CV-1834-BC (N.D. Tex. Sept. 
29, 1998), affd without opinion 180 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (unpublished), 
cert. denied 529 U.S. 1062 (1999). Note that the district court's unpublished opinion is 
available at 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15493; the material quoted from it in the text above 
appears at • 24. 
445. Anderson, 180 F.3d 265. 
446. Williams v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 256 F.3d 260, 260-61 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(Smith, Jones, & DeMoss, JJ., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en bane) 
[hereinafter Williams II]. 
447. Williams v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 242 F.3d 315, 318-19 (5th Cir. 2001). 
448. Id. at 319. 
449. Fifth Circuit Rule 47.5.4, then in effect, provided that "[u]npublished opinions 
issued on or after January 1, 1996, are not precedent, except under the doctrine of res 
judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case." 
450. Williams, 242 F.3d at 322 (holding that "[t]he district court therefore erred in 
finding DART immune from suit,). 
• 
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The refusal of the en bane court to rehear this case en bane 
is unfortunate, for this is an opportunity to revisit the 
questionable practice of denying precedential status to 
unpublished opinions. . . . I respectfully dissent from the 
denial of rehearing en bane, which would have given this 
court an opportunity to examine the question of 
unpublished opinions generally, an issue that is important 
to the fair administration of justice in this circuit.45 1 
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The dissenters recognized the fundamental unfairness that 
has occurred in treating DART differently in two identical cases 
decided within two years, based not on factually distinguishing 
factors or a change in the governing law, but merely the whim of 
one panel choosing not to publish. The fact that the party was 
DART in both cases makes it apparent that the defendant was 
not only similarly situated in each case, but as far as legally 
relevant facts go, it was identically situated. Yet, it was treated 
differently. The dissent in Williams explains the fundamental 
injustice aptly: 
If the Anderson panel had published its opinion, it would 
have been binding on the panel in the instant case-
Williams and the result here would have been different. 
Based, however, on the mere fortuity that the Anderson 
panel decided not to publish, our panel in Williams was free 
to disagree with Anderson and to deny to DART the same 
inm1unity that Anderson had conferred on it less than two 
years earlier. 
What is the hapless litigant or attorney, or for that matter a 
federal district judge or magistrate judge, to do? The reader 
should put himself or herself into the shoes of the attorney 
for DART. That client is told in May 1999, by a panel of 
this court in Anderson, that it is immune, on the basis of a 
"comprehensive and well-reasoned opinion." Competent 
counsel reasonably would have concluded, and advised his 
or her client, that it could count on Eleventh Amendment 
inununity. 
Then, in March 2000, in the instant case, a federal district 
judge, understandably citing and relying on the circuit's 
decision in Anderson, holds that "[i]t is firmly established 
that DART is a governmental unit or instrumentality of the 
451. Williams II, 256 F .3d at 260 (Smith, Jones, & DeMoss, JJ., dissenting). 
• 
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state of Texas." In February 2001, however, a panel, 
containing one of the judges who was on the Anderson 
panel, reverses and tells DART that, on the basis of well-
established Fifth Circuit law from 1986, it has no such 
in1n1unity. One can only wonder what competent counsel 
·11 d . h 1· 452 wt a vtse t e c tent now. 
Indeed. How did the Anderson panel affrrm such a plainly stated 
grant of immunity in 1999 in the face of case law dating back to 
1986? How could the Williams panel, in fairness and accord 
with equal protection, treat DART differently without 
distinguishing or reconciling the decision in Anderson? These 
questions remain unanswered because the petition for rehearing 
en bane was denied,453 as was the petition for certiorari.454 
Perhaps one of the most telling tales of unequal treatment 
can be found in the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. 
Rivera-Sanchez,455 in which the Ninth Circuit examined an issue 
left unresolved following the Supreme Court's decision in 
Almendarez-Torres v. United States.456 The Ninth Circuit was 
forced to admit in Rivera-Sanchez that no less than twenty prior 
panels had issued unpublished decisions on the matter at issue, 
and those decisions split on the answer: Eleven cases were 
remanded for re-sentencing, six were remanded for correction of 
the judgment, and three were remanded for consideration of the 
proper standard under Almendarez.457 For three years following 
Almendarez, these Ninth Circuit cases had escaped review while 
providing different answers to the same legal question. If not for 
the Rivera-Sanchez court's request during oral argument that 
452. Williams II, 256 F.3d at 260-61 (Smith, Jones, & DeMoss, J., dissenting from 
denial of petition for rehearing en bane). 
453. Williams II, 256 F.3d 260. 
454. Dallas Area Rapid Transit v. Williams, 534 U.S. 1042 (2001). The reader will note 
that the Eighth Circuit' s decisions in Anastasoff and Christie present a similar issue, albeit 
one with a better outcome. The Anastasoff court held itself bound by the earlier 
unpublished decision in Christie, but it could easily have chosen otherwise even though the 
complaining taxpayers in the two cases were similarly situated. See §V.D.2, supra. 
455. 222 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2000). 
456. Almendarez-Torres v. US., 523 U.S. 224 (1998) (leaving unresolved whether a 
district court must re-sentence a defendant convicted of illegal re-entry following a 
deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and § 1326(b )(2), or can merely correct the judgment 
of conviction). 
457. Rivera-Sanchez, 222 F.3d at 1062-63. 
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counsel prepare and provide a list of unpublished cases, this 
unequal disposition of cases would probably have continued.458 
It is ironic that the Ninth Circuit panel's request for 
counsel's citation of those unpublished decisions and its own 
subsequent citation of them was in direct contravention of its 
then-current rule on unpublished cases, which provided that 
"[ u ]npublished dispositions and orders of this Court may not be 
cited to or by the courts of this circuit,',459 except in several 
circumstances that did not apply to Rivera-Sanchez's situation. 
The confusion within the circuit was resolved only because the 
Ninth Circuit itself ignored its non-citation rule. 
These are not isolated examples. In fact, "[ e ]mpirical 
evidence suggests that cases such as Christie and Anderson are 
more cotnmon than one might think."46° For example, one study 
of unpublished opinions found that publication decisions, 
combined with limited citation/precedent rules, have an effect 
on the substance of the law, and that unpublished decisions are 
not simply routine applications of the law.461 Instead, they 
contain "a noticeable number of reversals, dissents, or 
concurrences," and appear to suggest "significant associations 
between case outcome and judicial characteristics. ,,462 
The authors of this study continue by pointing out the 
dangers inherent in the practice: 
Our findings thus yield troubling public policy implications 
that make the constitutional issue posed by the Eighth 
Circuit more stark. We know that at least some unpublished 
decisions reach results with which other judges would 
disagree, and that judges and courts also vary in their 
tendency to publish outcomes. It follows that denying 
precedential value to unpublished opinions gives judges 
discretion to decide which of their rulings will bind future 
458. Id. 
459. For infonnation about the fonner version of the Ninth Circuit rule, see Serfass & 
Cranford, supra n. 165, at 255 & 255 n. 6 (referring to text of interim rule and indicating 
that fonner version (in force when Rivera-Sanchez was decided) prohibited citation of 
unpublished decisions). 
460. Williams II, 256 F.3d at 262 (Smith, Jones, and DeMoss, J., dissenting from denial 
of petition for rehearing en bane). 
461. Merritt & Brudney, supra n. 328, at 120. 
462. Jd. 
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decision-makers and sets the stage for inconsistent 
treatment of like cases. 463 
It is this inconsistent treatment of like cases that is the most 
troubling from an Equal Protection perspective, because "failing 
to give unpublished opinions precedential effect raises the very 
specter described by the Ei§hth Circuit: that like cases will be 
decided in unlike ways." 64 Clearly, the idea that these 
unpublished opinions are issued in easy cases involving well-
established legal principles that add nothing to the body of law 
and can safely be ignored rests on faulty empirical grounds.465 
Given that unequal treatment exists, this government action 
should be subjected to the appropriate scrutiny and its 
justifications examined. The most appropriate standard is strict 
scrutiny, and the process of declaring certain decisions non-
precedential cannot meet the justification standard required. 
2. Strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard, and it is not 
met here. 
The appropriate standard for such discrimination is strict 
scrutiny because the unequal treatment here inhibits a 
fundamental right. The right to a fair trial is certainly a 
fundamental right: "Few, if any, interests under the Constitution 
are more fundamental than the right to a fair trial by 'impartial' 
jurors,''466 and the Supreme Court has repeatedly held other 
concerns, such as the right to counsel, to be important in 
protecting the "fundamental right to a fair trial. "467 Among the 
463. /d. at 120-21. 
464. /d. (citing Anastasoff). 
465. Boggs & Brooks, supra n. 288, at 20-21 & 21 n. 17. See also Stienstra, supra n. 8, 
at 37 (noting that less than half the circuits routinely publish reversals); Hannon, supra n. 
296, at 215-24 (noting the significant number of unpublished opinions involving reversals, 
dissents, or concurrences). 
466. Gentile v. St. Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1075 (Rehnquist, C.J., White, Scalia & 
Souter, JJ., dissenting). 
467. See e.g. J.E.B. v. Ala. ex rei. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (indicating that peremptory 
challenges are a means to ensure fundamental right to fair trial); Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 
U.S. 364 (1993) (recognizing that right to counsel exists to protect fundamental right to fair 
trial); Chandler v. Fla., 449 U.S. 560, 577 (1981) (holding that judicial control of media 
coverage of court proceedings is constitutional when exercised to "protect the fundamental 
right of the accused to a fair trial"). 
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various other protections in service of an overall fair trial, the 
court has expressed a concern for "equal justice.'7468 This equal 
justice is denie~ to. parties befo~e th~ court ~h~, deBending on 
the day they arr1ve 1n court, recetve dtfferent JUSttce.4 9 
The government cannot meet the standard of demonstrating 
that this discrimination inhibiting a fundamental right is 
necessary to achieve a compelling govermnent interest, and that 
it could not attain the goal through any means less restrictive of 
the right.470 While the interest in dealing with the volume of 
cases filed in federal court is compelling in a lay sense, it does 
not meet the high standard the Supreme Court has required for a 
compelling govenrment interest. For example, the Court has 
rejected claims that administrative efficiency was a compelling 
govemtnent interest sufficient to justify discrimination based on 
gender: "[O]ur prior decisions make clear that, although 
efficacious administration of governmental programs is not 
without some importance, 'the Constitution recognizes higher 
values than speed and efficiency. "'471 
Likewise, the Court has struck down a statutory provision 
that inhibited the fundamental right to travel by imposing a one-
year waiting period on welfare b.enefits.472 The Court applied 
strict scrutiny, stating that "[s]ince the classification here 
touches on the fundamental right of interstate movement, its 
constitutionality must be judged by the stricter standard of 
whether it promotes a compelling state interest."473 The Court 
rejected arguments that administrative efficiency or the 
budgetary benefits of the waiting period were compelling state 
468. Strongman, supra n. 135, at 220 (citing Griffin v. Ill., 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) 
(noting that the United States seeks to afford equal justice to all and special privileges to 
none in administering its laws)). 
469. Compare e.g. Williams II, 256 F.3d 260, with Anderson, No. CA3:97-CV-1834-BC 
(N.D. Tex. 1998). 
470. In this analysis, the government bears the burden of demonstrating both the 
necessity of its action and the compelling governmental interest that action furthers. Etwin 
Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law 761 (3d ed. Aspen 2006) (pointing out that "[u]nder 
strict scrutiny it is not enough for the government to prove a compelling purpose behind the 
law; the government must also show that the law is necessary to achieve that objective" 
(emphasis in original)). 
471. Frontiero v. Richprdson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973) (quoting Stanley v. Ill., 405 U.S. 
645, 656 (1972)). 
472. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
473. /d. at 638 (emphasis in original). 
• 
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interests in the face of such a fundamental right:474 
We recognize that a State has a valid interest in preserving 
the fiscal integrity of its programs. It may legitimately 
attempt to limit its expenditures, whether for public 
assistance, public education, or any other program. But a 
State may not accomplish such a purpose by invidious 
distinctions between classes of its citizens. It could not, for 
example, reduce expenditures for education by barring 
indigent children from its schools. Similarly, in the cases 
before us, appellants must do more than show that denying 
welfare benefits to new residents saves money. The saving 
of welfare costs cannot justify an otherwise invidious 
I "fi . 475 c asst tcatton 
Moreover, even if a compelling state interest can be found 
here, the courts' non-precedent policies (which now apply to 
eighty percent of federal circuit decisions) were not narrowly 
tailored.476 First, the claim that these cases are not lawmaking is 
belied by the high percentage of unpublished opinions that are or 
contain reversals, dissents, and concurrences.477 Second, the 
courts could accomplish their goal of streamlined opinion 
writing by adopting a brief opinion format· · one that sets forth 
the bare minimum necessary to explain the prior precedent 
under which a particular case falls, the relevant facts that bring it 
within that case's control, and the result.478 Creating a two-
tiered, two-track system of adjudicating cases and rendering 
opinions is not a good fit. 
As with the core Article III issue, this potential 
constitutional infirmity in the federal courts of appeals' 
designation of the vast majority of their decisions as non-
precedential should be further examined and pressed in court. 
474. !d. at 636-38. 
475. ld. at 633 (footnote omitted). 
476. The requirement that a government action is narrowly tailored means that the action 
fits the compelling interest with "greater precision than any alternative means." Wygant v. 
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n. 6 (1986) (citing John Hart Ely, The 
Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 723, 727 n. 26 
(1974)). 
477. See Boggs & Brooks, supra n. 288, at 20-21. See also Stienstra, supra n. 8, at 37 
(noting that more than half the circuits did not automatically publish opinions reversing 
decisions below); Hannon, supra n. 296, at 215-24 (noting the significant number of 
unpublished opinions involving reversals, dissents, or concurrences). 
478. Cappalli, supra n. 5, at 795 . 
• 
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Because of the importance of the right to a fair trial, this issue 
should be decided by the United States Supreme Court. 
B .. Due Process 
As with the Equal Protection claim, which has been raised 
by commentators but not advanced before a court, it has been 
suggested that the scheme .of declaring some decisions non-
precedential violates Due Process requirements.479 This claim 
proceeds from the statement in the Due Process clause that "[n]o 
person shall ... be deErived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law," 80 which has been held to contain both 
substantive and procedural requirements.481 
The substantive due process objection is similar to the 
equal protection objection outlined above.482 The right to a fair 
trial, as embodied in the requirement that courts should be 
bound to follow prior decisions (or distinguish them or change 
the law), is arguably a fundamental right and "implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty" as set forth in the Constitution.483 
The concept that a common law court would both look to prior 
decisions and make decisions knowing that they would be 
treated as precedential by later courts is intrinsic to our judicial 
• 
479. See generally Wade, supra n. 354. See also Miller, supra n. 354, at 204; Analisa 
Pratt, Student Author, A Call for Uniformity in Appellate Courts • Rules Regarding Citation 
of Unpublished Opinions, 35 Golden Gate U.L. Rev. 195, 214-19 (2005). 
480. U.S. Const. amend V. 
481. See e.g. Wade, supra n. 354, at 717; Pratt, supra n. 479, at 214. 
482. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are the source of both substantive due 
process and equal protection rights, and the two types of protections are frequently found 
concurrently. Both involve assessing the fundamental nature of the right asserted, the 
justification of the government action, and the "fit" or burden of the government action. 
Often the Court applies both, and finds the requirements of both to be met, but sometimes 
the Court itself splits on which protection is a better analysis for a given problem. Compare 
e.g. Zablocki v. Redhai/, 434 U.S. 374, 382 (1978) with id. at 392 (Stewart, J. concurring) 
(using an equal protection approach for the majority opinion, but having the concurrence 
apply a due process analysis). While the difference is essentially one of phrasing, the 
distinction is typically whether the inhibition of a right applies to everyone (due process) or 
only to some (equal protection). Under either approach, depending upon who is viewed as 
hanned by the non-precedential opinion regime, the core analysis and outcome are the 
same. 
483. See e.g. Griswold v~ Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J. concurring). 
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system.484 The practice of the court, the argument proceeds, of 
issuing non-precedential opinions infringes upon that right both 
as to the party whose decision is made without that process and 
as to those who would seek to rely upon that decision in the 
future.485 If, then, the right is fundamental and the government's 
action impinges on it, that action is subject to strict scrutiny and 
must be justified by showing that the action is the least 
burdensome means of achieving a compelling interest.486 As 
discussed above in the equal protection analysis, the practice of 
declaring opinions in advance to hold no precedential weight is 
not a the least burdensome means of achieving any compelling 
state interest. 
The procedural due process requirement guarantees that 
people deprived of life, liberty, or property are entitled to a 
reasonable level of judicial or administrative process.487 This 
"duty of government to follow a fair process of decisionmaking 
when it acts to deprive a person of his possessions" serves "not 
only to ensure abstract fair play to the individual," but "[i]ts 
purpose, more particularly, is to protect his use and possession 
of property from arbitrary encroachment---- to minimize 
substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations of property."488 In 
setting the standard for what process is required, the Supreme 
Court has relied upon traditional common law procedures, 
stating recently in Honda Motor Co., Ltd. v. Oberg: 
As this Court has stated from its first due process cases, 
traditional practice provides a touchstone for constitutional 
analysis. . . . Because the basic procedural protections of 
484. See Section III, supra. 
485. Cf. Loritz v. U.S. Ct. of Appeals for the 9th Cir., 382 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(fmding that a litigant whose case was disposed of by unpublished opinion lacked Article 
III standing because he was asserting due process rights of later litigants). But see id. at 
992-93 (Beam, J., concurring) (stating that the necessary standing is created by plaintiffs 
argument that prior unpublished, case law, if it were precedential, would dictate a different 
outcome). 
486. Clark v. Jeter., 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (stating that classifications "affecting 
fundamental rights ... are given the most exacting scrutiny" (citations omitted)); Harper v. 
Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 672 (1966) (pointing out that the Court has "long been 
mindful that where fundamental rights and liberties are asserted under the Equal Protection 
Clause, classifications which might invade or restrain them must be closely scrutinized and 
carefully confined"). 
487. See e.g. Wade, supra n. 354, at 717; Pratt, supra n. 479, at 214. 
488. Fuen.tes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-81 (1972). 
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the connnon law have been regarded as so fundamental, 
very few cases have arisen in which a party has complained 
of their denial. In fact, most of our due process decisions 
involve arguments that traditional procedures provide too 
little protection and that additional safeguards are necessary 
to ensure compliance with the Constitution .... 
Nevertheless, there are a handful of cases in which a party 
has been deprived of liberty or property without the 
safeguards of common-law procedure .... When the absent 
procedures would have provided protection against 
arbitrary and inaccurate adjudication, this Court has not 
hesitated to find the proceedings violative of due 
process. 489 
157 
In Honda, the Supreme Court invalidated, on due process 
grounds, Oregon's departure from the well-established common 
law procedure of judicial oversight of punitive damage 
awards.490 In so doing, the Court examined this longstanding 
check on excessive awards, which has been the common law 
practice "for as long as punitive damages have been 
awarded,''491 reviewed the history of judicial oversight of 
punitive damage verdicts,492 and then placed its decision as 
soundly within a long line of cases finding the Fifth (and 
concomitant Fourteenth) Amendment due process guarantees 
violated by procedures removing this "well-established 
conrmon-law protection."493 The Court held that the protection 
was deeply entrenched despite minor variations in its fortn 
throughout common law history,494 and that the nature of the 
489. 512 U.S. 415,430 (1994) (internal citations omitted). See also Wade, supra n. 354, 
at 717; Pratt, supra n. 479, at 214. 
490. Honda, 512 U.S. at 434-35 (recognizing that "[a] decision to punish a tortfeasor by 
means of an exaction of exemplary damages is an exercise of state power that must comply 
with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"). 
491. !d. at 421. 
492. !d. at 421-29. 
493. /d. at 430 (citing Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 
272 (1856); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); Brown v. Miss., 291 U.S. 278 (1936); In 
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970); Burnham v. Super. Ct., 495 U.S. 604 (1990); Pac. 
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991)). 
494. /d. at 434-35 & 435 n. 12 (noting that the strength of judicial deference to jury 
verdicts and the extent to which judicial review of jury verdicts was contested varied in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, yet fmding the practice well-established overall 
despite these differences). See also id. at 421·26 (detailing the established but not always 
precisely identical practice of judicial review of jury verdicts). 
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protection, as part of due process, created an "insurmountable 
presumption of unconstitutionality because there was no 
adequate replacement procedure and no societal transformation 
justifying the departure. "495 The Court contrasted the setting of 
Honda, in which no societal transformation dictated the change, 
with the setting of International Shoe Co. v. Washington,496 in 
which modern changes in communication, transportation, and 
business dealings made litigation in a distant forum less onerous 
and more necessary.497 Similarly, the Court contrasted the 
setting in Honda, in which no adequate alternative protection 
was given, with that in Hurtado v. California,498 in which a 
neutral magistrate was substituted in the criminal charging 
process for the common law grand jury.499 
In regard to the issue of denying precedential status to 
unpublished decisions, Honda provides, by analogy, an 
argur11ent that the practice violates procedural due process. Like 
the judicial oversight of punitive damage verdicts in Honda, the 
precedential status of all opinions: 
( 1) is deeply rooted in common law tradition; (2) creates a 
presumption of unconstitutionality if removed; (3) lacks an 
adequate replacement procedure; and (4) was not abrogated 
in response to constitutionally justifiable societal 
c. . 500 trans1ormatton. 
Thus, the practice of denying all decisions precedential status is 
as violative of due process as is the denial of judicial oversight 
of punitive damage verdicts. The practice of according all 
decisions ~recedential status is deeply rooted in the common law 
tradition. 5 1 Much like the practice of judicial oversight 
examined in Honda,502 the exact contours of the common law 
practice in connection with unpublished opinions have not been 
rigid or unchanging, but the core of the protection has existed 
from early common law and has been adopted into modem 
495. Wade, supra n. 354, at 718 (citing Honda). 
496. 326 u.s. 310 (1945). 
497. Honda, 512 U.S. at 431. 
498. 110 u.s. 516 (1884) 
499. Honda, 512 U.S. at 431. 
500. Wade, supra n. 354, at 722 (citing Honda). 
501. See Section Ill, supra. 
502. Honda, 512 U.S. at 434 . 
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practice. Just as the Court in Honda rejected the claim that a 
lack of perfect unifortnity in application of the rule undermines 
the rule itself, here the Court should reject the claim that the 
practice of adhering to precedent has changed over time. 503 In 
some form sufficient to establish the principle that all decisions 
of a common law court form precedent to which that court looks 
in making future cases, the practice of referring to past cases 
stretches back farther and is of more fundamental im ortance 
The removal of the practice of according precedential status 
to all decisions creates a presumption of unconstitutionality that 
cannot be overcome. For a reviewing court to find such an 
action constitutional, the government must show that societal 
transforn1ation has necessitated such a change or that an 
adequate replacement process has been put in place,505 neither of 
which applies here. 
While the booming caseload of the federal courts presents 
an argument for societal transformation of a type, that argument 
is flawed in two respects. First, unlike the change identified in 
International Shoe, the change here is intrinsic to the court, 
rather than to the society it judges. If such an internal need could 
be considered a sufficient societal transformation, the court 
would always be able to offer such a justification by explaining, 
"we need the change." Second, the practices within the legal 
system demonstrate a resilient insistence on the citation of and 
reliance on unpublished decisions as some form of precedent, 
even in the face of rules to the contrary. Studies have shown that 
both lawyers and courts have frequently relied upon and cited 
unpublished decisions, even when circuit rules restricted 
them. 506 This suggests that it is not that society has moved on, 
503. /d. 
504. Wade, supra n. 354, at 723 (pointing out that "[t]he history of lawyers citing to all 
prior judicial decisions is much lengthler than the comprehensive punitive damage review 
considered 'deeply rooted' by the Honda Court" and that "[w]hereas the Honda Court 
traced the practice of punitive damage review to the mid-seventeenth century, the ability to 
cite prior decisions dates back four hundred years further to the middle of the thirteenth 
century," and then asserting that "[ t ]he long history of this citation procedure is sufficient 
to indicate a deeply-rooted common law practice in accord with Honda"). 
505. Honda, 512 U.S. at 431-32. 
506. See Reagan et al., supra n. 250, at 15-17 (reporting that a Federal Judicial Center 
survey of federal practitioners indicated widespread research of unpublished decisions and 
the perceived usefulness of those opinions). See also Robel, Practice of Precedent, supra n. 
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but that the courts themselves hav·e abrogated this doctrine 
against societal interests. Finally, society has transformed in 
ways that cut against such a justification. The unpublished 
decisions of the federal courts of appeals are now uniformly 
citeable thanks to new Rule 32.1. 507 Such decisions are widely 
available in the Federal Appendix, on West's and LEXIS's 
online services, and on the courts' own websites. 508 Even with 
citation restrictions in place, past practice suggests that these 
opinions will be looked at and used.509 If anything, society has 
pushed back against the encroachment on this traditional 
conunon law protection. Nor have any adequate alternate 
procedures been substituted. It is difficult to imagine what 
alternative procedure could be substituted to meaningfully 
replace the ability of litigants to rely upon a court's following its 
decisions from one case to the next absent some factual 
distinctions or changes in the law. 
As with the other Constitutional questions surrounding the 
practice of issuing non-precedential opinions, this issue should 
be pressed by litigants and Supreme Court review sought (and 
granted). Even if none of these arguments is ultimately 
successful, and the Supreme Court decides that cases can be 
designated as non-precedential, the question remains as to 
whether they ought to be. That question embodies both 
pragmatic costs of denying some decisions precedential status 
and an inquiry into what we, as members of the legal 
conununity, perceive the purpose of courts and court decisions 
to be. While the issue of volume in the federal courts is 
apparent, declaration of some decisions as non-precedential is 
not . a necessary response. Nor, in the minds of many, is it a 
desirable one. 
5, at 401 (indicating that "evidence suggests that lawyers and judges value these opinions 
. . . 
despite the rules limiting citation," and that "[t]his valuation, in turn, suggests a cultural, 
rather than a rule-bound, conception of stare decisis"); Working Papers, supra n. 314, at 78 
(revealing that nineteen percent of attorneys polled reviewed either "most or all" or "most 
or all in one or more areas of the law" and forty percent reported reviewing unpublished 
cases that come up during their research); Katsh & Chachkes, supra n. 338,, at 301-02 
(noting that a "prudent'' lawyer researches unpublished opinions to mine the court's past 
practices, reasoning, and language regardless of publication or citation rules). 
507. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1. 
508. See generally Shuldberg, supra n. 150. 
509. See Robel, Practice of Precedent, supra n. 5, at 404-09. See also Robel, Myth, 
supra n. 5, at 962 (noting that "some litigants can and do use these opinions"). 
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C. Pragmatic Objections to Precedential Status and Proposed 
Solutions 
Even if the Supreme Court were to resolve all of the above 
questions in favor of the practice of rendering non-precedential 
opinions, the answer of whether the courts may issue them does 
not resolve the question of whether they ought to issue them. 
The practice of issuing non-precedential opinions is a failed 
experiment in addressing the federal courts' volume issue. 
Litigants' and courts' continued use of unpublished opinions, 
even throughout a period of restricted citation, demonstrates that 
reliance upon prior decisions is deeply embedded in our legal 
culture and our rule-based legal system.510 This legal culture is 
based on an expectation of consistency, development of the law 
through accretion of precedent, and analogical reasoning. With 
the enactment of Rule 32.1, which permits citation of 
unpublished decisions, the rules denying some decisions 
precedential status makes even less sense.511 Permitting citation 
undercuts the presumption that less time can be fent on 
opinions merely because they are unpublished.51 These 
decisions will be scrutinized, their reasoning adopted, and their 
authority urged u~on the courts, whether as precedent or merely 
as past practice. 51 
Reasoning by analog and appeal to precedent are part of 
expected and practiced by lawyers, litigants, and judges alike.515 
Failure to respect these expectations about precedent, such as by 
declaring decisions not precedent ex ante, is harmful to the 
510. See generally id. & id. 
511. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1. 
512. See Standards for Publication, supra n. 4, at 18 (pointing out that "[a]n opinion that 
meets the needs of the parties . . . can be written with the assumption that the parties are 
familiar with the background of the case," but that "[a]n opinion for the whole world 
cannot rest on such assumptions"). 
513. See Robel, Practice of Precedent, supra n. 5, at 400. See also Robel, Myth, supra n. 
5, at 962. 
514. Schauer, supra n. 287, at 572. 
515. See Robel, Practice of Precedent, supra n. 5, at 400. See also Robel, Myth, supra n. 
5, at 962. 
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courts' public image and self-image alike.516 While there are no 
easy solutions, there is merit in wading into the- "morass of 
jurisprudence" surrounding the issue and taking a stand based on 
jurisprudential grounds: 
It is often said among judges that the volume of appeals is 
so high that it is simply unrealistic to ascribe precedential 
value to every de-cision~ We do not have time to do a decent 
enough job, the argument runs, when put in plain language, 
to justify treating every opinion as a precedent If this is 
true, the judicial system is indeed in serious trouble, but the 
remedy is not to create an underground body of law good 
for .one place and time only. The remedy, instead, is to 
create enough judgeships to handle the volume, or, if that is 
not practical, for each judge to take enough time to do a 
competent job with each case., If this means that backlogs 
.1.1 h . ..11 b . d 517 wt grow, t e prtce must stt . e pat . 
Solutions to this problem seem to fall into three categories. 
First, written opinions could be brief and limited to only the 
necessary infortnation. Second, courts could take the time to 
write full discursive opinions and accept the backlogs. Third, 
Congress could act, on its own or in response to the above, to 
.add federal judgeships or, more drastically, limit or alter the 
federal jurisdiction. 
1. Legal Reasoning and Precedent 
Precedent is not merely a cornerstone of common law; it is 
inherent in the human experience. From the young child going 
off to first grade who proclaims that she ought to get a new 
backpack because her brother got a new backpack when he 
started first grade to the clerk who is unwilling to accept a filing 
by fax simply because he has never done so in the past, 
precedent is part of our sense of fairness and propriety. Even 
small children understand and naturally apply appeals to 
precedent as argument for what they want. This behavior 
continues into adulthood as we frequently justify our actions as_ 
in accordance with past practice or argue for others to alter their 
516. Pether, supra n. 5, at 1483-84; Reynolds & ruchman, No-Citation Rules, supra n. 5~ 
at 1199-1204. 
517. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 904. 
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past practices in our favor. Indeed, the idea that someone is 
"setting a bad precedent" is part of the common vernacular. 
In the American legal community, the importance of 
precedent is even greater.518 At its core, the common law 
requires practitioners to analogize cases to determine applicable 
legal principles and whether they apply to given facts. 519 
Llewellyn explains this well when he says: 
We have discovered that rules alone, mere forms of words, 
are worthless. We have learned that the concrete instance, 
the heaping up of concrete instances, the present, vital 
memory of a multitude of concrete instances, is necessary 
in order to make any general proJ2osition, be it rule of law 
or any other, mean anything at aiL520 
Declaring some decisions non-precedential merely because they 
apply the same rule of law applied in earlier cases deprives the 
law of these instances. It is from these instances that society can 
discern the strength and limits of the rule. It is exceedingly rare 
that a decision adds nothing to the law.521 Each decision adds 
either a slight expansion of the rule to a certain set of facts, 
limitation of the law to a certain set of facts, or merely the 
weight of a newer and additional decision, which affirms the 
resilience of the rule. Each instance of applying law to facts, 
which the court has been charged with doing anyway, provides 
another example that can inform individuals in ordering their 
affairs as well as in evaluating whether to bring a similar 
challenge to court. This process of building and refming the 
common law comports with Lord Coke's perception that the law 
would be "refined" by "long and continual experience," with 
judges "declaring its principles with even greater precision and 
renewing it by application to the matter at hand."52 This process 
is being diminished by the growing body of non-precedential 
• 0 
optntons. 
518. See generally e.g. Robel, Practice of Precedent, supra n. 5; Robel, Myth, supra n. 
5. 
519. Llewellyn, supra n. 327, at 66-69. 
520. /d. at 12 (emphasis in original). 
521. Arnold, supra n. 21, at 222-23. 
522. Healy, supra n. 36, at 66 (citing John Greville Agard Pocock, The Ancient 
Constitution and The Feudal Law (Cambridge U. Press 1987)). 
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One conm1entator described the effect of this deprivation of 
preced~nt with a vivid metaphor, stating that "[t]he doctrine of 
precedent is like a pointillist painting with judicial opinions as 
the carefully placed points providing depth,"523 and then noted 
that when some of the points are removed, the overall picture is 
made less distinct, its contours less clear.524 The power of this 
metaphor is magnified by the extent to which non-publication 
has now expanded. Over eighty-four ercent of all federal 
painting missing eighty-four percent of its points! This principle 
is the same as Llewellyn's "heaps'': The common law functions 
based on repeated applications of the rule of law, applications 
that provide fodder for inductive reasoning about what the rule 
is, and more critically, analogical reasoning about how the rule 
is (and will be) applied.526 This is why scholarly writers talk of 
the common law being "deprived" of precedent, 527 and why 
Judge Arnold noted: 
I would take the position that all decisions have 
precedential significance. To be sure, there are many cases 
that look like previous cases, and that are almost identical. 
In each instance, however, it is possible to think of 
conceivable reasons why the previous case can be 
distinguished, and when a court decides that it cannot be, it 
is necessarily holding that the proffered distinctions lack 
merit under the law. This holding itself is a conclusion of 
law with precedential significance .... Every case has some 
precedential value, maybe not much, but some.528 
523. Strongman, supra n. 135 at 195. 
524. /d. 
525. Judicial Business, Table S-3, supra n. 6, at 52 (showing the percent unpublished in 
the twelve-month period ending Sept. 30, 2006, to be 84.1 ). 
526. Llewellyn, supra n. 327, at 12, 48-50. 
527. Merritt & Brudney, supra n. 328, at 73 (noting that limited publication can "deprive 
litigants of useful precedent"). See also e.g. Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of 
Appeals Perish if They Publish? Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and 
Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44 Am. U. L. Rev. 757, 785-800 (1995) 
(describing consequences of limiting precedent); Foa, supra n. 335, at 338-40 (noting 
"loss" to bench and bar occasioned by Seventh Circuit rule). 
528. Arnold, supra n. 21, at 222-23. 
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Whether it is exalted as by Blackstone529 or feared as by 
Brutus,530 the sense that what a court does sets a legal precedent 
that must then be followed or distinguished is fundamental to 
our legal system. 531 This fundamental nature is apparent in the 
actions of both lawyers and judges, who have continued to use 
all cases despite the last three decades' practice of limited 
publication, citation, and precedent. 
2. Judges and Lawyers Find Unpublished Cases 
Authoritative. 
Though some part of the case for limited citation has been 
made on freeing lawyers from the need to research the growing 
body of case law, the evidence su gests that lawyers are all too 
rules were also supported by vague statements that too many 
precedents would overwhelm the law,533 and this, too, has 
proven inaccurate. 534 Whether they were false premises or 
because modem information technology has outpaced and 
outmoded these ideas,535 lawyers have continued to seek 
529. See Anastas off, 223 F .3d at 900 (citing Blackstone, supra n. 39, at *69: "it is an 
established rul~ to abide by fonner precedents"). 
530. Id. at 903 n. 13 (citing Essays of Brutus, XV, supra n. 383: "[O]ne adjudication will 
fonn a precedent to the next, and this to a following one. These cases will immediately 
affect individuals only; so that a series of determinations will probably take place before 
even the people will be infonned of them," and Letters from The Federal Farmer No. 3, 
supra n. 383: "no precedents in this country, as yet, to regulate the divisions in equity as in 
Great Britain; equity, therefore, in the supreme court for many years will be mere 
discretion"). 
531. Llewellyn, supra n. 327, at 61. 
532. Compare Standards for Publication, supra n. 4, at 7 (pointing out that "[t]he 
endless search for factual analogy requires immense expenditures of time and funds"), with 
Robel, Practice of Precedent, supra n. 5, at 401 (stating that "evidence suggests that 
lawyers and judges value these opinions despite the rules limiting citation," and that "(t]his 
valuation, in tum, suggests a cultural, rather than rule-based conception of stare decisis"). 
533. Standards for Publication, supra n. 4, at 6 ("(c]ommon law in the United States 
could be crushed by its own weight if the rate of publication is not abated"). 
534. Shuldberg, supra n. 150, at 558-59. 
535. See Hannon, supra n. 296, at 206, 209 n. 48. See also Boggs & Brooks, supra n. 
288, at 18 (contending that "[t]he 'unpublished opinions' debate ... is badly misnamed," 
because "(b]etween Lexis and Westlaw, Internet sites maintained by universities and some 
of the circuit courts of appeals, and networks of attorneys practicing in particular fields, it 
is the rare opinion that is not disseminated for mass consumption"). 
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precedents in courts' prior decisions even in the face of 
publication and citation restrictions. 536 
Limiting publication of certain cases was intended in part 
as a cost-saving measure. 537 Limiting citation was seen as a 
necessary ste in preserving the efficiency gained in limiting 
status to these cases has been carefully avoided. 53 The hope was 
that courts could issue written opinions only for their law-
making decisions and not for their law-applying decisions, 
which would result in a savings in terms of both opinion 
creation costs and opinion use costs. To prevent a market for 
arising for these unpublished opinions, however, a citation ban 
was needed. Finally, in order to justify a citation ban, many 
circuits declared these opinions as non-precedential. 540 
These ideas are, one by one, faltering. Whatever additional 
savings were envisioned by preventing unpublished opinions 
from being physically published has not come to pass given the 
ubiquity with which new unpublished cases are collected and 
published. Likewise, with the enactment of Rule 32.1, the 
citadel of non-citation has fallen, at least in the federal 
system.541 That decisions of the courts, which were viewed by 
lawyers and judges as having some value, even throughout the 
536. Robel, Practice of Precedent, supra n. 5, at 414 (noting "the depth of our historical 
cultural commitment to justification"). 
53 7. Standards for Publication, supra n. 4, at 6-8. See also Boggs & Brooks, supra n. 
288, at 19 (counseling against defending ''on high theory a practice that is in fact justified 
for simple efficiency reasons"); Robel, Practice of Precedent, supra n. 5, at 402 (tracing 
the shifting and highly pragmatic rationales for limited publication and citation). 
538. Standards for Publication, supra n. 4, at 18-21; Reynolds & Richman, No-Citation 
Rules, supra n. 5, at 1185-86; Robel, Practice of Precedent, supra n. 5, at 404 (also noting 
unequal-access argument against allowing citation). 
539. Standards for Publication, supra n. 4, at 20-21 (recommending denying citation to 
unpublished decisions and avoiding the "morass of jurisprudence" involved in directly 
declaring them non-precedential, thus leaving the development of the precedential value of 
unpublished decisions to the "correspondence of publication and precedential value on the 
one hand, and of non-publication and non-precedential value on the other"); Fed. R. App. 
P. 32.1 advisory comm. n. (stating that "Rule 32.1 is extremely limited .... It says nothing 
about what effect a court must give to one of its unpublished opinions or to the unpublished 
opinions of another court"). 
540. Reynolds & Richman, No-Citation Rules, supra n. 5, at 1179-81. 
541. See Barnett, supra n. 281 (referencing, by the use of "siege" and "battlefield" in his 
title, Judge Cardozo's famous phrase in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 114 N.E. 441, 445 
(N.Y. 1931 ), that the assault on the citadel of privity was proceeding apace to make a 
similar claim regarding no-citation rules). 
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non-citation era, should be properly viewed as precedential 
seems a logical final step. 
Surveys of judges and lawyers in the federal system have 
indicated that the attempt to create a body of "disposable 
opinions" that could be produced more cheaply and ignored by 
later litigants and courts has failed.542 Lawyers and judges 
already make use of unpublished, unciteable opinions. Surveys 
conducted in the 1990s by the Commission on Structural 
Alternatives for the Federal Courts (dubbed the "White 
Commission" in honor of its chair, Justice Byron White), 
queried federal trial and appellate judges as well as a random 
selection of attorneys with cases filed before the federal 
courts.543 Although the White Commission's primary area of 
interest was the desirability and feasibility of splitting the Ninth 
Circuit and similar structuring issues,544 it did touch upon the 
issue of unpublished, non-citable, non-precedential opinions, as 
part of an overall practice of "differentiated decisional 
processes. "545 
The White Commission surveys of lawyers and federal 
judges revealed that federal judges and lawyers alike looked to 
and cited unpublished opinions with a frequency that suggested 
that they found them to be of value.546 For example, nearly one 
in five lawyers reported that they review most or all unpublished 
542. See generally Robel, Practice of Precedent, supra n. 5 (examining recent surveys 
of federal judges and lawyers). See also Robel, Myth, supra n. 5, at I (coining the teun 
"disposable opinion" in reference to unpublished, unciteable opinions of the federal 
circuits). 
543. See Working Papers, supra n. 314, at 3 (stating that the response rate was eighty-six 
percent among appellate judges, eighty-one percent among district judges, and fifty-one 
percent among attorneys queried). 
544. Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, Final 
Report at ix (1998) [hereinafter White Commission Report]. 
545. /d. at 21-22. The White Commission discussed the marking of certain types of 
appeals at or near the time of filing as in need of less attention, which might typically mean 
no oral argument, staff-drafted dispositions, and unpublished decisions. This process may 
have its own issues of constitutionality and propriety, but that issue is beyond the scope of 
this article. See e.g. Pether, supra n. 5, at 1438, 1491-92. 
546. Robel, Practice of Precedent, supra n. 5, at 405-09 (summarizing the relevant data 
from the White Commission's surveys of federal judges and lawyers, which were 
conducted in 1998, at a time when limited citation rules were still in effect in most 
circuits). 
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decisions in their circuit in at least one area of law. 547 Moreover, 
another forty-four percent of lawyers reported reading 
unpublished opinions that come up in the course of their 
research. 548 With nearly two-thirds of lawyers who responded 
reporting that they "do not feel free to ignore these opinions 
either generally or with respect to specific cases," Dean Robel 
was right to note that lawyers read these cases, "because the 
Even when such rules are in place, preventing lawyers from 
citing (or from being obligated to cite) unpublished opinions, 
such opinions are still researched because it is "prudent" and 
because lawyers believe that they "indicate how the appellate 
court has ruled in the past and thus might rule in the future. "550 
In addition to this cultural conception of precedent, which 
lawyers believe in despite non-precedent rules, lawyers are 
aware pragmatically that unpublished decisions continue to have 
some precedential effect despite the rules. Two attorneys from a 
prominent national law firm described the potential benefit this 
way: "[I]t behooves counsel to review unpublished opinions 
because they still may influence a court that reads (or 
remembers deciding) them itself."551 Evidence suggests that 
these lawyers are correct.552 At least one study has found the 
citation of unpublished decisions to be common in the federal 
courts of appeals, often in support of the court's legal 
analysis. 553 Such use is not surprising given that judges both 
read and consider unpublished opinions, according to the White 
547. Working Papers, supra n. 314, at 78 (showing that nineteen percent reported 
reviewing either "most or all" or "most or all in one or more areas of the law"). 
548. /d. (indicating that forty percent reported reviewing unpublished cases that come up 
during their research and another four percent reported reading only that subset of those 
that arise out of the districts in which they practice). 
549. Robel, Practice of Precedent, supra n. 5, at 406 (2002) (citing Katsh & Chachkes, 
supra n. 338). 
550. /d. 
551. Katsh & Chachkes, supra n. 338, at 302. 
552. See Hannon, supra n. 296, at 235 (tbl. 6) (noting courts' citations to their own 
unpublished opinions). See also Johns v. State, 35 P.3d 53, 65 (Alaska App. 2001) 
(Mannheimer, J ., concurring) (noting the routine usage of unpublished opinions by 
Alaska's lower courts). 
553. See Hannon, supra n. 296, at 235 (tbl. 6). 
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Commission survey.554 For instance, over one quarter of 
appellate judges responded that they review all unpublished 
decisions of their circuits either before or soon after they are 
issued, and that number is fifty percent or higher in four 
circuits.555 Similarly, one fifth of district court judges reported 
reviewing all unpublished decisions in their circuits.556 These 
numbers indicate that far from regarding them as easy and easily 
forgettable opinions, both appellate and district judges are taking 
time either crafting or reviewing the content of these opinions. 
This again makes sense, given that roughly a third of district 
court judges expressed concern that some area of the law in their 
circuits was inconsistent or difficult to know, a problem which 
over half ascribed, at least in . part, to inconsistency between 
published and unpublished opinions or a lack of circuit decisions 
on point.557 
Even prior to Anastasoff, federal courts and lawyers 
practicing before them found some value in unpublished 
opinions. Dean Robel summarizes this behavior aptly: 
Large numbers of participants in the federal appellate 
system, including judges, use unpublished opinions in ways 
not contemplated by the publication plans, although 
completely consistent with common-law understandings of 
practice surrounding precedent. 558 
While the benefits and contours of the continued adherence to a 
common law understanding of precedent can be argued 
normatively, the fact that such adherence is firmly embedded, so 
firmly embedded that it overrides in many respects rule-based 
proscriptions against following it, seems beyond dispute. 
554. Working Papers, supra n. 314, at 15, 49 (including survey data for, respectively, 
appellate and trial judges). 
555. See id. at 15 (indicating that twenty-seven percent so reported, and that the Fourth, 
Seventh, D.C., and Federal Circuits are at or over the fifty percent mark). 
556. See id. at 49 (noting that twenty percent so reported). 
557. See id. at 48 (indicating that thirty-seven percent indicated some area of circuit law 
as "inconsistent or difficult to know," and that twenty-three percent identified the cause as 
inconsistency between published and unpublished opinions, while twenty-nine percent 
identified the cause as a lack of circuit decisions on point). The reader should note that 
these responses were not mutually exclusive, and that a respondent who was so inclined 
could choose several responses to this survey question. 
558. Robel, Practice of Precedent, supra n. 5, at 414. 
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More recently, two important surveys were undertaken as 
part of the federal rulemaking process that eventually resulted in 
Rule 32.1. In 2004, the proposed rule was well on its way to 
being approved, but the Judicial Conference's Standing 
Committee (the last stop before submission to the Supreme 
Court for approval) decided to have the issue studied further by 
the Federal Judicial Center and the Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts.559 
The FJC study surveyed all active and senior circuit judges 
and a random selection of attorneys who had appeared in recent 
federal cases,560 and corroborated some of the White 
Commission's findings. For example, forty-four percent of 
judges in circuits that allowed citation said they found citations 
to unpublished decisions helpful "occasionally," "often,'' or 
"very often."561 Moreover, thirty percent of those judges noted 
that unpublished opinions are "occasionally," "often," or "very 
often" inconsistent with published precedent. 562 These numbers 
support the contention that decisions rendered in unpublished 
opinions are neither routine nor easily discarded. They are, 
however, very much in use already in the federal courts of 
appeals. The FJC's survey of attorneys revealed that attorneys 
research unpublished opinions, even when they cannot cite 
them, and that attorneys fre~uently find unpublished decisions 
that would aid their cases.56 In addition, the study found that 
attorneys reported, on average, that permitting citation would 
have "no appreciable impact" on their workload. 564 
The AO study examined the nine circuits that then 
permitted citation of unpublished opinions in some forn1 and 
found that allowing citation to unpublished decisions did not 
increase the courts' workload or the disposition time of cases 
before the courts.565 Like the FJC study, it confirmed that 
559. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little, supra n. 1, at 1453-55. 
560. Reagan et al., supra n. 250, at 3, 15 (noting that response rate was 86°/o for both 
judges and attorneys surveyed). 
561. /d. at 39 (tbl. K). 
562. /d. at 40 (tbl. L). 
563. /d. at 15-17. 
564. /d. at 17. See also id. at 49 (tbl. U). 
565. Schiltz, Citation of Unpublished Opinions, supra n. 1, at 65 (citing John K. Rabiej, 
Chief, R. Comm. Support Off., Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts., Memo. to Advisory Comm. on 
App. R. at 1 (Feb. 24, 2005)). 
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unpublished opinions were being used and valued even before 
the institution of Rule 32.1. 
The Advisory Committee itself heard similar comments 
regarding the use and importance of unpublished opinions. 566 As 
one scholar concluded after reviewing the comments, "[t]he 
evidence is overwhelming that unpublished opinions are indeed 
a valuable source of 'insight and information. "'567 He pointed 
out that 
[f]irst, unpublished opinions are often read .... Second, 
unpublished opinions are often cited by attorneys. . . . 
Third, unpublished opinions are often cited by judges. . . . 
Fourth, there are some areas of the law in which 
unpublished opinions are particularly valuable. . . . Fifth, 
unpublished opinions can be particularly helpful to district 
judges, who so often must exercise discretion in applying 
relatively settled law to an infinite variety of facts. . .. 
Sixth, there is not already "too much law," as some 
opponents of Rule 32.1 claim. 568 
Similar comments regarding not just use, but also legal 
significance, came to light during the Rule 32.1 adoption 
process.569 First, many commentators rejected the idea that a 
court can predict which cases will have precedential value: 
[ o ]nly when a case comes along with arguably comparable 
facts does the precedential relevance of an earlier decision-
with-opinion arise. . . . Lacking omniscience, an appellate 
panel cannot ;redict what may come before its court in 
future days. 57 
Others pointed out that courts often struggle to predict the legal 
significance of cases and often designate as non-precedential 
cases that should be precedential as evidenced by the many 
unpublished decisions that contain dissents, concurrences, and 
566. /d. at 44-49. 
567. /d. at 44 (citing Comm. on Rules of Practice & Proc. of the Jud. Conf. of the U.S., 
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate, Bankruptcy, 
Civil, and Criminal Procedure 33-34 (2003)). 
568. Id. at 443-46 (footnotes omitted). 
569. Id. at 44-47. 
570. Cappalli, supra n. 5, at 773 (quoted in Schiltz, Citation of Unpublished Opinions, 
supra n. 1, at 47 (noting that Professor Cappalli sent this article as an attachment to his 
comment to the Advisory Committee)). 
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reversals.571 For example, one research study found that 
publication decisions, when combined with limited-citation 
rules, do affect the substance of precedential law. 
Unpublished decisions do not reflect routine applications of 
existing law with which all judges would agree. If they did, 
these decisions would not include a noticeable number of 
reversals, dissents, or concurrences, nor would they show 
significant associations between case outcome and judicial 
characteristics. 572 
Other surveys show similar results. Professor Barnett, 
whose work in this area has been prolific, 573 conducted a survey 
of federal public defenders regarding their use of unpublished 
decisions in both permissive and restrictive citation circuits.574 
He found that sixty-seven percent of those polled favored the 
citation of unpublished opinion and found the use of such 
opinions a routine part of existing practice.575 Many of those 
polled indicated that the additional research presented by 
unpublished opinions required no additional effort and that there 
was no disparity of access.576 Indicative of the overall sentiment, 
Barnett noted these two comments from federal public defenders 
regarding the citation of unpublished opinions: "That doesn't 
bother me at all. I always do the research; that's part of my job," 
and ''as an advocate, I always use anything I can."577 
Both scholarly commentary dating back to the enactment of 
limited publication and citation rules and several recent surveys 
and studies indicate that the use of opinions as precedent is too 
fundamental and persistent to be set aside by rule. Three decades 
of circuit rules have been unable to overcome the strong cultural 
commitment to the idea of precedent as inherent in every 
571. Schiltz, Citation of Unpublished Opinions, supra n. 1, at 48. 
572. Merritt & Brudney, supra n. 328, at 120. 
573. See generally e.g. Barnett, supra n. 338; Stephen R. Barnett, In Support of 
Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1: A Reply to Judge Alex Kozinski, 51 
Fed. Law. 32 (Dec. 2004) [hereinafter Kozinski Reply]; Barnett, supra n. 354. 
574. Barnett, supra n. 338, at 1550-51 (analyzing responses of federal judges and federal 
public defenders to questions regarding unpublished opinion usage). 
575. !d. at 1551. 
576. /d. at 1514, 1518, 1519 (reporting that the cases frequently "come up" or "pop up" 
on Westlaw or other commercial services and, as one public defender explained, 
"[r]esearch isn't what it used to be.") 
577. /d. at 1519. 
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decision courts make. The purposes for which the limitations on 
precedential effect were instituted limiting publication and 
limiting citation have fallen away, laying bare a practice 
which, even if it may exist consistent with our Constitution, 
ought not to exist in accordance with our sense of how the legal 
system works. 
3. Ideas for Addressing Volume 
There remains the problem of volume. It is easy to see that 
the increase in the number of filed cases has grossl outstripped 
as Judge Arnold, have argued that the fundamental principle of 
precedent should not to be trumped by pragmatic concerns: "The 
remedy, instead, is to create enough judgeships to handle the 
volume, or, if that is not practical, for each judge to take enough 
time to handle each case. If this means that backlogs will grow, 
the price must still be paid."579 Others have argued that the issue 
of volume alone is not persuasive.580 
Nevertheless, at least three potential solutions take the 
volume-based arguments made by the opponents of full 
precedential status at face value. To fully explore the costs and 
benefits of each is beyond the scope of this article, and this list is 
by no means exhaustive. 
a. Expand the Judiciary 
First, the federal judiciary could be expanded. This 
expansion an increase in federal judgeships is not a novel 
suggestion. It is both the obvious response to the suggestion that 
there are too few judges to do the work of the courts and a 
578. See White Commission Report, supra n. 544, at 14 (tbl. 2-3, "Authorized District 
and Circuit Judgeships and Filings per Judgeship") (showing increase in filings per 
appellate judge from forty-four to 300 between 1892 and 1997). 
579. AnastasofJ, 223 F.3d at 904. 
580. Robel, Practice of Precedent, supra n. 5, at 415 (posing this thought experiment: 
"To see why the argument from case load is unpersuasive, take it seriously. Imagine that 
courts continue deciding cases in exactly the same way they are deciding them now, giving 
to each case exactly the attention it now gets, and writing exactly what they now write, no 
more and no less. Next imagine that the only change is to the rules that govern what 
lawyers can do with those opinions. What would be lost in abandoning limitations on 
citation?'' (footnote omitted)). 
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recommendation of the Hruska Commission in 1975: 
[t]he creation of additional appellate judgeships is the only 
method of accommodating mounting caseloads without 
introducing undesirable structural change or impairing the 
appellate process. Accordingly, the Commission 
recommends that Congress create new appellate judgeships 
wherever caseloads require them.581 
Such a response, however, is not without its costs, including, for 
example, added judicial pay, added administrative costs, and 
perhaps even court restructuring. Still, as the most 
straightforward method of dealing with the issue of volume, it 
should be considered further. 
b. Encourage Streamlined Opinions 
Second, opinion writing in cases designated as unpublished 
can remain streamlined._ A short opinion format more detailed 
than the simple "affirmed," but far shorter than the typical multi-
page unpublished opinion is likely to supply sufficient critical 
information to satisfy both the parties in the case at bar and later 
litigants. Many presently unpublished opinions are written in 
this fashion and are workable. 582 Once judges know that these 
opinions will now be citeable in wake of Rule 32.1; it seems 
likely that some standardization or development of short 
opinions will occur regardless of the precedent issue. And it 
bears noting that the use of short opinions is not a novel 
proposal: 
. . [S]hort opinions ought to be utilized for the eighty percent 
of appeals now being archived as non-precedential. Should 
a policy reversal occur and appellate judges begin to treat 
all appeals as precedential, no judicial retraining would be 
necessary. Nor would retraining be necessary under a 
system where brief, published explanations are required.583 
581. Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System Structure and 
Internal Procedures, Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195, 201 (1975) (This 
Commission was dubbed the "Hruska Commission" after its chairrnan, Sen. Roman L. 
Hruska.) 
582. Bamett, Kozinski Reply, supra n. 573, at 33 (pointing out that "[o]ne need only 
page through the Federal Appendix, that oxymoronic publisher of 'unpublished' opinions, 
to see that the opinions are serviceable and in no way beyond the realm of citabilityn). 
583. Cappalli, supra n. 5, at 796. 
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Advocates of keeping unpublished decisions non-citeable 
and non-precedential suggest that unpublished decisions are the 
easy cases, which do nothing more than apply well-settled law 
to new facts in a manner that does not meaningfully expand the 
law.584 If that is so, then it should be straightforward to dispose 
of such a case in a one-to-two paragraph opinion setting forth 
the governing authority, the facts of this case that bring it within 
that authority, and the result. What matters in such decisions is 
what the court does and not what the court says it is doing:585 
[T]he true content of law is known not by the verbal rule 
formulations but by the application of those verbal 
fortnulations to specific settings. Astute lawyers look for 
cases analogous to theirs decided under abstract rule 
fortnulations; they search for on point precedents. In sum, 
the actual scope of a doctrinal fortnulation is leam.ed 
through its applications and not through the words chosen 
h d . 586 to express t e octnne. 
A long and carefully crafted opinion seems unnecessary in this 
context. 
c. Restrict the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts of Appeals 
Third, the federal courts' jurisdiction could be restricted in 
some fashion. Congress could restrict the federal courts' 
jurisdiction either by making certain appeals discretionary or by 
limiting the courts' subject matter jurisdiction. These are 
extreme solutions, both, but either would serve to address the 
584. See Schiltz, Citation of Unpublished Opinions, supra n. 1, at 32 (citing StephenS. 
Trott, J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the 9th Cir., Letter to Peter G. McCabe, Secy., Comm. on R. 
ofPrac. & Procedure 1 (Jan. 8, 2004)). 
585. See e.g. Barnett, Kozinski Reply, supra n. 573, at 32 (pointing out that "law is not 
what judges say, but what they decide"); Cappalli, supra n. 5, at 772-79 ("It is sound 
practice for appellate courts to estimate the rules they craft to decide the case .... Still, it is 
only an estimate because the power to deterrnine the holding of a judicial precedent resides 
in future judges applying it"); Boggs & Brooks, supra n. 288, at 17 (acknowledging that 
"[t]o the common lawyer, every decision of every court is a precedent; ... [and] "it is the 
decision not the opinion that constitutes the law"). 
586. Cappalli, supra n. 5, at 768-69; accord Black v. Cutter Labs., 351 U.S. 292, 297-98 
(1956) (noting that an appeal is a review of a judgment, not of an opinion, and that 
precedent-applying courts have not only the power but a duty "to look beyond the broad 
sweep of the language and detennine for ... [themselves] precisely the ground on which 
the judgment rests"). 
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volume issue. More creative and drastic solutions likely exist. 
For example, two appellate judges, in response to the White 
Commission survey, proposed the abolition of the existing 
federal courts of appeals in favor of a single national court of 
appeals. Such a system would help to equalize judicial caseloads 
between Judges and promote uniform national appellate 
decisions. 87 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Whether by constitutional case decision or by the adoption 
of a new Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure, the practice of 
issuing non-precedential opinions should be ended. Failure to 
recognize every decision as precedential represents and 
perpetuates a serious problem in our judicial system because the 
practice conflicts with both our constitutional and community 
values. 
Evidence suggests that unpublished opinions are already 
published. They have long been researched despite the rules 
against their citation, and they are now fully citeable under Rule 
32.1. Unpublished decisions are already being published, 
researched, and cited because they are perceived to have 
precedential value within our legal system. This value should be 
recognized rather than denied. 
The Supreme Court has aptly cautioned in another context 
that "[l]iberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt."588 
Yet for over three decades, the federal courts' policy of creating 
"non-precedential precedents"589 has increasingly fostered a 
jurisprudence of doubt. After three decades of limiting the 
publication, citation, and precedential effect of their opinions, 
fe·deral courts are still carefully avoiding the "morass of 
jurisprudence"590 involved in closely examining the precedential 
587. See Working Papers, supra n. 314, at 31, 34 (reporting an opinion expressed in 
some detail by a judge of the Third Circuit and echoed much more tersely by a judge of the 
Seventh Circuit). This potential solution is mentioned not to promote it, but only to suggest 
by example that other ideas for dealing with the issue of volume are out there. 
588. Planned Parenthood ofS.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 843 (1992). 
589. See Reynolds & Richman, No-Citation Rules, supra n. S, at 1167 (quoting 
testimony of Seventh Circuit Judge Robert Sprecher before the Commission on Revision of 
the Federal Court Appellate System). 
590. Standards for Publication, supra n. 4, at 20. 
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status of unpublished opinions. However, the winds have 
changed. 
The limitation of publication now exists in name only. The 
limitation of citation has been removed by Rule 32.1. The 
limitation on full precedential status for all decisions of the 
federal courts of appeals, initially instituted to help realize the 
gains believed to flow from the other two limitations, is the last 
remaining vestige of a flawed and failed experiment. The 
practice of deciding ex ante which cases join the body of 
precedent and which do not should be abandoned. Both the 
dictates of American constitutional law and the traditions of the 
American legal community require it. 
